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SUMMARY
This thesis attempts to test the hypothesis that since IASs were not drafted so as to 
deal with the specifities of Islamic banks, the adoption of IASs by Islamic banks had 
render the financial statements of these banks non-compaiable. To test this 
hypothesis, this thesis examines some of the accounting practices of Islamic banks.
As a first step the thesis conducted a pilot survey on the accounting practices of some 
Islamic banks in order to determine the similarities, differences and level of disclosure 
among Islamic banks operating in different countries and which are subject to 
different accounting regulations.
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the accounting differences and level of 
disclosuie that existed among Islamic banks. The thesis conducted case studies on 
two of the Islamic banks operating in Balirain.
Based on the findings of the two case studies, the thesis supports the research 
hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
Islamic banks are a new type of (religious) business organisations that were 
established primaiily to meet the needs of those who adhere to their faith in their 
financial transactions. It is generally believed that Islamic banking staited to take off 
in the aftennath of the boom in the oil prices in 1973-1974 (Wilson 1997, Moore, 
1997). So far, in Iran, Sudan and, to some extent, Pakistan the whole banking system 
has been transformed to comply with Islamic Shari 'a. The growth of this industry has 
been remarkable. It is reported that in 1997 the total assets of the 176 Islamic 
financial institutions reached US$147 billion
Islamic banks are truly different from non-Islamic banks in that financial products 
involving riba are strictly avoided. As an alternative to the receipt and payment of 
riba, which is stiictly prohibited, inter alia, by the Shari ‘a, Islamic banks use the 
Mudaraba financial instrument to mobilise funds in investment accounts. Mudaraba 
is a profit shaiing contract (described in detail later on) derived from the Shari 'a. It 
includes detailed accounting rules that are also derived from Islamic jurisprudence 
and explicitly takes into consideration the economic welfaie of the fund provider 
(Karim, 1996).
In the Mudaraba contract, the Islamic bank acts as Mudarib (entrepreneui*), and 
cannot guarantee the capital of Investment Account Holders (I AH). In case of loss 
that is not due to negligence or misconduct, the lAH will share in the loss in 
proportion to their capital. Such Investment Accounts did not exist in the 
conventional banks and, hence were not addressed by either accounting standard 
setters or banking supervisors.
(1) The International Association o f  Islamic Banks (1997).
(2) Riba is translated strictly as usury, but interpreted by modern Islamic scholars as being equivalent to interest (see Mallat, 
1988; Saleh, 1992; Taylor and Evans, (1987).
In a way, these investment products offered by Islamic banks are similar to those of 
mutual funds (un-guaranteed funds). Both institutions manage the funds on behalf of 
their investors, and in case of loss not due to negligence, the investors will bear such 
loss. On the other hand, an Islamic bank is entitled to receive its Mudarib share of 
profits only when the lAH fimds generate profits; in contrast, fund managers receive 
typically their management fee based on the net assets value (NAV) and regardless 
whether the fimds generate profits or not.
Quoting a 1997 lASC Insight Report, Karim (1999) state tliat most of the countries in 
which Islamic banks operate either look directly to International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) as their national standards or develop national standards based 
primarily on IAS. These countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Sudan etc. Malaysia 
develops its own national standards, which are based primarily on IAS. Despite the 
adoption of IAS by Islamic banks in the prepar ation of their financial statements 
major differences continued to exist among them that rendered these financial 
statements non-comparable.
The fact that Islamic banks accepts funds on profit sharing basis, raises accounting 
issues, in particular regar ding the recognition of profits and their allocation between 
shareholders and lAH, which are not addressed by accounting standards (whether 
national or international) drawn up with conventional financial institutions in mind. 
This has ar guably given rise to a lack of effective accounting regulation of Islamic 
banks, with consequences as such outlined below.
1.2 PROBLEMS OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING
Adopting the IAS for Islamic banks gave them a wide range of options to use 
accounting treatments which would meet their individual objectives. Such accounting 
differences relate to measur ement and disclosur e policies adopted by Islamic banks, 
as well as the presentation of their financial statements. For example, some Islamic 
banks use the front-end loading in recognising their profits from Murabaha 
(instalment sale) transactions; other banks use the accrual basis by dividing the profits 
over the period of the instalments.
In addition, some banks treat their investments inMw^/zaraAa (pailnership or joint 
venture) financing as long term investments, while others treat them as an investment 
in associated company by applying the equity metliod. {Murabaha and Musharaka 
are explained in more detail in chapter 3).
Differences were noted in the accoimting policies relating to real-estate held for 
investment. Some banks value their real-estate by using the historical cost method 
with provision for any decline (other than temporary) in value, other Islamic banks 
use the lower of cost and mai'ket price. Also there are otlier Islamic banks which re­
appraise their real-estate at market value investments, and any excess of appraised 
value over cost is allocated between lAH and shareholders.
On the liability side, accounting differences were also noted in the presentation of 
I AH on the banks’ balance sheet. Some Islamic banks present their lAH as a liability 
in the liability section of the balance sheet. Other Islamic banks reflect lAH as funds 
under management by reflecting them as off-balance sheet item.
Fur thermore, none of the Islamic banks disclose their Mudarib share of profit or their 
accounting policies on profit allocation between shareholders and lAH.
The above differences suggest that the existing framework for accounting regulation 
in adopting IAS for Islamic banks did not achieve accoimting harmonisation among 
them mainly because IAS were not prepared to cater for such institutions.
1.3 THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
This thesis attempts to test the hypothesis that because IASs were not drafted so as to 
deal with the specificities of Islamic banks, the adoption of IASs by Islamic banks had 
neither prevented their financial statements being non-comparable in important ways 
nor led to an acceptable level of disclosur e. To test this hypothesis, this thesis 
examines and analyses certain accoimting practices of Islamic banks in Bahrain 
during the early to mid 1990s, with a view to determining the degree of comparability 
of their financial statements, and the extent to which the accounting standards to 
which some of them were subject were effective fiom the standpoint of the
compai'ability of their financial statements and of adequate disclosure. The 
accounting standards in question were the IAS issued by the International Accounting 
Standard Committee (lASC).
The evidence emerging from the case studies that were carried out supports the 
research hypothesis.
1.4 EMERGENCE OF AAOIFI
Because IAS or other accounting standards did not cater for Islamic banks, Islamic 
banks realised the importance of establishing a self regulatory body which would be 
responsible for issuing accounting standards that consider the natur e of Islamic banks.
Therefore, In 1991, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI), a private-sector standard-setting body, was established in 
Bahrain to promulgate accounting standards for Islamic financial institutions based on 
Shari‘a precepts. AAOIFI has so far issued 18 standards (12 accounting, 5 auditing, 
and one code of ethics). Islamic banks operating in Bahrain and Sudan are required 
by their supervisory authorities to adhere to AAOIFFs accounting standards. In 
addition, international rating agencies have started to take into consideration 
AAOIFFs standards in rating Islamic banks (Karim, 1999).
The thesis examines the ways in which AAOIFFs standards address the loopholes 
resulting from the reliance on IASs for the accounting regulation of Islamic banks.
The thesis is structured as follows:
Part I provides background and review of literature. It includes three chapters. 
Chapter two reviews the literature on the regulation of financial reporting. Chapter 
three examines the general principles of commercial transactions in Islam. Chapter 
four discusses the accounting issues that relate to concepts and practices in Islamic 
banking.
Part II addresses the research objectives, methodology and the case studies canied 
out. This part includes tlnee chapters. Chapter five discusses the research objectives 
and methodology. In chapter six and seven the case study of Ahmed Bank and the 
case study of Mohammed Bank are presented respectively.
In part III the analysis and conclusions are presented. This part comprises two 
chapters. In chapter eight, the comparison, analysis and conclusions of the case 
studies are discussed. The overall conclusions of the thesis are stated in chapter nine.
CHAPTER 2 
THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL REPORTING
This chapter discusses the arguments for and against accoimting regulation. It is an 
intr oduction in which the resear cher highlights the development of accounting regulation 
in the USA and the UK and the establishment of the lASC (International Accounting 
Standards Committee). Then, it analyses the arguments for and against regulating 
financial reporting. It ends by noting the differences between measurement standards and 
disclosure standards. Thus, the chapter is divided into five main sections:
1. The History of Accounting Regulation.
2. Arguments for Accounting Regulation.
3. Arguments against Accoimting Regulation.
4. The Differences between Disclosure Regulation and Measmernent Regulation.
5. Conclusions
2.1 THE HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING REGULATION
Arrangements for accounting regulation differ between coimtries. The possibilities 
cover a wide spectrum. They range fiom a system that depends mainly on statute, for 
example in France and Germany, tlirough a balanced mixture of statutory and self- 
regulatory approaches (Australia and Canada), to regulation that relies mainly on self­
regulation by the accoimting profession or more precisely, by "tire business and financial 
community" (Armstrong in FASB, 1976). The United Kingdom, especially prior to the 
Companies Act of 1981 (Consolidated in the 1985 Act, which enacted the Fourth 
Directive of the European Community into British Law), and tire United States provide 
examples of this last system (Bromwich, 1992).
Taylor & Turley (1986, p. 3) stated that “there ar*e four* broad approaches to regulatiorr. 
The first is regulation by the accounting profession thr ough corrvention, precedent and 
training. This is potentially the most informal and least stringent mearrs of regulation. A 
second approach is regulation by private sector regulatory institutions. Such institutiorrs
may be associated with the accountancy profession (e.g. the Accounting Standards 
Committee (ASC), or may exert an influence over accounting as part of their other 
activities (e.g. the Stock Exchange). The third approach involves public sector regulation. 
This can be through governmental bodies (e.g. the Depar tment of Trade in the UK or the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the USA) or through company law. 
Four thly, a mixed system involving aspects of some or all of the other tlnee approaches 
may be adopted.”
2.1.1 Accounting Regulation in the United States
Prior to 1936, financial accounting and reporting was dominated by a laissez faire attitude 
(Hendriksen, 1977, p. 76), in which companies and auditors were left to decide upon 
appropriate financial accounting practices for themselves. This period was characterized 
by much disparity amongst companies in their reporting practices, and relatively few 
important items were disclosed (Gaa, 1988).
Beginning in the late 1920s, the New York Stock Exchange became interested in the 
quality of the financial disclosures made by listed companies (Zeff, 1972, 1984). By 
1930, after the stock market crash, the Exchange was concerned with both the inadequacy 
of specific firms’ accounting practices, and with the var iety of accounting practices used 
by different corporations.
Later, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established to regulate the 
securities markets under the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. These statutes gave the 
SEC a broad statutory power over accounting and auditing practices. The main concern 
of the SEC was to reduce the variety of accepted accounting principles (Gaa, 1988). The 
SEC is empowered to specify the content of financial reporls submitted to it imder 
various acts. The SEC Coimnissioners and Chief Accountants have been reluctant to go 
beyond this statutory requirement, by having the SEC itself promulgating financial 
reporting standar ds for SEC regulated firms. However, while the decision of the SEC not 
to involve itself in the standard setting process still stands, it has the legal power to 
intervene should it choose to.
The accounting profession and the business community were eager to keep all aspects of 
financial accounting and reporting under their control. The result was that in 1938 the 
SEC effectively delegated the responsibility for standar dization to the Committee on 
Accounting Procedure (CAP), which was established by the professional organization of 
CPAs (the American Institute of Accountants, later renamed the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants - AICPA). In Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 4, it 
announced that reports filed with the SEC would be presumed to be misleading or 
inaccurate (and therefore subject to regulatory sanctions) unless the accounting principles 
used have “substantial authoritative support” or ar e the subject of a specific ruling by the 
SEC. In so doing, therefore, the SEC largely delegated the task of recommending 
prefeiTed accounting practices to the accounting profession itself (Hendriksen, 1977; p. 
69; Zeff, 1972).
The CAP had two objectives: to “naiTow down the range of choices in accounting 
procedures”, and to establish a more carefully selected and better integrated body of 
accounting principles or practices This tendency toward uniformity and
systematization has persisted to the present day (Gaa, 1988).
The transfer of authority in 1959 fi:om the CAP to the Accounting Principles Board 
(APB) was essentially no more than a transfer from one senior cormnittee of the AICPA 
to another, with a change of name but little change of substance. Both bodies consisted 
exclusively of members of the AICPA, who therefore had to be CPAs, mostly iii public 
practice. In summary, the activities of the CAP and APB may be regar ded as having been 
part of the self-regulatory aspect of a professional group. At the same time (as the SEC’s 
actions over time have consistently indicated) it has also been accepted that the profession 
should retain this responsibility only as long as its actions are regarded by non­
professionals as being “in the public interest” (Gaa, 1988).
(3) 1939 Midyear Report o f  the CAP, Zeff, 1972, p. 137.
When the setting of accounting standards was examined in 1971-1972 by the AICPA’s 
study on Establishment of Accounting Principles (the Wheat Committee), these 
characteristics of the APB were seen as weaknesses, and they led the committee to 
propose a substantially different kind of body to replace the Board. The Wheat 
Committee reported in March 1972, its proposals were quickly approved by the Council 
of the AICPA, and the new body that the committee had proposed, to be called the 
Financial Accoimting Standards Board (FASB), came into being on July 1, 1973 
(Solomons, 1986).
The Wlieat committee surmned up its views in these words “It may at some time become 
clear beyond question that standard-setting caimot be left in private hands. But that time 
is not yet. Until it is shown without doubt that this task must be entrusted to government, 
we strongly prefer to keep it where it is. There are two prerequisites for the success of 
such an undertaking in the private sector. These are the existence of a tradition of 
standar d setting and the participation, at the core of the process, of a well-organized 
profession anxious to make the process work. In the field of accoimting, these two 
prerequisites are satisfied” (Solomons, 1986).
Zeff (1995, p. 56) argued that “the authorization given to the FASB by the SEC should 
not lead to the conclusion that the SEC has been a passive bystander, since the SEC has 
kept a close watch over the issues, agendas, priorities, and tentative positions of the 
standar d setter and has not been reluctant to intervene.”
The next section highlights the role of the regulatory bodies in the UK.
2.1,2 Accounting Regulation in the United Kingdom
In the UK throughout the nineteenth century there were no mandatory accounting and 
audit regulations in the Companies Acts, notwithstanding the fact that railways, banks and 
public utilities were subject to much greater regulation (Parker, 1990). During the 
twentieth century, the rules in the Acts have greatly increased in quantity and complexity. 
Nobes and Parker (1991) claimed that a notable landmark in the accounting regulations is
the introduction of the Companies Act 1947 (consolidated as the 1948 Act), which made 
group accounts compulsory, introduced many disclosure requirements and required 
directors to prepare financial statements which were 'true and fair’. The 1948 Act 
remained the principal Act for around forty year s but was amended by a series of Acts in 
1967, 1976, and 1981, All these acts were consolidated hi the 1985 Act. The accounting 
and auditing provisions of the Act were amended and restated by the Companies Act 
1989, in which the seventh and eighth Directives of the EC were incorporated.
It was not until late 1969 that the accoimting profession in the UK star ted to play a role in 
developing consistent accounting principles. Taylor and Turiey (1986) reported that in 
December 1969, The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) 
took the initiative and published a Statement o f Intent on Accounting Standards 
1970’s. In January 1970, The Accounting Standards Steering Committee (ASSC) was 
created to develop definitive standards of financial reporting. To begin with, the ASSC 
was a committee of the ICAEW alone, but its representatives as a professional body grew 
quickly by the joining of other accounting professional bodies. In February 1976 the 
ASSC was reconstituted and the word‘steering’ was dropped from the title to leave the 
Accounting Standards Committee (ASC).
There was much dissatisfaction with the ASC as regar ds its slow approach to developing 
accounting standards. Accounting Standards Committee standards were eligible for 
issuance based on a two-thirds vote of its 21 members. However, the ASC had to obtain 
the approval of the six member bodies of the Consultative Committee of Accountancy 
Bodies (CCAB) before a standar d could be issued. The ASC was also criticized for 
failure to use a conceptual firamework and for the lack of compliance by many companies 
with its standards (Collins & Bloom, 1997).
Although the ASC had produced twenty-five standards by 1991 there was also criticism 
that it was not adequately staffed, that it had no ground plan and that it was reactive rather 
than proactive. Therefore, a fairly radical reform of the standar d-setting process was 
introduced in 1990, following a report sponsored by the accountancy profession (The 
Dearing Report, 1988) which recommended the setting up of the Accounting Standards
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Board (ASB), with a salaried staff comprising accountants responsible for issuing 
standards (Elliott & Elliott, 1993). The Accounting Standards Board (ASB) was 
established in the United Kingdom in 1990, replacing the ASC. An independent 
Financial Reporting Council oversees the ASB. Unlike the ASC with its dependence on 
the CCAB, the ASB is authorized to issue its standards directly rather than in consultation 
with other bodies (Collins & Bloom, 1997).
The Companies Act 1989, as part of this process of setting up a more authoritative 
standard-setting body in the United Kingdom, did place a duty on corporate directors to 
follow accounting standards. This was the first mention of accounting standards in 
United Kingdom legislation. Both the profession and the Dearing Committee wanted a 
stronger statutory backing to be given to accounting standards. Bromwich (1992) claims 
that “the government refused to give additional authority on the groimds that it would 
amount to giving statutory backing to accounting standar ds setting in UK and attenuating 
the desired self-regulatory character of the standar d setting.”
The degree of intervention by the accounting profession in accounting regulation is a 
notable feature in countries like the US, UK, Canada and Australia, as compared to 
continental European countries. However, tire str ength of the profession varies fiom 
country to coimtry (Nobes & Parker, 1991).
Ar cher and Karim (1997, p. 103) claim that “self-regulation is prevalent in the English- 
speaking countries with their tradition of common law and corresponding lack of a 
comprehensive commercial code, and less prevalent in the coimtries of Continental 
Europe where comprehensive commercial codes and ‘accounting law’ are the norm. In 
the case of the United Kingdom, France, The Netherlands, and the other member states of 
the European Union, the broad framework of accounting law is governed by the various 
Accounting Directives of the EU Commissions, which ar e enacted into national law.”
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While the United States has many accounting standards tightly written in a legalistic style, 
the traditional approach in tlie United Kingdom has been to have far* fewer written 
standards, and even these, by and large, are guidelines rather than rigid rules (Collins & 
Bloom, 1997).
The US and UK accoimting regulations aie either directly or indirectly influenced by their 
respective legal systems and governmental enforcement mechanisms. The next section 
highlights the role of the lASC in regulating accounting standaids in a way which does 
not have legal backing.
2.1.3 The Establishment of the International Accounting Standards Committee 
(lASC)
For the last twenty five years, the lASC (which was established in 1973), has been 
developing accounting standards with the objective of working “generally for the 
improvement and harmonization of regulations, accoimting standaids and procedures 
relating to the presentation of financial statements” (lASC, 1998). In the late 1980s, the 
lASC began a project to reduce the number of options within its standards. This was part 
of a major campaign to increase the adoption of IAS (International Accounting Standards) 
internationally, especially for securities listing purposes. Nevertheless, there is probably 
some lASC influence in continental European countries. The most obvious example is in 
Italy, where listed companies ar e required to follow IAS in the absence of a relevant 
national standar d (Nobes & Parker, 1991). The governments of France and Germany ar e 
also considering draft laws which would allow group accounts to use certain ‘foreign’ 
accounting rules, perhaps IAS, US r*ules, or both (Nobes, 1996).
The lASC can be commended for its part in the effort to reduce the number of differences 
between national accounting standards. Although differences between national 
accounting standards remain, there is greater compar ability between the different national 
sets of accounting standards. In July 1995, in order to enliance its global role, the lASC 
reached an agreement with IOSCO (The International Organization of Securities 
Commissions), in which it was decided that, if the I ASC completed a set of high-quality 
accounting standards that covered a number of key areas, IOSCO would consider
12
recommending those ‘core standards’ for endorsement by its members for cross-border 
filings (Bloomer, 1997),
For most cross-border purposes, the users of accounting data must live with these
accounting differences. This leads to expense in various ways (lASC, 1996):
■ Investors, lenders, etc., steer clear* of some profitable investments because they do 
not understand or trust the financial data relating to them.
■ Some investors, lenders, etc., do not realise the nature of the accounting differences, 
so they make the wrong financial decisions.
■ Other investors, lenders, etc., spend time and money adjusting accounting data so 
that it can be used compar ably across borders.
Gray and Maunders (1980) suggested that the divergence in accounting methods was
caused by the orientation of different groups of users. For* example, in the UK and the 
USA financial reporting is oriented toward the equity investors who are mainly interested 
in the profits of the fir*m, whereas the orientation in France and Ger*many is towards the 
creditors, and the interest is therefore in the ability of the firm to meet its obligations, 
including its interest payments.
Today there is increasing interest in international accounting standards (IAS). Some are 
interested because greater acceptance of international accounting standards will lead to 
pres8ur*e in the local countr*y to enhance the quality of local financial reporting. Others 
are interested because the direction of the development of international accounting 
standards is fundamentally different from the type of standards currently used locally. 
The fact is that by enhancing the quality of international accounting standar*ds, there will 
be a greater degree of interest in those standar ds around the world (Wyatt, 1997).
The lASC has no legal power to enforce its standards and therefore it relies on its 
members “who are members of the International Federation of Accountants” to support 
its standards and to use their best endeavour s to ensur e that published financial statements
13
comply with the standai'ds; to ensui'e that auditors enforce them; and persuade 
governments, stock exchanges and other bodies to back the standards (lASC, 1983),
As indicated above, in practice this means that financial reporting is a regulated activity, 
at least partially. However, there are some arguments against accounting regulation. 
Hence, the next section of tliis chapter will analyse the arguments for and against the 
regulation of financial reporting.
2.2 THE ARGUMENTS FOR ACCOUNTING REGULATION
2.2.1 Monopoly Control of Information by Management
Quoted in Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 159) Leftwich (1980) argued that “corporate 
accounting reports ar e often claimed to be the main source of information available to 
investors, and, as consequence, it is argued that managers are able to manipulate stock 
prices to their own advantage. In an efficient market, the stock price adjustment to an 
accomiting report is unbiased and, therefore, managers cannot systematically mislead the 
stock market.” It is to be noted that “efficient market” refers in this context to “semi­
strong form efficiency” like that of US and UK markets where only the publicly available 
information are reflected in the securities prices and not the private information. Fama 
(1970) delineated tlu*ee major forms of market efficiency, weak, semi-strong, and strong:
i) The mar ket is efficient in the weak form if prices fully reflect information regar ding the 
past sequences of prices. Tliis form of market efficiency has obvious implications for 
technical analysis, and it includes the random walk theory of stock prices. The 
implications for accounting for marketable equity securities ar e discussed in Beaver 
(1971, 1973).
ii) The market is efficient in the semi-strong form if prices fully reflect all publicly
available information, including financial statement data. Trading strategies based 
upon published financial statement data will not lead to abnormal returns.
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Hi) The market is efficient in the strong foim if prices fully reflect all information, 
including inside information. Hence, even having access to non-published inside 
information will not lead to strategies promising abnormal expected retuins.
Proponents of regulation claimed that if the management has more information in an 
efficient market than is available via other souices, but does not provide the information 
to the market, it can be argued that die market cannot discriminate between efficient and 
less efficient firms as accurately as it otherwise might. Hence, governmentally enforced 
disclosme improves the ability of the capital market to discriminate between firms and to 
allocate capital appropriately (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).
According to Wolk et al (1992, pp. 81-82) “Witli accounting regulation, the argument is 
that it is better to force mandatory reporting rather than to have individuals competing to 
buy information privately and at monopolistic prices. In other words, mandatory public 
disclosure is a cost-effective method of getting firm-specific mformation to those 
demanding it. It is a waste of social resources for everyone to be buying the same private 
information about firms. The production costs of mandatory reporting requirements may 
be quite small since most of the basic information is produced as a by-product of internal 
accounting systems. If marginal information production costs are low, then the social 
costs associated with mandatory financial reporting requirements may be small.”
Beaver (1989, pp. 186-187) argued that “the argument for disclosure regulation is that 
management has mcentives to suppress unfavourable information. While there may be a 
general awareness of this potential among investors, investors would not know 
specifically the natur e of the suppressed information. As a result, investors will be unable 
to distinguish quality differences among common stocks to the same extent they would 
under fuller disclosure. Hence, security prices will not fully reflect quality differences 
among stocks, and there will uncertainty about the quality of each stock. There may be a 
tendency for lower-quality stocks to be selling at a higher price than would prevail under 
fuller disclosure and conversely for the higher-quality stocks. This can lead to a 
phenomenon known as ‘adverse selection’ in which the management (and investors) of 
poorer quality stocks have greater incentives to offer additional shar es for sale than the
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management of higher-quality stocks. The anti-fraud provisions issued by the SEC can 
be viewed as requiring firms to provide disclosme warranties to investors. Presumably, 
the legal liability reduces the incentives of management to suppress unfavomable 
information.”
2.2.2 Uninformed Investors
Lev (1988, p. 6) claimed that “the traditional view, often espoused by policymakers and 
accoimtants, that there is a need to protect the “small” (presmnably miinformed) investor 
was probably derived from genuine concerns about inequities in capital markets. 
However, the call for regulation to redress such inequities was generally phrased in 
vague, naïve and somewhat paternalistic terms suggesting that uninformed investors were 
at the mercy of market insiders. This rather mrconvincing plea for regulation, 
emphasizing fraud as the major hazard to investors, effectively dampened the interest of 
modern accounting and economic researcher in equity issues.” A typical example is Ross 
(1979) quoted in (Lev, 1988, p. 6) dismisses equity considerations in disclosme 
regulation because they are based on such “defenseless investor” ar guments “The equity 
benefits of [disclosme] legislation- as between insiders and out-siders- are more difficult 
to identify. The case for such benefits seems to rest on the traditional view that outsiders 
ar e at the mercy of insiders, and need to be protected from them.”
Lev (1988, p. 7) argued that “iminformed investors can defend themselves by minimizing 
trading with informed investors, that is by buying and holding well-diversified portfolios 
for the long r-un. Alternatively, the uniformed can identify specific groups of insiders, 
such as managers, and prohibit them, by legal or contractual ari'angements, from trading 
in the secmities of their own firms. At the extreme, suspecting gross investors 
asyimnetries, iminformed investors may quite rationally withdraw from the stock market 
altogether. A massive withdrawal of uninformed investors from the mar ket will strip the 
informed of the benefits of their costly-acquired information (thereby decreasing 
incentive for information production), and will deprive the economy of the allocational 
and risk sharing benefits of large and efficient capital markets. Herein, therefore, should 
lie our concern with inequity in capital markets. It stems form the adverse social effects
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brought about by the defensive measures takes by uninformed investors who perceive 
significant inequity.”
Lev (1988) also claimed that the most effective remedy to alleviate the adverse 
consequences of inequity in capital markets is to remove the major source of inequity, 
namely the informational advantage held by informed investors. This advantage could be 
decreased by instituting a policy mandating regular* and timely public disclosure of 
information.
2.2.3 The Alleged Market Failures^ ^^
A market failure exists when the quantity or quality of an item produced in a free market 
differs from the supposed social optimum. The social optimum is the output that 
maximizes some social welfar e function. The optimum is attained only if the prices of 
particular goods equal their social marginal costs. In a private market, individuals 
maximize their own utility and equate their private marginal benefits and costs. If an 
good’s private costs ar e less than its social cost, too much of the good is produced in a 
ftee market, there is over-production of the good. Conversely, if good’s private benefits 
are less than its social benefits, too little of the good is produced there is under-production 
of the good. The 'over-' or 'under-' production is relative to the production level chosen 
by a benevolent, social welfar-e-maximising dictator.
(4) Inequity in capital markets, according to Lev (1988) as inequity o f  opportunity or the existence o f  systematic and significant 
information asymmetries across investors, leads to adverse private and social consequences: high transaction costs, thin markets, 
lower liquidity o f  securities, and in general, decrease gains from trade.
(5) The following analysis o f  the alleged market failures draws heavily on a summary by Leftwich (1980).
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The mai’ket failui’es ai’gument suggests that social welfare can be improved in a Tai*eto' 
sense by government regulation moving the private output closer to the social optimum. 
The ability of the govermnent to increase welfare in a Pareto sense means it can induce an 
output change that makes at least one person better off without making anyone worse off. 
An accounting market failme is alleged to exist because the output of information in 
accoimting reports in the absence of regulation is non-optimal in a Pareto sense. 
Alternatively, an accounting market failure exists because the resource allocation 
resulting from the market for financial information is inequitable, that is, “unfair” to some 
groups or individuals (e.g. Burfon, 1974; Lev, 1988).
2.2.4 The Public Good Problem
The distinguishing feature of a public good is that one person’s consumption of it does 
not reduce the quantity available for others to consume. A traditional example of a public 
good is national defence. By contrast one person’s consumption of a private good does 
reduce the quantity available for others.
The public good attribute of information need not lead to a market failure per se. The 
faihue comes about if the private producers cannot exclude non-pur chasers of the good 
from using it or cannot effectively price-discriminate between purchasers. In the case of 
corporate financial statements, it is claimed that corporate managers carmot exclude non- 
pm'chasers (Gonedes and Dopuch, 1974). Investors who do not hold securities in the firm 
can obtain the information in the firm’s report without paying anything toward the 
information’s production. Because they ar*e not paid for tlie use of information by non­
purchasers (e.g., non-shareholders), corporate managers do not take the value of the 
information to those non-purchasers into accormt when determining the quantity of 
information to produce (private benefits are less than public benefits). Hence, the 
managers “imderproduce” information in the absence of regulation. Thus, tliere is an 
alleged market failure.
2.2.5 The Signalling Problem (Also called the ’Screening’ problem)
A problem arises when one party to a potential transaction has more information than 
another; that is, there is information asymmetry. The problem relates to corporate
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disclosure because corporate managers have more mformation about the value of the 
corporation than do outside investors. Those firms whose share prices are undervalued 
have an incentive to expend additional resowces on providing financial information to 
signal that fact. The remaining, overvalued, firms implicitly signal that fact by not 
providing additional information and the value of their shar e drops to the average value 
for the overvalued group. Now some of those firms’ shar es ar e indeed 'imdervalued' and 
they therefore expend resources to provide additional information. The process continues 
until only the very worst-performing firms do not signal. This principle is known as the 
“signalling hypothesis” to refer to the proposition that signalling motivates corporate 
disclosure, thus mitigating potential market failur e.
Clear ly, the expenditure of resour ces on information in our* corporate example improves 
the allocation of capital and increases output (i.e., the most efficient firms receive more 
capital). However, par t of the expenditur e is related to past performance and may not be 
related to future performance and hence not yield any social benefits. To that extent, 
signalling may cause an over-production of information of doubtful relevance in 
accoimting reports.
2.3 THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST ACCOUNTING REGULATION
2.3.1 Trading of Information in an Efficient Market
In competitive unregulated markets, managers do not ear n an abnormal rate of retur n by 
witliliolding and trading on information, because the manager’s equilibrium 
compensation is reduced by the amount of profits he is expected to earn fiom insider* 
trading (Mamie, 1966). In an efficient market, the firm’s price is such that investors 
outside the firm (fiom whom the managers earn their* insider* trading profits) earn a 
normal rate of return. Thus, the effect of insider* trading is to lower* the firm’s stock price 
without increasing (on average) the manager’s compensation. To the extent that insider* 
trading interferes with the manager’s production/investment and financing decisions, it 
lowers the market value of the firm even fmther (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).
(6) This subsection draws heavily on Watts and Zimmennan, 1986.
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By providing information, managers can persuade the market that they will engage in less 
insider trading, and that they can increase the firm’s market value and, given that their 
compensation depends on the market value, their own welfare. Consequently, managers 
have incentives to voluntarily disclose the information and will do so if the costs of 
disclosm e ar e less than the effect of the disclosme on the value of the firm (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986).
2.3.2 Incentives for Managers to Produce Adequate Information
Taylor and Tmiey (1986) state that opponents of regulation have argued that both the 
suppliers and the consumers of accoimting information experience sufficiently strong 
incentives to trade in information to ensme that tr ading will take place in the absence of 
regulation or compulsion. On the demand side, users bid for information, which is 
relevant to their decisions; while on the supply side, management has strong incentives to 
provide adequate and reliable information in order to attract resomces and to ensme 
beneficial effects on economic indicators such as share prices. Enterprises not providing 
information deemed useful by users, or not conforming to generally accepted standards of 
disclosmes, would not attract or keep resomces.
A second reason for trading in information is provided by the relationship between 
managers and shareholders in enterprises. A number of writers have applied agency 
theory to this relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; 
Leftwich, 1980). They concluded that mutual benefits are received by management and 
shareholders fiom the disclosme of audited financial information. According to an 
agency theory view, management (the agent) possesses superior information about the 
enterprise, and shareholders (the principal) cannot directly observe management 
behaviom*. This asymmetry of information supply creates the problem of ‘moral hazar d’. 
According to Taylor and Tmiey (1986), moral hazard is related to the potential which the 
agent has for engaging in activities which are not in the best interests of the principal, 
such as fiaud or consumption of excessive perquisites. In order to solve the problem of 
moral hazard, the principal may seek to ensme that the agent’s objectives are congruent 
with those of the principal by offering incentive schemes, such as profit sharing or share
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option schemes. Alternatively, the principal may seek information with which to monitor 
the agent’s behaviour. The generation of information is a costly exercise and the agent 
has comparative advantage in its production.
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argued that agents have an interest in providing 
information in order to reduce the cost of monitoring the agent-principal relationship. In 
addition, they will wish to provide such information in order to reduce the principal’s 
reliance on incentive schemes, which may involve the agent in undesirable risk taking. 
For similar* reasons, the agent will favour an external independent audit (Watts, 1977). 
The audit of an agent’s financial report to principals, both actual and potential, provides a 
signal to principals regarding the quality of the agent’s services, and thereby helps to 
distinguish the superior* agent from the inferior*. In the absence of such authenticated 
discr*iminator*y information there is a tendency for* only the services of inferior* agents to 
be traded (Akerlof, 1970).
Wolk et al (1992, p. 78) claimed that “agency theor*y posits a conflict between owners and 
managers that is mitigated to some extent by financial reporting. Routine financial 
r*epor*ting is one means by which owners can monitor employment contracts with their* 
managers.”
2.3.3 Private Contracting Opportunities
Another argument in favour* of unregulated markets for* financial information is the 
presumption that anyone who genuinely desired information about a firm would be able 
to obtain it, even in the event that umegulated markets resulted in less fiee and public 
disclosure. Any party could privately contract for information with the firm itself, with 
the firm’s owners, or* indirectly with information intermediaries, such as stock analysts. If 
information were truly desired beyond that which is publicly available and fiee of charge, 
private individuals would be able to buy the desired information. In this way market 
forces should result in the optimal allocation of resources to the production of 
information. Because of private opportimities for contracting additional information, the 
argument is that regulatory intervention in the form of mandatory disclosure rules 
becomes unnecessary (Wolk et al, 1992).
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2.4 THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DISCLOSURE REGULATION AND 
MEASUREMENT REGULATION
Although it can be inferred from 2.2 above that there are strong justifications for 
accounting regulation, it is important to highlight the differences between disclosure 
regulation and measurement regulation. According to Archer and Karim (1997, p. 101) 
they state that “The objectives of accounting standards ar*e concerned with the amount of 
information disclosed and the formats used to do so (disclosure standar ds), and also with 
the accoimting methods used to calculate the numbers disclosed (measurement standards). 
Measur ement issues comprise those of recognition (e.g., of income) and valuation (e.g., 
of assets).”
Beaver (1989) argued that if the capital market is semi-strong form efficient there is a 
prima facie reason for requiring more disclosure because that will enable the 
intermediaries and analysts to do their job more effectively because they will be provided 
with more information, therefore more information will be reflected in the stock prices. 
That argument does not apply to measur ement regulation, as the measur ement regulation 
is more concerned with the information processing costs of correcting for the effects of 
different accounting principles, e.g. the private costs of different analysts doing it are 
likely to be greater than the cost of making firms comply with measurement standar ds. 
The costs of the firms setting up systems to comply with these standards will arguably, be 
less than tire costs of the users having to cope with heterogeneous information.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
Although the benefits of accounting regulation remain a matter of debate, there are sound 
theoretical reasons in favour* of both disclosure standards and measurement standards. 
Histor*y suggests that, with regard to disclosur e, the signallhig incentive for* the production 
of financial reporting information is insufficient to overcome the tendency to market 
failure. For* example, UK companies did not disclose their* sales turnover figure until 
required to do so by the 1967 Companies Act. The argument that measur ement standards 
permit scale economies in information processing is also persuasive.
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Before discussing the issue of accounting regulation for Islamic banks, it is necessary to 
review the characteristics of the transactions and financial instruments with which they 
are involved (ch.2), and then to examine the specific accounting issues which these raise 
(ch.2 and 3). As will be seen conventional accounting regulation (including International 
Accounting Standards) generally fails to address these issues (ch.6).
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CHAPTER 3
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
IN ISLAM
The chapter is divided into thr ee sections. Section One reviews the history of riba 
since the early civilisation and how various laws and religions dealt with the 
riba/\xsmy question. Section Two highlights the early experiments in establishing 
Islamic banks and their development. Section Three discusses some of the crurent 
accounting differences between Islamic banks.
3.1 BACKGROUND ON THE HISTORY OF RIBA/USVRY
3.1.1 Definition of Rrôa/Usury
Riba is variously translated as ‘increase’, ‘excess’, ‘usury’ or ‘interest’ (Pryor, 1985). 
Parker (1988), quoting Pope Clement in 1312, defined usmy as any accrual, great or 
small, above the principal of the loan. Dorph (1990) defined usmy as exorbitant 
interest over and above a morally prescribed limit. However, the term riba is 
interpreted as any pre-determined increase over the principal, fiom verses quoted in 
the Holy Qman: "You see the land life less but when we make water fall on it, it 
shakes and grows" (Surat Al-Hajj Verse No. 5). The term (Rabat) in the Arabic 
version of this verse means ‘raised’ or ‘increased’.
3.1.2 History of Usury
Usury has been in existence ever since lending began in the early civilisations. The 
law of Hammabi (18 ceritmy BC) dealt with lending to ensme efficiency, equity and 
control as compound interest was forbidden (Dorph, 1990). In 594 BC Solon 
cancelled all private and public debts when he reformed the Athenian constitution. In 
340 BC Lex Genuica prohibited the char ging of interest in republican Rome, and two 
centmies later Julius Caesar limited the rate of interest to 12% (Anwar*, 1987).
24
Taylor and Evans (1987) claim that the views of two philosophers had particular* 
significance in the consequent treatment of usur*y. The two philosophers were Seneca, 
a Roman, and Aristotle, a Greek. Seneca considered the practice of usury to be wr*ong 
on moral grounds since the return is linked to time and not to any natural wealth 
increase. Aristotle distinguished between wealth of two kinds, namely, 'natural' 
wealth, which he felt to be the result of man producing in conjrmction with raw 
materials, and 'urmatural' finance. Finance was seen as an evil art and its most evil 
form was usur*y. Money was supposed to act as a medium of exchange and, therefore, 
any other* role for* it was contrary to its objectives. Aristotle claimed that money is an 
unproductive instr ument and, therefore, it should not bear* any interest.
3.1.3 The Church Position on Usury
In 4 AD, dur ing the time of the Roman Empire, the chinch announced the prohibition 
of interest to the clergy, and in the fifth centm*y the prohibition of interest was 
extended to the laity. In the eighth centur*y interest became a criminal offence (Anwar, 
1987). In the Middle Ages Roman civil laws differentiated between usur*y and interest 
according to whether* they were res fungibilis or* res non fmgibilis.
Res fungibilis refers to a commodity that is exactly replaceable in kind, and res non 
fungibilis to an item not replaceable in kind. The law recognised money as 'fungible' 
and hence justice was seen to be done if the same amount of money was returned to 
the lender by the borrower. However, to establish fairness and justice for* the lender, 
modifications in the laws were introduced to deal with events under which the lender 
may experience losses as a consequence of default by the borrower*. Such events 
allowed the lender* to receive a return considered as usur ious interest in case of certain 
risks, including:
■ termination or foregoing of gains.
■ [the risk of] non-payment.
■ [penalty clause against] late re-payrnent.
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Less defensible was the trims contractus, the notorious triple contract theory, which 
(Anwar, 1987) claims gave legitimacy to usury in the name of interest. It was 
discovered that the kind of loan which was condemned by the church and in which the 
creditor claimed interest from the beginning of the loan was allowed under triple 
contract theory. This theory is based on three separate agreements, each of which was 
lawful if considered separately; namely, a sleeping partnership, an insurance against 
the loss of the principal, and an insurance contract against fluctuations in the rate of 
profit. It was therefore assumed that if 'A' entered into these three separate 
agreements, then there was no reason why he could not combine the thr*ee contracts 
into one.
In the sixteenth centmy, as trade fiourished, moneylenders in Europe played a critical 
role in the financial sector until the emergence of the modern banking system. 
(Moneylenders were generally despised for centuries because they were practising 
usury. This was particularly so when tire debt in question was onerous.) Clnistians 
were prominent in moneylending activities, a matter of concern to the religious 
authorities as Cluistianity expressly condemned usmy and any legitimisation of usmy 
was seen as heresy.
By contrast, Taylor and Evans (1987) claim that commenda (the original form of 
Mudaraba contract in general use by Italian and other merchants in the late Middle 
Ages and early modern times) was permissible provided the investing partner 
genuinely shared the risk. Thus a pai*tner needed to do no more than entiTist his 
money to a trader or craftsman at his own risk and on that account was entitled to a 
share of the profit or was liable for his shar e of the loss (Biyer, 1993).
According to Biyer (1993, p. 119), "to avoid ecclesiastical condemnation, the sea-loan 
was increasingly replaced by commenda. However, according to Parker (1988, p. 
140) de Roover claims that "the introduction of the bill of exchange was to circumvent 
the ban on usmy. In Italy where the bill of exchange was introduced, it involved 
interest not overfly but indirectly as interest included in the rate of exchange since the 
bill of exchange at that time was used between merchants in different countries.”
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3.1.4 The Views of Judaism on Usuiy
Under Judaism, Israelites were forbidden to demand any increase on amounts lent to 
Israelites but were allowed to charge interest to gentiles. According to many scholars 
of Judaism, the reason for this distinction was that there was no law among gentiles 
that prohibited the charging of interest. Therefore, they claimed that it would be 
unfair to prevent Jews from charging interest to gentiles (Zindo 1994).
In Emope, the Jews came under strong pressure during Napoleon's reign (the early 
nineteenth century) to cease distinguishing between Jews and non-Jews as regards the 
char ging of interest. Such pressure led Jewish notables to argue tliat such a distinction 
was no longer viable in the Diaspora, and the charging of interest within the Jewish 
community was therefore permitted (Dorph, 1990).
3.1.5 Islamic Position on Riba/Usury
The most noteworthy investment practices in the pre-Islamic period were Musharaka 
(partnership) and Commenda {Qirad or Mudaraba). Rayner (1991) claims that these 
investment methods were based on the assumed honesty of the merchant (Mudarib), 
who would invest the monies of the investors (Rab al Mall) in trade. The results of 
the investments would be shared as profits or losses in proportion to the investors' 
share in such investment, while tire merchant would be entitled to a certain percentage 
as a commission if there was a profit. In the case of no profit or loss, he would 
receive nothing and thus lose his efforts. If the merchant combined his/her capital 
with the investors' funds {bilateral commenda), both the investors and the merchant 
would share the loss or profit in proportion to their capital.
In pre-Islamic days riba (usury) was practised in Mecca (the holy city of Muslims). 
Al-Fakr Al-Razi described the dealing on riba which prevailed in pre-Islamic days as 
follows: Arabs used to pay the money on loan and receive each month a certain sum 
leaving the principal sum intact; when the debt matured the lender claimed the 
principal from the borrower. If it was not possible on the part of the debtor to pay, 
then the lender used to increase the principal sum and extend the time (Naqvi, 1993).
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The emergence of Islam drastically changed the behaviour of the inliabitants of 
Mecca, as new rules were established which included the prohibition of riba. Indeed, 
the largest verse in the Quran was devoted to the condemnation of rrèa Allah says that 
"Those who eat riba will only rise from their graves just like the rise of a person who 
has been inflicted with mental instability by the devil and that is because they said that 
trading is like riba and God has allowed trading and banned riba; he who receives a 
sermon from his God and desists (from eating usury) shall have what he had already 
taken (prior to the ban) and his absolution rests with God, and those who recommit 
usury are residents of hell where they are eternal.
God shall strip riba of all the blessings and increase the alms and double the merit; 
God does not like sinful renegades (who make riba legitimate). Those who believed, 
have performed benevolences, performed prayers and paid Zakah will be rewarded by 
God and there is no fear* for them nor shall they be grieved. Oh ye believers fear God 
and abandon what remained of riba, if you are (real) believers. If you fail to do so be 
advised that God and his Messenger will wage war on you; if you repent you may 
recover your capital without taking an increase or recovering less than the capital sum; 
he who is in financial straits, let him wait for better times and if you give alms 
(discharge the liability of an insolvent) it would be better for you, if you know it is 
good" (Surat Al Baqara, Verses Nos. 275 - 280).
Also, Allah said of riba "Oh ye who have believed do not eat riba which multiplies 
and fear God that you may thrive" (Surat Al-Omran, Verse No. 130).
In his last pilgrimage sermon Prophet Mohammed (peace and blessings of Allah be 
upon him) said. "However, every usury of pre-Islamic days is abolished, you ar*e 
entitled to take your capital so that you do not oppress nor be oppressed" (Naqvi, 
1993).
The verses of the Quran and the saying of the Prophet categorically prohibited and 
condemned riba, which in the context of present day financial practices is universally 
interpreted to mean 'interest'. However, the condemnation of interest is not strictly 
adhered to by all Muslims or observed in the majority of Islamic countries.
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Exceptions are Sudan, Iran and Pakistan, where a process of Islainization of the 
banking system has been adopted
Riba is sometimes interpreted as compoimd interest, but is better understood as a pure 
return on money as opposed to the provision of asset-based finance (e.g., Murahaha 
and Ijara),
3.2 THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN ISLAMIC BANKING
Despite the legitimisation of interest in Islamic coimtries, it is well known that a 
number of pious Muslims do not deposit their savings in banks because they wish to 
strictly observe the Islamic prohibition of interest. It is incumbent on Islamic banks, 
therefore, to completely eschew all such practices which involve any element of 
interest, so that the trust placed in them by the depositors with regar d to the return 
paid on their deposits being completely free of interest is duly discharged (Alimed
1989). Therefore, since the nineteenth century, when interest-based banking was 
introduced in the Islamic countries, there has been a need to establish interest-free 
banks as well.
There are now over fifty Islamic banking institutions operating in a nirmber of 
different coimtries and encompassing both most of the Muslim states and some non- 
Islamic states. The major international Islamic banks are the Dar Al-Mall Al-Islami 
Trust, the Al-Baraka Group, Kuwait Finance House and Al-Rajhi Banking & 
Investment Corporation.
The first recorded experiment to establish interest-free banks began in 1920 in a rural 
village in Egypt in the form of a peasant co-operative financial society. Following this 
experiment efforts were made to repeat it elsewhere. The following sections review 
some countries' experiences in developing Islamic banking.
(7) See Gieraths (1990) and Aryan (1990) for some doubts on tlie practice o f  Islamic banking in Iran and 
Pakistan in R.Wilson (1990).
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3.2.1 Islamic Banking in Egypt
The first attempt to introduce Islamic banking into the Egyptian economy could be 
said to have started with the establisliment of the Mit Gharnr local banks in 1963, and 
latter more Islamic banks were established. The main Islamic financial institutions 
include the Nasser Social Bank and tlie Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt (Al-Ashker, 
1990).
3.2.2 Mit Ghamr Local Savings Bank
This bank was established in 1963 in a provincial rural centre in the Nile Delta, Mit 
Ghamr. The bank was owned by the public sector because at that time all financial 
institutions in Egypt were owned by the state. Abdeen and Shock (1984) claim that 
the purpose of this experiment was to attract savings of low income peasants and to 
mobilise them for development investment, no interest was paid or charged on the 
bank's transactions. The activities of the bank covered five areas: deposit accounts, 
loan accounts, equity participation, direct investments and social services.
Deposit accounts were classified as savings accounts, which bear no interest but were 
intended to develop the savings habit amongst small savers such as students and blue 
collar* workers, with investment accounts based on profit and loss shar*ing.
Loans were divided into two main types: non-investment loans were provided on 
humanitarian grounds, but only if the borrower maintained a savings accormt with the 
bank. Investment loans were provided on the basis of profit and loss sharing. The 
loans were mainly directed to small enterprises and craft workers who had the 
requisite skills but were short of funds.
The Mit Ghamr Savings Bank suffered from a lack of government support (Abdeen 
and Shock, 1984). However, other factors played a part in the failure of the bank, 
particularly once the bank had been placed under the direct control of the state 
administration and had therefore lost its operational autonomy.
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3.2.3 Nasser Social Bank (NSB)
The experiment of the Mit Ghami* Savings Bank encouraged pious Muslims to try 
again. Mr. Ahmed Al-Najar, a well-known Islamic banker, was behind the idea of 
both the Mit Ghamr and the NSB (Abdeen & Shock 1984).
Some Islamic banks were established between the 1970s and early 1980s in order to 
attain social objectives. These included the NSB. Abdeen & Shock (1984) stated that 
the main factors behind the revival of the Mit Ghamr experiment:
i) The decline in the number of the depositors and deposits after putting the Mit 
Ghamr Bank and its branches mider the control of a commercial bank which 
operated an interest-based system.
ii) The changes in the govermnent administration imder the late president, Anwai* Al-
Sadat.
The NSB took over the Mit Ghamr Savmgs Bank, thereby benefiting from the 
popularity of the latter bank but committing itself to meeting all of that bank's 
outstanding obligations. The bank was very successful but, due to the need for 
govermnental financial support, which meant putting the bank under the Government's 
control, the public became suspicious and the bank lost the trust of its clients.
3.2.4 Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt
In 1977 the Egyptian government took a leading step in supporting the Islamic banks 
when it issued a special act authorising the establishment of the Faisal Islamic Bank of 
Egypt. This was followed by the setting-up of two more Islamic banks.
The authorised capital was set by the Act as US$5 million, divided into 80,000 shares 
of US$100 per value per share. The Act states that the Egyptian participation in the 
capital is 51 per cent, while Saudi pailicipation is 49 per cent.
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The bank's capital was subsequently increased to US$40 million in 1977 and in 1984 
the authorised capital increased to US$500 million. The issued capital was 
subsequently raised to US$100 million (Al-Asliker, 1990).
Besides compliance with the SharVa ruling in its operations, the bank offers all 
banking operations including the normal banking services of commercial banks, 
accepting deposits on a profit and loss sharing basis.
3.2.5 Islamic Banking in Pakistan
Pakistan was created in the name of Islam in 1947, and the demand for Islamization of 
the countiy's economic life was, according to Anwai* (1987), voiced as early as the 
first year of the countiy's independence.
The late Zahid Hussain, the first governor of the Central Bank, announced in his 
opening statement on July 1, 1948, his intention to reform the banking system to 
operate in line with Islamic principles, including the elimination of interest from the 
banking system. In 1959 the State Bank of Pakistan (The Central Bank) setup an 
Islamic economic section within the resear ch department of the bank to cany out 
research regarding the elimination of interest from the banking system. Dming the 
1950s, several prominent scholar's, including M. N. Siddiqi and Mohammed Uzqin, 
had proposed an Islamic banking system based on Mudaraba, but the govermnent did 
not take serious steps in that direction (Anwar, 1987).
However, Zindo (1994) claims that the process of Islamization of the Pakistani 
economy was initiated following a declaration by the late President Zia ul Haq in 
February 1979, that the government planned to remove interest from the economy 
within a period of tlnee years. He also claims that a decision had been taken to begin 
moving in this direction, commencing with the elimination of interest from the 
operations of the House Building Finance Corporation, the National Investment Trust 
and the Mutual Funds of the Investment Corporation of Pakistan. '. ~
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On the other hand, Gieraths (1990) claims that pronounced official attempts to 
Islamize Pakistani society started in July 1977, following General Zia's coup. The 
determination to eliminate riba from the economy turned out to be the major field of 
activity in Islamizing the economy and has led to a number of changes in the banking 
system, a system inlierited from British colonial times.
The conversion of the operations of commercial banks to a non-interest basis took 
longer. This process began in January 1981 with the setting-up of separate counters 
for accepting deposits on a profit and loss shar ing basis in all the domestic branches of 
the five nationalised commercial banks. As from July 1, 1985 all banks were required 
to accept deposits on a profit and loss basis, except foreign currency deposits which 
continued to earn interest and cuiTent accoimts on which no interest or profit was 
given since the principal amount is guaranteed (Zindo 1990).
In 1980, a law was promulgated under which banks and other financial institutions can 
register themselves as Mudaraba companies and mobilise funds tluough the issuance 
of Mudaraba certificates. Funds obtained tluough a Mudaraba can only be used in 
such business as are permitted under SharVa and need prior clearance from the 
Religious Board established by the government. On the other hand, to safeguar d the 
banks against delays and defaults in repayment by parties obtaining finance, a law 
called the Banking Tribunals Ordinance was promulgated in 1984 (Zindo 1990).
However, Zindo (1990) claims that the Islamization of the banking system has certain 
deficiencies in that no institutional mechanism exists for a continuous scrutiny of the 
operating procedures of banks and other financial institutions from a (S/zan'a point of 
view. Also, deposits originally based on the principle of profit and loss shar ing 
between depositor and bank, turn out to be limited to profit sharing since the 
Govermnent guarantees all deposits.
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3.2.6 Islamic Banking in Turkey
In Turkey, perhaps the most drastic move was in 1928 when the country decided to 
follow a path of complete secularism. Even today, the govermnent seeks to 'separate' 
religion from politics and other areas of public life despite the fact that 99 per cent of 
Tm'key's population is Muslim. Since Atatiu'k, various governments have made 
concessions to Islam, including the establishment of Islamic banking in Turkey. 
However, the establishment of Islamic banks in Turkey was controversial and the 
decision to allow their opening was criticised by both the conventional bankers and 
the secularists.
Several Islamic banks, together with niunerous foreign conventional banks, have been 
established in Tur key since 1980. Although the role of Islamic banks, or "special 
finance houses" as they are called in Turkey, is still fairly limited, they have 
nevertheless managed to attract a sizeable number of investors. These finance houses 
are obliged to generate their income from fees for services, profit sharing from equity 
participation, trading in commodities and foreign exchange, the building and 
management of industrial and agricultural businesses, leasing operations and other 
transactions that involve risk and do not violate Islamic principles (Boldwin 1990).
There are strict and detailed rules governmg the operations of Islamic banks or 
‘special finance houses’ in Tmkey. No where should the words‘Islam’ or 
appear, as the authorities intend to avoid an open conflict with the aims and principles 
contained in the secular constitution. Permission to set up “a special finance house” 
needs to be obtained fr om both the Central Bank and the Council of Ministers.
So far*, four Islamic banks have been established in Tiukey. One is called Al-Baraka 
Turk Ozel Financs Kiirmmi, with the majority shaieliolder being the Al-Baraka 
Investment and Development Coiporation of Jeddah, whose chairman is Sheikh Saleh 
Kamel. The second is Faisal Finans Kurumu, whose main shareholder is Prince 
Mohammed Al-Faisal Al-Saud of Dar Al-Mall Al-Islami Group. The third is Kuwait 
Turkish, which is half-owned by the Kuwait Finance House. The fomth is the 
Anadolu Finance Institution, which is wholly owned by Turkish individuals nationals.
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The banking services offered by the Islamic banks in Turkey are generally similar to 
those of the conventional banks, but exclude the granting of loans or the acceptance of 
deposits at fixed or varying rates of interest.
The finance houses may also offer leasing facilities and carry out commodity trading. 
The finance houses offer tluee types of account: current, participation and special 
investment. Current accounts are payable on demand. These accounts are operated 
and recorded separately from all other accoimts and the finance houses are also 
required to keep funds in local and foreign cunency separate from each other.
The finance houses also accept deposits in the form of participation or profit and loss 
sharing accoimts and invest the deposited funds on behalf of the depositors in 
economic sectors or projects whose operations conform to SharVa principles (Boldwin
1990).
Despite the fact that the market share captured by the finance houses is steadily 
increasing, it appears that this is a result of these institutions offering financial 
products which appeal to customers, not as a result of direct competition with riba 
banks. According to Boldwin (1990, p. 56), "overall, the Islamic finance houses have 
shown that they operate successfully in a very competitive financial sector and that 
they complement rather than compete with conventional banks. The finance houses 
are obliged to act prudently to earn goodwill and customer loyalty and to maintain 
their good reputation.
3.3 DIFFERENT ACCOUNTING PRACTICES
The accoimting practices of Islamic banks in most countries ar e partially regulated, as 
in Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan. However, in spite of such regulation, significant 
accoimting differences among Islamic banks can be observed. These accounting 
differences can be observed between Islamic banks operating in the same country (as 
in the case of a certain Middle Eastern country in which the Mohammed Bank, the 
Khalifa Bank and the Alimed Bank all operate), and between banks that belong to the 
same group (such as the Ahmed Bank and the Sarali Bank). Accounting differences
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can also be noted between Islamic banks operating in different jmisdictions, such as in 
the case ofthe Aysha Bank, the AbdulGhafoor Bank and Fatima Bank It is worth 
noting that the Mohammed Bank, the Khalifa Bank and Aluned Bank all adhere to 
International Accounting Standards (IAS).
The differences in accounting practices were noted in reviewing the bank's financial 
reports and in some cases from interviews held with the banks' senior management, 
auditors and members of their SSB.
The Following Section Highlights The Differences In The Accounting Practices 
Among Islamic Banks:
3.3.1 Different Presentations of Financial Statements
i) Financial Statements: Islamic banks differ in their presentation of Investment 
Account Holders’ Funds in their balance sheet, as some banks present them as a 
liability while others treat I AH as an 'off balance sheet items “funds under 
management.” This difference is found between: 1) banks operating in the same 
country, such as the Mohammed Bank and the Ahmed Bank; 2) banks that belong to 
the same group, such as the Ahmed Bank and the Sarah Bank; as well as 3) banks 
belonging to different groups and operating in different countries, such as the 
AbdulGhafoor Bank and the Fatima Bank.
Every one of the above groupings has its own ar gument for its method of presentation. 
Banks that present lAH under the liabilities section of the balance sheet argue that this 
presentation fairly reflects the size of the balance sheet. They argue this, despite the 
fact that lAH represent no liability for the bank, i.e., the bank is not obliged to returir 
on maturity the initial amounts of the invested funds in case of losses (except when 
the bank has violated the terms of the agreement or acted with gross negligence.) 
They also believe that Islamic banks have a moral obligation to invest these funds 
prudently.
(8) These are fictitious names for a number o f Islamic banks located in and outside o f  Bahrain.
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The auditors of these banks have supported their clients’ views in favour of reflecting 
lAH under the liabilities section of the balance sheet. Tliis is because they believe that 
Islamic banks should be able to meet the demand of the lAH to withdraw their funds 
at any moment in time in order to preserve the bank’s credibility in the market. 
Therefore, tliis presentation is considered a fair one since it is thought to truly reflect 
the financial position of the bank.
In this regal'd, some supervisory authorities, like those in Jordan and Egypt, have 
instmcted their Islamic banks to reflect lAH in the liabilities section of the balance 
sheet.
It is expected that this presentation of lAH by such groups of banks may strengthen 
the claims of some supervisory authorities that Islamic banks should be treated 
similarly to conventional banks. Examples, ai e the calculation of the cash reserve 
requirements, and the gearing ratio (a ratio between the share capital and deposits).
Banks that treat lAH as funds under management claim that it is unfair to reflect I AH 
in the liabilities section of the balance sheet, as these funds represent no liability for 
the bank. Also, whilst the relationship that governs the bank and I AH is based on a 
Mudaraba contract, the relationship in the conventional bank is governed by fiduciary 
contracts. Under a Mudaraba contract, the Islamic Bank will not be entitled to receive 
any remimeration horn the I AH unless a profit is made. However, under a fiduciary 
contract, the bank's management fees ar e normally collected regardless of whether the 
investments earned profits or losses, e.g., as a percentage of the value of the assets 
managed. The fiduciary relationship in conventional banks is similar to the agency 
contract that is also permissible in Islamic fiqh
However, the Statement of concepts of financial accounting standards of Islamic 
banks and financial institutions issued by the Accoimting and Auditing Standards 
Organization (AAOIFI) for Islamic Financial Institutions has come up with a 
reasonable treatment for both Restricted and Umestricted Investment Account Holders 
(UIAH). It is stated that "Umestricted Investment Accounts refer to funds received by
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the Islamic bank from individuals and others on the basis that the Islamic bank will 
have the right to use and invest those funds without restriction, including the Islamic 
bank's right to commingle those invested funds with its own investments in exchange 
for proportionate participation in profits and losses after the Islamic bank receives its 
share of profit as Mudarib" (para. 24, p. 42). "The relationship between the Islamic 
banks and holders of investment accounts and their equivalent is based on an 
unr estricted Mudaraba contract because the Islamic bank has the right to commingle 
funds received from holders of UIA with owners equities. The Islamic bank also has 
the right to use those funds unconditionally and without any restrictions imposed by 
holders of UIA. Hence, UIAH ar e considered as one of the elements of the financial 
position of the Islamic bank. This is in conformity with the SharVa precepts which 
permit the Islamic bank to commingle its own assets with those which the Islamic 
bank has the right to use or dispose o f  (para. 25, p. 42).
It is expected that this presentation may encourage some supervisory authorities that 
have not yet developed separate regulations for Islamic banks to reconsider their 
position.
On the other hand, according to the Statement of Concepts (para. 25, p. 42), 
"Restricted Investment Accounts and their equivalent are not considered an element of 
the Islamic bank's financial position because the Islamic bank does not have an 
unconditional right to use or dispose of these funds.”
ii) Income Statement: Islamic banks differ in the way they present their income 
statement and in the types of information that they disclose in it. For example, the 
Mohammed Bank presents its income statement much as a conventional bank would, 
by reflecting all of the bank's expenses (and not distinguishing between the expenses 
to be borne by the shareholders and those to be borne by I AH).
The revenues represent the income generated from investing the shareholders’ and 
lAH funds, as well as the bank's income from its other operations. It is also noted that 
the bank reflects the amount of profits allocated to lAH as an expense (i.e., a 
deduction in arriving at net profit).
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Klialifa Baiik reflects in its income statement only those expenses which are borne by 
the shareholders, such as operating expenses etc., while lAH beai* those expenses 
which are directly related to their investments. The profit and loss accoimt reflects 
only those expenses that are attributed to the shaieholders and no information is 
shown about the expenses that aie borne by I AH.
Ahmed Bank reflects in its income statement only those expenses and revenues that 
are related to the assets and liabilities of the bank, as well as the profits received by 
the bank, as Mudarib. However, the income statement reflects no information on the 
expenses and revenues related to the funds imder management (IAH). Similaiiy 
AbdulGhafoor Bank reflects in its income statement only those expenses and revenue 
that are attributed to the shaieholders. The income statement, however, shows no 
information on the expenses that aie borne by the lAH. The bank does not reflect in 
the income statement the profits attributed to lAH.
It can be obsei*ved from the above analysis that significant differences exist in the 
income statement among the above-mentioned Islamic banks, which effectively render 
their income statements non-comparable.
3.3.2 Differences in the Level of Information
In order for the financial statements to be cleaiiy understandable and comparable, an 
adequate level of information needs to be disclosed by all banks (Islamic and non- 
Islamic). To achieve this objective, Islamic banks operating in countiies like Bahiain, 
Kuwait and Jordan were required to comply with lASC standaids (IASs). 
AbdulGhafoor Bank's financial statements state that it complies with the IASs only if 
these standards do not violate the SharVa (as required by the bank's by-laws).
This section examines the differences in the level of information disclosed by Islamic 
banks in then financial reports, and the implications regarding the need for regulating 
the information that should be disclosed therein. For this purpose, the financial 
statements of a number of Islamic banks operating in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan and 
Sudan ar e reviewed.
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It should be noted that although the disclosure of the bank's policy regarding the 
allocation of profits between shareholders and lAH is essential for users of financial 
statements, none of the financial statements of Islamic banks which have been 
reviewed discloses this information.
Unlike conventional banks, Islamic banks use different policies for the chaining of 
expenses to I AH. For example, Khalifa Bank transfers some of the expenses (such as 
legal consultants' fees and the fees of the external auditors) to the Mudamba pool, i.e. 
the pool consisting of the banks’ own funds and those of UIAH. The expenses 
charged to the pool are deducted from the profits of the Mudaraba pool and aie not 
shown on the income statement, whereas general expenses (e.g. staff salaries, rents, 
etc.) are borne only by shareholders and are therefore shown in the bank's income 
statement. The expenses charged to the restricted lAH aie also not shown on the 
bank's income statement.
On the other hand, it was noted from private interviews held with Khalifa Bank, 
Ahmed Bank and AbdulGhafoor Bank, that all of them transfer the profits on 
investing excess crurent accoimt funds, to their shaieholders, on the groimds that 
shareholders of these banks guarantee the amounts placed on current accoimt. 
However, none of these banks discloses such information, despite the fact that it is 
important to the shareholders.
3,3.3 Different Measurement Practices
i) Assets Valuation: Differences aie noted between Aysha Bank, Mohammed Bank 
and Khalifa Bank in their accoimting policies relating to real estate held for 
investment. Mohammed Bank uses the historical cost method, with provision for any 
decline other than temporary in value, where necessaiy (1996 audited accomits), while 
Khalifa Bank uses the lower of cost and market price (1996 audited accomits). 
Therefore, although Mohammed Bank and Khalifa Bank both adhere to IASs, each of., 
them treats investment in real estate differently. However, the 1996 audited accounts 
of Aysha Bank states that, “investments in properties were re-appraised and any 
excess of appraised value over cost has been allocated between I AH and
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shareholders.” In the latter bank, the shareholders’ shaie of nmealised profit is taken 
to the shareholder's equity, while the lAH share of profit is shown on the liabilities 
side ‘under Mudaraba accounts’ as a revaluation reserve for I AH.
ii) The Effect o f the Accounting Policies on the Profits Paid to Shareholders and 
lAH: Mohammed Bank uses the historical cost basis and creates a provision in case of 
permanent decline in the value of the real estate held for investment. The provision 
has up to the present time been borne entirely by shareholders, despite it being stated 
in the contract with the I AH that the bank can charge their share of the amounts of 
provisions to the lAH. Therefore, the profits of the shareholders will be paiticulaiiy 
affected by the size of the provision.
Khalifa Bank re-values real estate held for investment on the basis of the lower of cost 
and mai'ket value. This method is more conservative than the historical cost because, 
if the value of real estate in the market is below its cost price, and even if the decline 
is not permanent, a provision will be created. Whereas, under the historical cost basis, 
the bank creates provisions only if the decline is permanent.
Khalifa Bank's accounting policy is to charge provisions on real estate entirely to 
shaieholders. Therefore, the level of provisions will not affect the profits allocated to 
I AH. It is worth noting that the Mudaraba contract between the bank and lAH is 
silent on the party that will beai* the provisions.
Unlike the Mohammed and Khalifa Banks, Aysha Bank recognises appreciation on 
the value of the real estate by adopting the maiket selling price (“marking to mai'ket”). 
This is similar to the position adopted by AAOIFI in its first exposure draft of the 
statement of concepts (AAOIFI 1993), which states that " ... equitable allocation of the 
results of umestricted investments between the holders of UIA who have provided or 
withdrawn funds at different points of time during the lives of those investments, on 
the other hand, and between such account holders as a group and owners of the 
Islamic bank on the other hand" (AAOIFI 1993d, para. 92). "... if umestricted 
investments were to be measiued at their acquisition (historical) cost, inequities would 
occiu' in the distribution of investment results between holders of investment accounts
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who provide or withdraw funds at different points of time duiing the lives of these 
investments. Likewise, inequities would occur in the distribution of umestricted 
investment results between the holders of UIA as a group and owners of the Islamic 
bank" (para. 93).
Karim (1995) aigued tliat AAOIFI changed its position on adopting tlie cash 
equivalent value to the historical cost basis because the latter has attracted strong 
resistance from some eminent SharVa scholars. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning 
that the majority of Islamic banks represented in the AAOIFFs Accomiting Standard 
Board strongly rejected adopting the cash equivalent value approach. This would, 
after all, exert pressme on the banks to pay out a higher level of profits to the 
shareholders and lAH if the bank started recognising the umealised gains in its income 
statement.
The accounting practices of Islamic banks and their basis in Islamic Shari 'a aie 
fmther analysed in the following chapter, in order to highlight matters relevant to the 
issue of the accounting regulation of Islamic banks.
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CHAPTER 4
ACCOUNTING ISSUES: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES IN
ISLAMIC BANKING
In addition to the accounting differences that have been highlighted in the previous 
chapter, this chapter intends to concentrate on some other accounting practices and, in 
particular, their juristic aspects. Prior to the development of accounting standards for 
Islamic banks, in some Islamic coimtries (e.g., Egypt, Kuwait and Balu*ain) Islamic banks 
were required by their national supervisoiy bodies to adopt the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS). Similaiiy, Islamic banks in Malaysia aie required to comply with the 
Malaysian Accounting Standards (Ahmed and Hamat, 1992), which are based on IAS. A 
sui'vey was conducted by the reseaicher to highlight accounting differences between some 
Islamic Banks operating in Balnain, namely Khalifa Bank, Mohammed Bank and Alimed 
Bank
The suiwey was canied out by conducting interviews with senior staff members that were 
responsible for setting accounting policies in each bank and with each bank's external 
auditors. The survey also included an examination of the annual reports of each bank.
The survey was extended to incorporate Islamic banks outside Bahiain, namely, the 
Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB), the Kuwait Finance House, the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan 
and Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB). However, no interviews were conducted with 
the staff of the latter groups of banks and the survey was limited to an examination of 
their aimual reports.
(9) These are fictitious names for a number o f  Islamic banks operating in Bahrain.
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4.1 MURABAHA FINANCING
4.1.1 The Juristic Aspects of Murabaha Transactions
Under normal Murabaha, the bank buys the goods for the purpose of selling them without 
any promise or commitment to pm chase made to the bank by a client. Another type of 
Murabaha financing, which is widely practised by almost all Islamic banks, is the Sale by 
Murabaha to the Purchase Order. This type of Murabaha usually involves more than 
two parties. For example, A will make a promise to B that he will buy from A certain 
type of goods at a pre-determined price. B will then order the goods ftom C on the basis 
of the promise made by A to buy the goods from B. B's profit is the difference between 
the purchasing price and selling price. Islamic scholars have discussed whether this type 
of Murabaha involves a commitment by A to purchase the goods from B. Since Islamic 
banks follow different SharVa rulings, some Islamic banks are of the opinion that the 
client is committed to meet his promise, whilst other Islamic banks adopt the iS/zan'a 
view and see no commitment on the client to meet his promise. Both SharVa views are 
supported by prominent SharVa scholais. Under both types of Mwraôa/zo financing the 
client will usually make the payment by instalments over the period of the conti act.
Murabaha financing with a commitment to buy allows the bank to deduct from the 
amount paid by the client, as down payment, any damages the bank suffers following the 
client’s refusal to accept the goods. If the amount paid by the client is less than the 
amount of damages caused, the bank should treat such a difference as an account 
receivable. On the other hand, under Murabaha financing with no commitment to buy, 
the bank will have no right to recover from the down payment made by the client the 
damages it has suffered following the client’s refusal to accept the goods. In this case the 
bank cannot retain any of the down payment made by the client (AAOIFI 1997).
(10) Accounting and Auditing Standards Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions.
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This amount of down payment is different from hamish gedyyah which is also paid by the 
client but it is considered an obligation on the Islamic bank and shall be tieated as a 
liability unless the Shari’a supervisory board of the Islamic bank decides otheiwise 
{Murabaha and Murabaha To The Purchase Orderer, AAOIFI 1996.)
Murabaha financing is legitimate only if it satisfies the following conditions (Karim and 
Abdullah 1995):
i) The seller should inform the buyer about the actual cost of the asset and his profit.
ii) The contract should not involve any element of riba.
Hi) The bank should inform tlie client about any defect/damages of the goods in advance.
It is worth noting that all Islamic banks that have been surveyed have met the above 
conditions on the legitimacy of the Mudabara.
Since Murabaha entails a fixed, pre-determined, rate of return to the Islamic bank, 
arguments have been raised as to its similarity to conventional interest. Imtiaz (1994) 
claims that Islamic banks deal in goods and not documents and thus bear several risks. 
Murabaha financing is widely practised by Islamic banks since it has a relatively low risk 
(the only risk it carries is credit risk and, in some cases, cancellations risk) and the return 
is highly predictable.
However, due to the non-existence of an Islamic inter bank maiket, Islamic banks aie 
compelled to maintain a higher level of liquidity than their conventional counterparts. 
This is one of the reasons why a lai ge part of Islamic banks' financing portfolio comprises 
short-term and relatively liquid Murabaha (Imtiaz, 1994).
The contract normally caters for the short-term financing requirements of clients thiough 
legitimate trading practices. Without the financing from the Islamic bank, it would not be 
possible for the client to undertake his trading activities to liis required or planned level. 
In addition it caters for consumer credit and also for certain kinds of trade credit.
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It has been noted that Islamic banks use different accoimting treatments for profit 
recognition relating to Murabaha financing. The following highlights some of these 
accoimting treatments as practised by some Islamic banks.
4.1.2 Recognition of Profit on Murabaha Financing
In profit-sharing (i.e. Mudaraba) contracts, the rules used for profit recognition affect the 
returns credited, in respect of such a contract, to Investment Accoimt Holders the duration 
of whose investment differs fi'om the dmation of that contract. Consider, for example, a 
credit sale for an item that the bank acquires for US$10,000 and then sells on to its 
customer for US$12,000, to be paid in 24 monthly instalments of US$500. There aie at 
least five different methods of profit recognition that may be applied. (Methods 1,2, 3, 
and 5 aie each used, or have been used, by at least one major Islamic bank.)
i) The gross profit of US$2000 is recognised when the customer takes delivery of the 
item.
ii) The gross profit of US$2,000 is recognised pro rata on the dates on which the monthly 
payment is due. That is, one-sixth or US$83.33 of each monthly payment is 
recognised as profit when it falls due.
Hi) The gross profit of US$2,000 is recognised pro rata on the receipt of the monthly 
payment. That is, one-sixth or US$83.33 of each monthly payment is recognised as 
profit when it is received.
iv) The gross profit is recognised once the capital of US$10,000 has been recovered. That
is, the final four payments of US$500 are treated as profit.
v) The gross profit is recognised once all the payments have been received (and the
transaction is liquidated).
With methods 1,4, and 5, an investor (IAH) who placed money in an investment account 
for 18 months staifing (say) two months after the customer took deliveiy would receive 
no share of the profit. With methods 4 and 5, an investor who placed money in an
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investment account for the last four months of the contract would receive a share of the 
profit proportionate to the time the funds had been invested, i.e., a 1/6^ ’^ shaie. (Archer 
and Kaiim, 1997). It is worth noting that in addition to the five methods mentioned 
above. Fay sal Islamic Bank of Bahiain uses the reducing method may either or similar to 
the ‘actuarial method’. Under this method as the balance of capital outstanding is 
reduced, so is the proportion of each installment recognised as income is reduced.
It is also important to note that the Jordan Islamic Bank practises method 1 ; all the 
Islamic banks in Bahiain employ method 2; and Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad uses 
method 3. The researcher is unaware of any Islamic bank using method 4, but method 5 
is adopted by all banks in Sudan,
4.2 MUSHARAKA FINANCING
The origin of the word Musharaka is the Arabic root 'Sharika ’ to ''share Musharaka is a 
participation in the project capital. Such participation may be in the capital of a joint 
venture or investment in a short-term financing. In Musharaka, the partner may or may 
not paiticipate in the management of the project (Doiph, 1990).
4.2.1 There are two types of Musharaka Financing
i) Constant Musharaka: In this type of Musharaka financing, the shares of the partners 
in the capital will remain unchanged dining the lifetime of the Musharaka.
ii) Declining Musharaka: In this type of Musharaka one of the partners agrees to sell his
shaie in the Musharaka to the other paitner by instalments.
4.2.2 The Juristic Conditions of Musharaka Financing
i) There must be acceptance of the terms, and an intention by the partners, to enter into a 
Musharaka financing agreement.
ii) The terms and conditions of the agreement should be clear.
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ni) Each partner's shai'e of the capital should be paid up in money. However, some 
Islamic jmists, under certain conditions, allow partners to pay up their shares in the 
capital with non-monetary assets.
iv) The contract should cleaiiy state the role that the management of the venture will 
undertake.
4.2.3 Profit Recognition on Constant Musharaka Transactions from the Shari’a 
Point of View
Shahatta (1995) stated that accounting treatments may be adopted on profit recognition:
i) The bank (Partner) may recognise the profit only when the contract is liquidated and 
the bank receives its capital back; or
ii) The bank (Paiiner) may re-value the Musharaka periodically.
Fui'thermore, Shahatta (1995) aigues that most Islamic scholars state that no profits 
should be recognised before the capital is recovered. Therefore, in order to comply with 
this Shari'a opinion, undistributed profits should not be recognised by the bank as 
investor (Rab al Mall). Therefore, I AH will only receive their profits when the 
Musharaka is liquidated and the bank has recovered its capital.
4.2.4 The Profit Recognition on Declining Musharaka from Shari’a Point of Views
Some Islamic banks recognise profits on declining Musharaka when the deal is liquidated 
and the bank has recovered its initial investment.
The above accounting treatment is accepted fiom the SharVa point of view since the 
majority of Islamic scholars have stressed that no profits should be recognised before 
liquidating the investment. Other Islamic jurists have allowed periodic re-valuation of 
the Musharaka, because they believe lAH may receive their share of profits before the 
capital is recovered.
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4.2.5 The Accounting Treatments of Musharaka Transactions as Practised by 
Islamic Banks
Klialifa Bank and Mohammed Bank use the declining Musharaka. They use Musharaka 
to acquire a building with another partner. The share of the bank in the Mw^/zamka 
declines gradually while the share of the other partner increases. The payment made by 
the client to acquire the bank’s share in the Musharaka includes part of the initial 
investment and part of the profit. The bank measures its share in the Musharaka at cost 
since it has no control over the management of the Musharaka. Both banks adopt IAS25, 
which states that "Long-term investments are usually canied at cost. However, when 
there is a decline, other than temporary, in the value of a long-term investment, the 
carrying amount is reduced to recognise the decline.”
Alimed Bank applies the constant Musharaka, which involves entering into a contract 
witli another partner through participating jointly in a specific project. The share of the 
partners in the Musharaka remains unchanged until the partners decide to liquidate the 
joint venture or sell it to a new investor. However, before transferTing the ownership of 
the Musharaka to the new investor, the latter should promise to pay a certain amount to 
the old par tners of the Musharaka either immediately or tlrr ough deferred instalments.
Although the banlc’s participation in the Musharaka is usually not less than 50 per cent, 
and it exercises management control, it treats its share in the Musharaka as an investment 
in an associated entity and uses the equity method to recognise its shai'e in the 
Musharaka.
4.2.6 The effect of the Musharaka Accounting Policies on Profit Allocation to lAH
The profit allocated to lAH depends upon the accounting policies used for Mws/zaraka 
financing. As stated above, some Islamic banks like the Khalifa Bank and the 
Mohammed Bank, measure their share in Musharaka at cost, while Musharaka profit is 
not recognised in the income statement until a right to receive payment is established. 
They claim that these accounting treatment is in line-with IAS 18. lAH who terminate
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their relationship with the bank before the bank receives the profit or obtains the right to 
receive the payment may not receive a proportionate return on the investment financed by 
their funds, but may receive a shar e of the retur n on an investment financed by other lAH 
funds received in the past.
Ahmed Bank uses the equity method to recognise its shar e in the Constant Musharaka. 
Adopting this accounting treatment allows the bank to recognise its share of the profit 
when the partners in the Musharaka declare quarterly the result of the Musharaka. 
Therefore, I AH who terminate their relationship with the bank before the partners declare 
the result of the Musharaka may not receive a proportionate retiun on the investment 
financed by their fluids, but may receive a share of the return on an investment financed 
by other I.A.H funds received in the past. However, if the assets of the Musharaka are of 
a type whereby a periodical retimi is received (e.g., property), such an effect is mitigated.
4.3 MUDARABA FINANCING
4.3.1 The Juristic Aspects of Mudaraba Transactions
Mudaraba is a an agreement between the Rab al Mall (the bank) and ihs Mudarib 
(client), in which the bank as a provider of funds agrees to finance the Mudarib with a 
certain amount of money, the purpose being to invest it in an activity stipulated in the 
Mudaraba agreement. The capital should be provided in cash. However, it is considered 
permissible by some jurists that the capital of a Mudaraba be provided in the form of 
trading assets (e.g., inventory). At the time of contracting, the value of such assets or 
their historical cost will be considered as the Mudaraba capital.
It is important to mention that such a Mudaraba contract is reflected in the assets section 
of the bank’s balance sheet. However, in the Mudaraba contract (that is presented on the 
bank’s balance sheet between the liability section and owners’ equity AAOIFI 1993), the 
bank plays the role of the Mudarib and I AH play the role of Rab al Mall.
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4.3.2 The Capital Terms and Conditions
i) The capital should be known to both parties.
ii) The capital cannot be in the form of a debt (due fr om a third party or the Mudarib).
Hi) The share of both the capital provider {Rab al Mall) and the Mudarib in the profits
must be specified.
iv) The share of both the capital provider and the Mudarib in the profits should be 
proportional, for it camiot be specified as a specific sum.
v) The capital provider should bear* any financial loss in full, while the Mudarib loses 
only his effort.
4.3.3 The Profit Terms and Conditions
i) The profits should only be shared between Rab al Mall and the Mudarib.
ii) The profit shar es are determined as percentages of the profits, or percentage of the 
capital.
Hi) The losses incmred should be borne by Rab al Mall provided the loss is not due to the 
misconduct or negligence of the Mudarib.
4.3.4 Rulings Pertaining to Profit
i) Recognition of Profit: This takes place at the time at which it can be established 
that profit is achieved in a Mudaraba. According to the Islamic Fiqh Academy, 
“profits are due when realised by declaration or re-evaluation and become payable 
only upon distribution”
(rt) Islamic Figh Academy resolution No. 5 para. 7, issued in respect o f  Muqaradali bonds and investment certificates in the fourtli 
session o f  the Academy held in Jeddah during the 18-23 Jumada 11, 1408H corresponding to 6-11 February 1988.
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ii) Entitlement to Profit: Hanafis and some Shafts, say that profit should be 
recognised on a realisation basis, whereas the Malikis, and some Hanabalis, believe 
that profit should be recognised only when it is distributed between the two parties,
i.e., on a cash basis {Mudaraba Standaid, AAOIFI 1996).
4.3.5 Ruling Pertaining to Losses
i) Net losses at the time of winding up the Mudaraba ai e considered as a decrease in 
the Mudaraba capital, and the Mudarib is requied to retuin the balance to Rab al 
Mall.
ii) Periodic losses in the Mudaraba shall be set off against previously earned profits.
Hi) Losses that cannot be set off against undistributed profit in the case of a
continuing Mudaraba shall be held in suspense until profits aie realised hereafter.
4.3.6 The Two Types of Mudaraba
i) Unrestricted Mudaraba: Umestricted Mudaraba refers to funds received by the 
Mudarib from the Rab al Mall on the basis that the Mudarib will have the right to use 
and invest those funds without restrictions. This includes XhQ Mudarib's xi^X to 
commingle those invested funds with its own investment for proportionate 
pai'ticipation in profits and losses after the Mudarib receives its share of profit as 
Mudarib {Mudaraba Standaid, AAOIFI, 1996).
ii) Restricted Mudaraba: Restricted Mudaraba refers to funds received by the Mudarib 
from the Rab al Mall on the basis that the Mudarib should follow the Rab al Mall’s 
instructions on matters such as the type of investment, the level of risk and the 
commingling of its own investment with the Mudarib funds {Mudaraba Standard, 
AAOIFI, 1996).
(12) The Four Sunni Schools o f  Islamic Law are Shafis, Malikis, Hanafis and Hanbalis, see Wael Hallaq, "A History Islamic Legal 
Theories” published, 1988.
52
4.3.7 The Accounting Treatment of Mudaraba Financing where the Islamic Bank 
Plays the Role of Rab al Mall
Alimed Bank uses this type of Mudaraba contact to provide its clients with the required 
funds to be invested in a certain asset or project. In this case Ahmed Bank plays the role 
of Rab al Mall and the client is the Mudarib. The Mudaraba financing appeal's in the 
bank’s balance sheet as an asset. The parties to the Mudaraba must agree on the ratio of 
allocation of profit before any business is undertaken. The bank’s share is measuied at 
cost at the end of a financial period and any appreciation in the value of the bank’s share 
is not recognised. In the case of a permanent decline in the value of the bank’s shai'e a 
provision is created against such decline and the bank’s balance sheet will reflect the net 
amount after deducting the provision. The bank recognises its share in the profits of the 
Mudaraba only when they aie distributed or declared as distributable by the 
(client). This type of Mudaraba contract is different from the other type of Mudai'aba 
contract where the lAH place its funds with the bank where the I AH plays the role of Rab 
al Mall and the bank acts as Mudarib. Under the latter type of Mudaraba contract, the 
lAH funds appeal's in the liability section of the balance sheet.
Klialifa Bank offers two types of Mudaraba financing. Namely, (a) General Mudaraba, 
and (b) Specific Mudaraba.
Specific Mudaraba involves an amount of money provided by Khalifa Bank (Rab al 
Mall) to another bank (Mudarib) to manage funds on behalf of Klialifa Bank. Klialifa 
Bank must know the type of investment involved. Usually, Klialifa Bank treats an 
investment as Specific Mudaraba when it participates in a large syndication and the 
bank’s (Khalifa Bank) shai'e of the profit can be determined.
Klialifa Bank’s balance sheet reflects the initial amount of the Mudaraba financing plus 
its amiual share of the profit. Since the bank’s share of the profit can be determined it 
uses the accrual basis to recognise its share of the profit on a pro rata basis.
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In the General Mudaraba, Klialifa Bank provides an amount of money to be used by the 
client for a certain investment specified in the agreement. Usually, the bank will use the 
cost method to recognise its share of the investment. Since the bank’s share of profit 
cannot be determined, it recognises its profit when it is received or agreed between the 
bank and the client.
4.3.8 The Effect of the above Accounting Treatment on lAH
As stated above, Ahmed Bank recognises its shai'e of profit of the Mudaraba only when 
distributed or declared as distributable by the Mudarib (client). Therefore, I AH who 
terminate their relationship with the bank before the profit is received or declared by tlie 
Mudarib may not receive a proportionate return on the investment financed by their 
funds. However, they may receive a share of the retimi on an investment financed by 
I AH funds received in the past. However, if the assets of the Mudaraba are of a type 
whereby a periodic return is received (e.g., propei*ty) such an effect is mitigated.
In any event, Klialifa Bank recognises its shai'e of the profit of the .SJoecz/zc 
when the instalment is due (accrual basis). This accounting method is intended to match 
the revenue with expenses and provide the lAH with a share of the profit before they 
terminate their relationship with the bank. This accounting method has been criticised for 
two reasons:
i) It represents a violation of Shari ’a principles in the opinion of some Islamic scholars 
who state that “the shaiing of profit before the capital is recovered is not valid.”
ii) If any loss occui's it may be related to a transaction that occurred in the past. It should 
therefore be borne by investors who were lAH at that time some of whom have 
terminated their relationship with the bank. At the same time this accounting 
treatment may be unfair for futiu’e lAH who will beai' losses that are related to 
transactions that occmred in the past before become lAH.
54
On the other hand, Klialifa Bank uses the cost method to measuie its share in the General 
Mudaraba, and it recognises its shai'e of the profit when the profit is received or agreed 
between the bank and the client. Therefore, lAH who terminate tlieir relationship with 
the bank before the profit is received or agreed between the bank and the client may not 
receive a proportionate retuin on the investment financed by their funds. They may, 
however, receive a share of the return on an investment financed by I AH funds received 
in the past.
4.4 PROFIT ALLOCATION
In Islamic banks there are various factors that affect the allocation of profits, which 
include the following:
4.4.1 Rate of Investment
In most Islamic banks the soiu'ces of funds include shareholders’ equity, investment 
accounts holders, saving accounts and current accounts. The bank's rate of investment is 
the amount available for investment (i.e., that not required to be held in liquid form 
without any remuneration.) This rate varies from one bank to another and fiom one type 
of account to another.
In determining the rate of investment, some Islamic banks (e.g., Mohammed Bank) take 
into consideration the level of liquidity to be maintained on each type of account to meet 
investors’ withdrawals. The level of liquidity is influenced by the liquidity requirements 
imposed by the regulatory agencies on Islamic banks. These requirements include the 
cash reserve maintained with the central bank, the maturing period of the investor’s funds 
(e.g., an investor’s accounts for a period exceeding one yeai' would require a lower 
liquidity percentage, while savings accounts would require a higher liquidity percentage 
because holders of these accoimts have the right to withdraw them at any time), and the 
withdrawal behaviour of the investors.
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Mohammed Bank maintains different liquidity ratios based on the matiuity period of the 
investor’s funds. For example, in the case of savings accounts the bank invests only 50 
per cent for the benefit of the investors, while the remaining 50 per cent will be 
considered to be held for liquidity puiposes. Any profit generated on investing the 
amount ‘for liquidity’ will be for the benefit of the shaieholders. The bank’s contract 
states that Investors aie entitled to at least 75 per cent of the profits earned on their funds 
after deducting 10 per cent for provisions. The bank’s share as Mudarib is the remaining 
25 per cent. Mohammed Bank would invest aiound 95 per cent of the funds deposited in 
investment certificates since tlie maturity period of such accounts is more than a yeai”.
However, other Islamic banks use different liquidity systems. For example, Khalifa Bank 
invests 100 per cent of the investor’s funds maintained with the bank. No percentage is 
deducted from the investor’s funds for liquidity purposes. The bank’s strategy is to use 
the cuiTent accounts as the liquidity cushion for satisfying unexpected withdrawals in 
investment accounts. This tends to have implications for the investment of the balances 
in current accounts which aie expected not to be withdrawn within a certain period. This 
is because any returns earned on the current accounts are for the benefit of shaieholders 
since they guaiantee these accounts.
Furthermore, Alimed Bank treats investment accounts as funds under management and 
the bank maintains separate liquidity ratios for each of its funds. The bank invests at least 
20 per cent of the fund’s assets in short-term investments. Any profits eained on these 
funds belong to lAH after deducting any direct expenses related to the fund, a fixed 
percentage as contribution to the reserve fund, and the bank’s share as Mudarib. The 
level of liquidity may vaiy depending on the investors’ withdrawal behavioui' and the 
maturity period of the investors’ accounts. The bank’s cuirent accounts are shown on the 
balance sheet as a liability. These accounts are guaranteed by the shareholders, therefore, 
any returns generated on them are for the benefit of the shai eholders. The bank invests 
only 10 per cent of its current accounts, with 90 per cent being held as liquidity reserves.
56
It is worth noting that some Islamic banks allow lAH to receive pai't of the profits earned 
on investing the surplus funds of cuirent accounts, as in the case of Kuwait Finance 
House (KFH), according to Kaiim (1995) that this is done either by way of donation from 
the shareholders’ share or it is known to the I.A.H at the time of contracting that they will 
participate in the profits of investing tlie suiplus of cuirent accounts in retuin for their 
pai'ticipation in compensating the holders of current account in the event of loss.
4,4.2 Rate of Profit Allocation
According to the rules of the Mudaraba contract, the profit allocation ratio between the 
Rab al Mall and the Mudarib should be specified. However, any loss is solely borne by 
the Rab al Mall. The SharVa stipulates that profits to be earned by both parties to the 
Mudaraba contract should be specified as a percentage of the profits earned on investing 
the I AH’s funds. In case the percentage of profit shaiing is revised in the fiituie, the 
Mudarib should notify the lAH about the amendment in advance (Karim 1995). In this 
regard, Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan states that amendment of the teiins governing the 
Mudaraba contract is possible at any time whether with respect to the percentage in 
which profits will be shared or otherwise, since this alteration will only take place with 
the consent of both parties and provided that the newly added term is within the accepted 
SharVa rules. This will then be valid even if it was not contained in the original contract. 
If the bank is of the opinion that there is some benefit in including a term in the 
Mudaraba contract that allows for reassessment of the share of the profits at the end of 
each operation or at the end of each year with the consent of the parties to the contract 
then that is possible and there is no uncertainty about this. Alteration of the percentage of 
profits in the Mudaraba contract can be effected with the consent of the parties even 
before the end of the operation.
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Khalifa Banlc agrees with the Unrestricted Investment Account Holders (UIAH) on a 20 
per cent Mudarib rate on their profits, while it chai'ges different rates on restricted 
investment accounts (3-15 per cent). The bank claims that, generally, the amount of 
funds placed with the bank under restiicted investment accounts aie laiger than those 
placed under mirestiicted investment accounts. This suggests that the bank had adopted a 
strategy of attracting more funds to be placed under restricted investment funds by 
charging them lower Mudarib rates compared with the rates charged on umestricted 
investment accounts. The bank’s financial statements make no reference to the actual 
Mudarib rate received by the bank.
On the other hand, Mohammed Bank’s contract document makes no reference to the 
percentage chaiged as Mudarib rate. Therefore, the bank has full discretion to decide on 
its Mudarib rate. This does not comply with the Shari ’a ruling which requires that the 
Mudarib rate should be known in advance to Rab al Mall (IAH). The bank claimed that 
the Mudarib rates differ fiom one account to another. The bank’s financial statements 
make no reference to the actual Mudarib rate received by the bank.
4.4.3 Revenues and Expenses
Khalifa Bank divides the expenses and revenue between shareholders and Umestricted 
Investment Account Holders. The shaieholders bear 50 per cent of the overall expenses 
excluding staffing costs. The latter is borne by the shaieholders alone. Any specific 
provisions in respect of unresti'icted investment accounts are borne by the shareholders.
In return, the shaieholders receive profits eained on their own flmds as well as the bank’s 
shai'e as Mudarib. In addition, shaieholders are entitled to receive income generated horn 
providing normal banking sei'vices, such as custody services, and fiom investing of 
surplus funds in current accounts, etc.
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Umestricted investment accoimts aie entitled to the retmii on their investments after 
deducting 50 per cent of all expenses (excluding the staffing costs which are borne by the 
shareholders), 5 per cent as a general provision, and 20 per cent as the bank’s shai*e as 
Mudarib. The bank does not disclose information in its financial statements on profit 
allocation. The bank’s income statement does not reflect the bank’s share of profit as 
Mudarib.
Unlike umestricted investment accounts, where the bank has the discretion to select the 
appropriate investment opportunities on behalf of these investors, in the case of restricted 
investment accomits the bank is obliged to follow the instructions of the account holders 
in selecting a suitable investment. The bank is entitled to a percentage of the profit as its 
Mudarib fee, which is shown in the income statement under the bank’s share as Mudarib.
Unlike mirestricted investment accounts, where 50 per cent (excluding staffing costs) of 
the bank’s expenses are borne by the account holders, no expenses are borne by the 
restricted investment accounts. It is worth noting, however, that in the income statement 
the bank’s share as Mudarib received from profits relating to muestricted investment 
accounts is not separated from that which relates to restricted investment accomits.
Mohammed Bank allows I AH and shareholders to participate jointly in the revenues and 
expenses of the bank, except profits earned on investments financed exclusively from 
cmrent accoimts and the bank as Mudarib. The latter types of return belong to the 
shareholders only. The financial statements make no reference to the bank’s policy on 
profit allocation.
(13) This analysis was carried out on the bank’s financial statements from 1991 audited accounts to 1996.
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Ahmed Bank separates the expenses and revenue of the bank from the expenses of the 
I AH. The bank’s corporate books show its own balance sheet and income statement. The 
balance sheet reflects the assets of the bank that have been financed by the shai eholders 
equity, the cunent accounts, and other liabilities. This does not include funds received 
from lAH as these aie treated as flmds imder management. However, the income 
statement reflects the revenue earned on the bank’s assets, the bank’s Mudarib share 
which it earns for managing lAH fluids, and revenue fiom providing banking sei'vices, 
etc. The expenses represent those that relate to the bank’s own assets such as provisions, 
bank operating expenses, etc. However, the bank maintains an income statement for each 
fund it manages.
4.4.4 Prudential Reserves (Provisioning Policy)
In conventional banks, it is usually the practice that at the end of the financial year the 
management of the bank, in consultation with their auditors, determines the amount of 
provisions to be charged to the profit and loss accoimt. In Islamic banks, the provisioning 
policy tends to differ from one bank to another. For example, Klialifa Bank charges what 
it calls a general provision to unrestricted investment accounts by deducting 10 per cent 
fl'om their profits. Any specific provisions are charged to the shareholders. The bank’s 
provisioning policy is not clearly stated in the bank’s financial statements. It is worth 
noting that no provisions are deducted fiom the profits of the restricted Investment 
Account Holders. This provisioning policy was endorsed by the bank’s SSB (Shai'i’a 
Supervisoi'y Boaid).
Before the deduction of the Mudarib share, Mohammed Bank sets aside 10 per cent of the 
I AH profits to create what it calls a provision “to meet any potential losses on the bank’s 
investments.” Although it is clearly stated in the contract with lAH that the bank has the 
right to deduct 10 per cent of the investor’s (lAH) profits as ‘general provisions’, the bank 
has thus far not exercised this right.
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As stated above, the Klialifa Bank and the Mohammed Bank create what they call 
'provisions' from the deduction made on the investor’s net profits and they aie not 
charged to the banlc’s profit and loss account. This suggests that these are reserves rather 
than provisions.
Ahmed Bank creates a reserve for each fund it manages by deducting a certain percentage 
from the profits of the fund. This is primaiily used to cover friture potential losses, and in 
case of a decline in the investor’s profits. The bank may use it to cover such a shortfall. 
If the fund does not generate what the bank considers to be sufficient profits on its 
managed funds, any shortfall in the amounts required for tlie reserve fund will be borne 
by the bank and is considered to be a donation to the fimd. The reseiwes maintained by 
the bank for each fund aie not shown in the bank’s financial statements. Fui'thermore, the 
bank creates provisions to cater for a permanent decline in the value of its own assets as 
well as for its own non-performing assets. Such provisions aie disclosed in the bank’s 
financial statements. The bank creates its own reserves, which are appropriated out of the 
bank’s net profits. In its audited financial statements the bank discloses the amounts 
provided by the shaieholders’ funds.
The above suggests that Mohammed Bank does not allocate (what it calls) provisions 
between shareholders and lAH, but in practice chaiges them entirely against the 
shareholders’ share of the profits. The bank reflects the outstanding amounts of 
provisions in the balance sheet. Khalifa Bank, on the other hand, allocates provisions on 
investments financed by lAH (both Restricted and Umestricted Investment Account 
Holders) against the unrestricted account holders' share of the profits. Alimed Bank also 
allocates the reserves maintained on its managed flmds on investments financed by lAH 
(restricted and Umestricted Investment Account Holders) in this way.
The financial statements of Klialifa Bank reflect the amounts of provisions, while the 
Aluned Bank’s financial statements do not include the reserve fund (prudential reserves) 
created on those investments financed by lAH, but reflect only the provisions created
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against the bank’s own assets. It is worth noting that both Mohammed Bank and Klialifa 
Bank refer to the amounts deducted from the profits of the lAH as provision, which, 
according to IAS 30, is a reserve. A provision is an asset valuation account whereas a 
reserve is an appropriation of profit.
4.5 INVESTMENT VALUATION
As already noted, Islamic banks accept funds from Investment Account Holders (lAH) on 
the basis of the Mudaraba contract either on a discretionaiy (unrestricted) or a non- 
discretionaiy (restricted) basis. The profits eained on such investments should be paid to 
I AH after deducting other expenses relating to the investment, and the result of the profit 
is shared between the bank (as Mudarib) and I AH. Based on the contractual relationship 
between the bank and Investment Account Holders, the bank should pay to Investment 
Account Holders the amount earned on their investments subject to various deductions as 
discussed above. The amoimts paid to lAH could certainly be affected by the accounting 
treatments applied to its investments. For example, assuming that the bank uses the asset 
revaluation method, if the value of the assets increases it may allow the bank to allocate 
higher profits to lAH. If there is a decline in the value of the asset the I AH may receive 
lower profits or may lose their investments altogether. This suggests that the bank’s 
profits and the profits paid to lAH will fluctuate from one financial year to another, based 
on the result of the valuation of the assets and also variations in the income earned on 
those assets.
This matter was discussed by AAOIFI (Statement of Concepts, 1993). AAOIFI decided 
that asset revaluation would be the ideal solution in order to measui e the real value of the 
investments. However, for the present, Islamic banks were recommended to apply the 
historical cost basis. This would not, though, prevent banks from presenting 
supplementaiy information based on the revaluation method in order to assist the user of 
their financial reports in their economic decision making.
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4.6 THE SHARIA SUPERVISORY BOARD
The main purpose for establishing Islamic banks is to allow Muslims to conduct their 
financial transactions in accordance with SharVa precepts. In order to give credibility and 
to satisfy the ethical expectations of their customers, the majority of Islamic banks have 
developed a control process in the form of in-house religious advisers, commonly called 
the Shaii'a Supervisoiy Boaid (SSB). The membership of the SSB is drawn exclusively 
fr om veiy knowledgeable Shaii'a Scholars (Gambling et al, 1993).
The members of the SSB aie supposed to be appointed by the bank's shaieholders. They 
have the right to attend the amiual general meeting of the bank, and perform all or some 
of the following duties (Karim 1990):
1- Design and approve the bank's contracts for its basic activities and issue religious 
rulings in response to requests by the staff.
2- Advise the external auditors and the management of the bank on the accounting 
treatments wliich require departui'e fr om generally accepted accounting principles in 
order to comply with Shari 'a precepts.
3- Ensure that the bank’s practices confoiin to the spirit as well as the letter of Islamic 
teaching.
4- Prepare a religious [compliance] report which is regai ded as pait of tlie annual report, 
in which it [attests as to] whether the bank's operations aie in conformity with the 
SharVa.
Briston and Al-Asliker (1986) claim that the frinctions of a SSB, which aie usually spelt 
out in the aiticles of association of the bank, lie in thi ee main areas. These are ex ante 
compliance (e.g., the checking of contracts in advance of their use), ex post compliance 
(e.g., checking that the approved forms of contiacts or transactions have been used or 
observed), and the calculation of Zakah. Kaiim (1990b) claims that the SSB is involved 
in determining the income that should be distributed amongst the bank's shareholders and
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Investment Account Holders. SSB also advises the bank on the expenses that the former 
must bear alone and on those which the latter can shaie.
Unlike external auditors, members of the SSB may be employees of the bank and on its 
payroll. However, the SSB has a right of access to any source of information and, at the 
end of the financial year, it issues a special report that is published with the external 
auditor's annual report. The SSB religious [compliance] report in which it [attests as to] 
whether the bank’s operations are in conformity with the S/zari’a. It also states whether 
or not SSB members had access to all the docimients and records that they deemed 
necessaiy to caiiy out their duties. Such a report is meant to give credibility to the 
information in the financial statements from a religious perspective.
Karim (1990b) claims that it is not mandatory that each bank should have its own SSB. 
This is because an SSB is perceived as a control process developed voluntarily by Islamic 
banks to satisfy the moral expectation of their customers.
However, in certain countries (such as the United Arab Emirates and Malaysia) it is a 
legal requirement for Islamic banks to establish an SSB. The Malaysian Islamic Banking 
Act (1983) states that “the Central Bank shall not recommend the grant of a license, and 
the Minister shall not grant a license, unless the Central Bank or the Minister, as the case 
may be, is satisfied that there is, in the articles of association of the bank concerned, 
provision for the establishment of a Shaii’a Supervisory Board to advise the bank on the 
operations of its banking business in order to ensine that they do not involve any element 
which is not approved by the Religion of Islam.”
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The accounting practices of the surveyed Islamic banks tend to suggest that they have 
great freedom in choosing their accounting policies. This possibility will be analysed in 
the next chapter by reference to the case studies. This will enable us to identify the 
potential consequences of more effective regulation and the extent to which regulation 
may be considered beneficial both to the users of the financial statements and to the banks 
themselves.
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
5.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
As was noted in chapter 1, this thesis examines and analyses certain accounting 
practices of Islamic banks in Balnain dniing the early to mid 1990s, with a view to 
determining the degree of compar ability of their financial statements, and the extent to 
which the accounting standar ds to which some of them were subject were effective 
from the standpoint of the compaiability of their financial statements. The accounting 
standards in question were the International Accounting Standaids (IASs) issued by 
the International Accounting Standards Committee (lASC). Wliile one of these (IAS 
30) is a disclosure standard for banks, neither it nor other IASs applied by Islamic 
banks in Balirain had been drafted so as to deal with the specificities of the financial 
instruments used by Islamic banks and the contents of their financial statements. The 
effectiveness of such accounting standar ds in the context of the financial reporting of 
Islamic banks is therefore an important issue, unless one takes the view that 
accounting regulation is unnecessaiy since rnaiket forces and private contracting are 
sufficient (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). This question is discussed in chapter 2 of 
this thesis, where the arguments that market forces and private contracting cannot be 
relied upon to result in adequate financial reporting aie accepted as persuasive.
In the light of conclusions regarding the degree of comparability of their financial 
statements and effectiveness of IASs for the accoimting regulation of Islamic banks, 
the objective of the thesis is then to evaluate the potential contribution of a set of 
accounting standards specifically drafted for Islamic banks, namely those issued by 
the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI).
5.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A review of the literatur e on accounting regulation was carried out in order to develop 
a broad theoretical proposition to guide the research. This would provide an 
understanding the advantages and disadvantages of regulation and enable one to gain
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an initiai insight into their relevance for Islamic banking. According to Hussey and 
Hussey (1997, p. 87) “The literature review is a wr itten summary of the findings fi'om 
literatur e sear ch. It is an important part of any research activity and should provide 
the background to and justification for the research project.”
5.2.1 Pilot Survey
A pilot survey was conducted on the accounting practices of some Islamic banks in 
order to establish the similarities, differences and level of disclosure among Islamic 
banks operating in different countries and wliich are subject to different accounting 
regulations. For this purpose, three banks were selected from Balnain and one Islamic 
bank from each of Kuwait, Jordan, Malaysia and Sudan.
The above countries were selected because Islamic banks in Bahrain and Kuwait ar e 
required to adhere to IAS. In Jordan, the financial statement of Jordan Islamic Bank 
(which was the only Islamic bank in Jordan until 1996), state that it complies with 
IAS only if these standards do not violate the Shari 'a (as required by the bank’s by­
laws). In Malaysia, all barrks, including Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, are required to 
comply with the Malaysian Accounting Standards, which are based on IAS. In Sudan, 
all banking systems have been Islamized and banks are required to adopt the IAS. 
However, the inclusion of Sudan in the sur vey was because of the strong intervention 
of the Shari ’a in the accounting practices of the banks there, which was as a result of 
the Islamization of the banking sector.
The survey of Islamic banks operating outside Bahr ain was limited to examining their 
financial statements for the 1996 financial year because the survey of these banks was 
intended to compare the similarities and differences and level of disclosur e based on 
their audited accounts.
The smwey of the Balrrain banks was intended to find out the similarities, differences 
and level of disclosure, comparing the Islamic banks in Balrr ain and those that operate 
outside Bahrain. In addition, analyses were conducted on the tlrree banks operating in 
Bahrain to find out the similarities, differences and level of disclosure among them 
despite the fact that they are subject to the same accounting regulation. Therefore,
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carrying out this exercise requires one not only to analyse the bank’s financial 
statements (from 1991 to 1996) but also to review their contracts with I AH and the 
memorandum and articles of association of the tlrree barrks.
Interviews were also held with the serrior management of the thr ee Bahr airr barrks to 
ask them about their accounting treatments and disclosines of specific issues (e.g. 
provisions, disclosur e of the basis of profit allocatiorr betweerr lAH and shareholders.) 
(enclosed as appendix 1, is the positions of the persons interviewed fiom Ahnred 
Bank, Mohammed Bank arrd Klralifa Bank.) To check on the informatiorr received 
from the senior managernerrt of the banks, more than one interview was held with 
them. If more clarificatiorrs were needed, discussions with the bank’s auditors were 
held, in the case of an accounting matter, arrd with the SSB when the point related to 
Shari 'a.
Furtherrrrore, to avoid misunderstarrding arrd to errsure accuracy of irrformation 
provided, each bank was irrvited to cornnrent orr the part written in the thesis related to 
that banlc. It is worth rroting that the arralysis of Islamic banks operathrg outside 
Bahrain was lirrrited to examirring their firrarrcial statements.
Irr order to gain a deeper urrderstandirrg of the accounting differerrces and level of 
disclosure that existed among Islamic barrks operating irr the same coimtry, arrd which 
were subject to the same regulations by adherirrg to IAS standards, an irr-depth 
arralysis of the accountirrg policies adopted by Islamic banks was required.
To achieve the above, it was decided to use the case study method to study in greater 
depth two Islarrric banks operatirrg in Bahrain. Given the lack of available research on 
the accounting practices of Islamic banks, it was decided that the case study method 
was the appropriate tool for this purpose. This is particularly so sirrce very little 
information orr accourrtiirg policies is disclosed in the armual reports of Islamic barrks 
as was apparent from the pilot survey.
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Hussey and Hussey (1997) identifies the following characteristics of case study 
research:
■ The resear ch aims not only to explore certain phenomena, but to understand 
them within a particular context;
■ The research does not conmience with a set of questions and notions about the 
limits within which the study will take place; and
■ The research uses multiple methods for collecting data, which may be both 
qualitative and quantitative.
5.2.2 Advantages of the use of Case Studies
The case study approach is supported by Yin (1983, p. 1) who argued that “case 
studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are bemg posed, 
when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.” Yin (1983, pp. 3-4) also 
argued that “the case study has been a common research strategy in psychology, 
sociology, political science, business, social work, and planning.”
Quoted in Yin (1994, p. 6) Lupo et al, (1971) stated that “how” and “why” questions 
call for explanatory answers which may benefit from the adoption of case studies. 
This is because such questions deal with operational links needing to be tr aced over­
time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence.
The case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, when the relevant 
behaviour camrot be manipulated. The case study relies on many of the same 
techniques as a historian, but it adds two sources of evidence not usually included in 
the historian’s repertoire: direct observation and systematic interviewing. Again, 
although case studies and histories can overlap, the case study’s unique strength is its 
ability to deal with a full variety of evidence - documents, ar tifacts, interviews, and 
observations-beyond what might be available in a conventional historical study
(r4) This and the following section draw heavily from Yin (1994) chapters 1 and 2.
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Furthermore, the essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case 
study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set decisions, why they were taken, 
how they were implemented, and with what result (Schramm, 1971).
5.2. 3 Limitations of the use of the Case Studies
Yin (1994, p,9) ar gued that “Although the case study is a distinctive form of empirical 
inquiry, many research investigators have disdain for the strategy. To put it another 
way, as a research endeavour, case studies have always been viewed as a less than 
desirable form of inquiry than either experiments or surveys. Perhaps the greatest 
concern has been over the lack of rigour" of case study resear ch. Too many times, the 
case study investigator is accused for being sloppy and to have allowed equivocal 
evidence or biased views to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions.”
The possibility also exists that people have confused case study teaching with case 
study research. In teaching, case study materials may be deliberately altered to 
demonstrate a particular point more effectively. In research such a step would be 
strictly forbidden. Every case study investigator must work har d to report all evidence 
fairly. Bias can also enter into the conduct of experiments (Rosenthal, 1966) and the 
use of other research strategies, such as designing questionnaires for surveys (Sudman 
& Bradburn, 1982) or conducting historical research (Gottschalk, 1968). The 
problems are not different, but, in case study research, they may have been more 
frequently encountered and less fr equently overcome.
Quoted in (Yin 1994, p. 10) Kennedy, (1976) stated that another limitation of the case 
study method is that case studies provide limited basis for scientific generalization.
Quoted in Yin (1994, p. 10) Lipset et al (1956) argued that “Case study, like the 
experiment, does not represent a ‘sample’, and the investigator’s goal is to expand to 
generalized theories (analytic generalization) arrd not to enumerate frequencies 
(statistical generalization). Or, as tlrr ee notable scientists describe in their single case 
study, the goal is to do a ‘generalizing’ and not a ‘particularizing’ analysis.”
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Quoted also in Yin(1994, p. 10) Freagin et a l( 1991) claimed that “case studies take 
too long, and they result in massive, unreadable documents. Tlris complaint may be 
appropriate, given the way case studies have been done in the past, but this is not
necessarily applicable to case studies done in the futiue.”
5.2.4 Selection of the Case Studies
From the three Islamic banks operating in Balrr ain, two of them were selected for the 
case studies. The reason for choosing Alimed Bank and Mohammed Bank and not 
Klralifa Bank is because each of the first two is in contrast to each other as indicated 
in the case studies e.g. Moharmned Barrk reflects I AH in the liability section of the 
balance sheet, while Ahmed Barrk reflects I AH as off balance sheet under funds under 
management. Klralifa Barrk, on the other hand, treats lAH sirrrilarly to the accounting 
treatments of Mohammed Barrk e.g. Klralifa Barrk also reflects I AH in the liability 
section of the balarrce sheet.
Moreover, conducting two case studies rather than one case study will provide better 
understanding of the accounting policies of Islamic barrks and will strerrgthen the 
ar gumerrt as to whether there is a need to regulate the accounting practices of Islamic 
harries by a set of accountirrg standards other than IAS.
One of the selected Islamic barrks, Ahmed Bank, treats lAH as funds rmder
rnanagemerrt, offers higher risk investmerrt with higher return, while the other selected 
Islamic barrk, Mohammed Bank, treats I AH in the liability section of the balance sheet 
and offers lower risk investments with lower return. The role of the SSB in the two 
barrks is also differerrt arrd both of them clairrr that they follow IAS as required by 
their supervisory body. Furthermore, while Ahmed Bank is part of a larger group 
operatirrg in rrurnber of courrtries, Mohammed Bank is a srrraller bank with no 
preserrce outside Balrrairr. These different characteristics of the two barrks provide a 
good opportirnity to study their despite their claim of adhering to the same set of 
accoimting standards, IAS.
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It is to be noted that the use of multiple case studies in research is supported by 
numerous authors. For example, Frestone & Hemott (1983) claims that the evidence 
from multiple cases is usually believed to be more compelling, and the overall study is 
therefore regarded as being more robust.
The research uses “embedded case studies” by conducting cross sectiorral comparison 
between the two banks rather than taking each case study separately. Furthermore, 
since the case studies mainly focused on the accounting treatments of the bank, 
analysing subunits (Yin, 1990) within the bank, rather than looking to the bank as a 
whole, the “embedded case studies metlrod” become more relevant. Yin (1990) also 
argued that analysing subunits allow significant opportunities for extensive analysis.
5.2.5 Steps Adopted in Developing the Case Studies
1. Examining both banks’ financial statements (from 1991 published accounts 
to 1995)
This was mtended to gain a better imderstanding of the banks’ accounting policies and 
the level of information published in their financial statements and to establish 
whether this information was in accordance with IAS and to establish the similarities 
and differences in the accounting treatments between the two banks and their 
respective levels of disclosiue. Examining the financial statements was also intended 
to lead to an understanding of the natur e and size of the operations car ried out by the 
bank, the size of the bank in terms of its own capital and I AH funds.
2. Reviewing Banks’ Memorandum and Articles of Association
This was intended mainly to ensure that the objectives of the two banks were to 
operate in accordance with the Islamic principles and to determine the responsibilities 
of the SSB in carrying out their duties. Furthermore, examining the Memorandum 
and Ar'ticles of Association was intended to establish whether setting up the banks’ 
accounting policies was solely the responsibility of the management and whether the 
SSB could participate in the setting up of these polices.
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3. Reviewing the Banks’ Contracts with lAH
This was intended mainly to evaluate (a) the level of information given in these 
contracts; (b) whether the contracts disclose the bank’s share as Mudarib; (c) the 
bank’s policy of allocation of profits between the bank and lAH including the 
percentage to be set aside for liquidity, which represents a liability of the bank; (d) 
whether the contracts disclose the expenses that are borne by the lAH including the 
percentage deducted from them for the “Reserve Fund”.
4. Conducting Inteiwiews with Banks’ Senior Management
One of the methods to collect data is through face to face interviews. One of the main 
sour ces of information which was essential for this thesis was the interviews held with 
the two banks’ senior management (enclosed as appendixes 1 & 2, ar e the positions of 
the persons interviewed from Ahmed Bank, and Mohammed Bank and the questions 
that were asked). Due to the complexity of the case studies and the low level of 
information published in each bank’s financial statements, the interviews were very 
rewarding since they allowed the thesis to address issues relating directly to the banks’ 
accounting policies which are not disclosed in the banks’ financial statements.
Questions were prepared in advance in order to obtain as much relevant data as 
possible fi'om the interviewee. To check the accur acy of responses, more than one 
interview was held sometimes to repeat the same questions or to ask for more 
clarifications on the responses. An audio recorder was used in all interviews.
Using the face to face interviews has its strengths and weaknesses, Hussey and 
Hussey (1997, p. 163) ar gued that “this method of face to face is an expensive method 
and time consuming, particular ly if conducted in a location which is the choice of the 
inter*viewee. At the same time, it offers the advantage that response rates tend to be 
high and comprehensive data can collected. It is often very useful if sensitive or 
complex questions need to be asked.” They added that (1997, p. 157) “interviewees 
may have certain expectations about the interview and therefore give what they 
consider to be a ‘correct’ or ‘acceptable’ response.”
73
QuotedinHussey and Hussey (1997, p. 157) Lee (1993) indicated another limitation 
of face to face interview that “it is difficult to predict or measuie potential bias, but 
the interviewer should be alert to the fact that it can distort the data and hence tlie 
findings.”
5. Conducting Interviews with the Banks’ External Auditors
More than one interview was held with both banks’ external auditors by conducting 
face to face interviews thiough questions prepar ed in advance (enclosed as appendix 3 
& 4, the positions of the persons interviewed from the External Auditors, and the 
questions that were asked.) The interviews were meant to understand the role of the 
auditors in advising the bank on the accounting policies to be adopted, and whether 
the procedures adopted in auditing Islamic banks were the same as those used in 
auditing conventional banks.
Furthermore, the interviews with the auditors were intended to check some of the 
issues that were raised witli the senior management of the banks. These issues were 
brought up with the auditors to check the accuracy of the information given to the 
interviewer by senior management.
6. Conducting Inteiwiews with the SSB of Each Bank
One interview was held with one member of the SSB of Mohammed Bank and one 
interview was held with two members of the SSB of Alimed Banlc. The interviews of 
the two banks were conducted separ ately and were face to face through questions 
prepared in advance (enclosed as appendixes 5 & 6, the positions of the persons that 
were interviewed from the Shari’a Supervisory Boards and the questions that were 
asked.)
The interviews held with the SSBs’ members also inquired whether the SSB played a 
role in setting up the banks’ accounting policies.
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7. The Comparison of the Two Cases Studies
A comparison of the two case studies was carried out to determine the similarities and 
differences on the accoimting practices of the two banks and their level of disclosuie. 
This was intended to test the hypothesis that because IASs were not di'afted so as to 
deal with the specificities of Islamic banks, the adoption of IASs by both banks had 
neither prevented their financial statements being non-comparable in important ways 
nor led to an acceptable level of disclosure.
If this hypothesis is supported by the findings of the reseaich, this in tuin will lend 
support to the development of accounting standaids that specifically cater for the 
characteristics of financial instruments used by Islamic banks in the mobilization and 
application of fimds (Karim, 1999),
The case of Alimed Bank is presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6 
AHMED BANK
The case study is divided into the following sections:
1- Introduction.
2- Types of contracts governing the bank’s relation with Investment Account Holders.
3- Accounting practices of the bank.
4- Role of the Shaii’a Supervisoiy Board (SSB).
5- Role of the external auditors.
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Ahmed Bank was granted a banking license in the early 1980s with paid-up capital of 
US$20m. It is worth noting that the first management of the bank had wide experience in 
banking and fund management. The bank is a subsidiary of a large financial group that 
holds 53 per cent of tire capital, the remainder being held by individual investors. The 
group operates in number of countries including Balrrain, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, 
arrd Turkey. It also operates in Europe.
The bank's Articles of Association state that it will “promote, foster and develop the 
applicatiorrs of Islarrric prirrciples, laws arrd traditions to the transaction of finarrcial, 
barrking arrd related business affairs irrcludirrg the investment of fimds.”
6.1.1 Assets of the Bank
Figure (1) shows that the barrk's assets, excludirrg assets pertaining to fimds urrder 
management, increased by alrrrost 100 per cerrt during the period 1991-1995. The 
increase was mainly due to an increase in shareholder fimds, which reached US$101m in 
1995, compared to a level of US$62m in 1991. The other major irrcrease was in the 
current accoimts, which reached US$57m in 1995, compared to a level of US$30rn in 
1991.
(rS) This is a fictitious name for one o f  the Islamic banks,
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The Total Assets of the Bank
Fig. Evolution of Total Assets
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Short-term assets reached US$72m in 1995 compared to US$54m in 1991. This item 
includes short-term liquid funds and investment in the bank's managed funds (the bank’s 
investments on behalf of the shareholders in its funds under-management, e.g., bilateral 
Mudaraba.) Funds due fiom related companies have shown a surge fi*om US$0.097m to 
US$36m over the same period. Income receivable and the item on the bank’s balance 
sheet labelled ‘other assets’ increased substantially as it reached US$54m in 1995 
compared to US$17m in 1991.
Fiq.Ql Evolution of Shareholders’ Funds
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6.1.2 Shareholders’ Funds
Figure (2) indicates that shareholders' funds increased from US$61.5rn in 1991 to 
US$100.8m in 1995, an increase of 64 per cent, mainly attributable to retained profits.
The movement of shareholders’ frrnds
Opening shareholders’ funds at 31/12/1991;
+ Right issues cash
+ Retained profits
+ Assets’ revaluation surplus
Less foreign exchange translation adjustments
Millions.
US$061.5
US$003.0
US$040.8
US$000.7
US$004.8
Balance of shareholders’ funds at 31/12/1995 US$100.8
The ratio of shareholders funds to total funds under management (Investment Account 
Holders or TAH’), which appear in the bank’s balance sheet as off-balance sheet items, 
rose from 1:18 (5.5 per cent) in 1991 to 1:10 (10 per cent) in 1995. This indicates a 
strategy to strengthen the bank's capital base in relation to its fimds under management. It 
is worth noting that up to 1995, all I AH were reported as funds rmder management.
The rights of the shareholders of Almied Bank include the following:
1- The appointment of members of the board of directors.
2- The appointment of the external auditors following the boards’ recormnendation.
The main responsibilities of the board of directors are to formulate the overall policies of 
the bank and to appoint the management and the Shari ’a Supervisory Boar d.
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Furthermore, the bank's net profits increased in 1995 to US$12.6m from US$9m in 1991. 
During the same period the return on owners’ equity declined from 14.7 per cent in 1991 
to 13.5 per cent in 1995 despite the increase in the bank’s net profit. The decrease was 
mainly attributed to the increase in the owners’ equity from US$61.5m in 1991 to 
US$100.7m in 1995 due to the dilution effect of the increase in equity. It is worth noting 
that funds under management declined slightly in 1995 in relation to 1991.
6.2 TYPES OF CONTRACTS GOVERNING THE BANK’S RELATION WITH 
lAH
6.2.1 Funds Under Management
Fig. 01 Evolution of Funds Under Management
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Funds under management represent the funds of Investment Accoimt Holders (lAH) 
which are mobilised on a Mudaraba basis (profit sharing). The bank indicated that its 
role is like that of fund managers who invest the investors’ fimds on their behalf with no 
liability on the managers’ part to return the investors’ funds in case of loss, provided that 
the loss was not due to negligence or breach of contract. The bank is entitled to a certain 
fee called the Mudarib shar e, which is calculated as a percentage of the lAH’s profits.
The bank offers specialised funds for investors. Each Fund has its own terms and 
conditions. The bank maintains separate accoimts for each fund. The Mudaraba funds 
can be broken down into two types: discretionary (unrestricted) accoimts and non- 
discretionary (restricted) investment accounts.
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6.2.1.1 Discretionary Accounts (Unrestricted Investment Accounts)
As regards discretionary accounts, the bank is permitted to employ lAH funds in 
investment opportunities that the bank deems appropriate without recourse to the 
investors. The discretionary accounts ar e of two types: General Mudaraba Fimd (GMF) 
and Private Investment Portfolio (PIP). The bank maintains separate balance sheets and 
income statements for each of these funds.
However, if any of the fimds is in need of liquidity, it may borrow fiom another fimd 
provided that the terms and conditions of that fund permit it. The deal between the fimds 
will be cariied out on an arms-length basis, which means that the rates that ar e used 
between the funds are the same rates as those used by the bank in dealing with another 
entity.
i) The General Mudaraba Fund (GMF): The bank imposes no conditions on the 
amoimts to be placed under GMF, unlike the Private Investment Fund where a minimum 
amount is required. The GMF invests in relatively low risk investments (savings-type 
products). Hence, the profits paid to investors in this Fund may be lower than the rate of 
profits distributed by other Fmids. Investors in this Fimd place their funds for periods not 
exceeding one year.
Investors in the GMF ar e allowed to withdraw their fimds at short notice. Due to its 
relatively high liquidity, this affects the level of the profits paid to them. The bank claims 
that managing the investors’ fimds imder GMF involves higher costs and a higher 
percentage of liquidity to meet investors' withdrawals of funds than for other types of 
fund. Accordingly, the banks' Mudarib percentage share is higher than for other 
accounts. Savings accomits fall under the same terms as the GMF.
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The Main Terms and Conditions of the Unrestricted Investment Accounts' Contract 
Cost o f Operations
Ahmed Bank {Mudarib) bear s all costs of banking operations and the cost of managing 
the assets of the fund. Brokerage fees paid to parties during the cour se of business for the 
purpose of acquisition of assets for the frind are in principle borne by the fund and not by 
the banlc. However, although the bank has the right to transfer such expenses to the flind, 
they ar e usually borne by the bank.
Asset Valuation and Recoenition o f Profit
According to the terms of the banks’ contract for Umestricted I AH:
“all assets pertaining to Investment Accounts of any kind whatsoever may be 
commingled. These assets are evaluated at the end of every Gregorian month. Profit 
realised and accrued for the month is credited to the investor’s account at the end of each 
pertinent month.”
The Bank's Share o f the Profit
The bank is entitled to a share of profit as Mudarib only if the Fund generates a profit.
The following ar e the ceilings for Mudarib ‘s share of profit:
Undetermined Term (Savings Accoimt) 33.33%
7 days (1 week) 25.00%
90 days (3 months) 20.00%
180 days (6 months) 17.50%
360 days (12 months) 15.00%
Reserve Fund
According to the banks’ contract:
"the bank is allowed to deduct up to a maximum of 10 per cent from the fund’s net profit 
for reserve fund (hidden reserve) as Takafol (mutual provision) among investors in the 
fund.” This reserve fund is determined after deducting any direct expenses relating to the
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fimd and before the Mudarib share, and is used primaiiiy to meet losses in respect of the 
assets of the fimd. It is also used to pay the investors' profits dur ing a period of decline in 
the fund's profitability (income smoothing). The amount of this reserve fimd is not 
shown in the financial statements or by way of a note to the accounts.
ii) Private Investment Portfolio (PIP): Each investor's fimds under PIP are managed 
separately. This serwice is offered to high net worth investors who place large amoimts 
with the bank. Although this is a discretionary accomit, the investor can give general 
instructions to the bank regar ding such matters as the level of risk he/she is willing to 
accept and the type of investment.
Cost o f Operations
The same terms and conditions of GMF also apply to PIP.
Asset Valuation and Calculation o f Profit
According to the banks’ contr act "the bank is authorised to invest the investor's funds in a 
portfolio managed by the bank or investment opportunities tlrr ough the assets of the bank. 
The investor also allows the bank to invest his fimds in other investment opportunities 
without any obligation on par t of the bank. If the bank was able to achieve profits in 
addition to the expected profits (the profits achieved by the bank in excess of the 
expected profits, as indicated to the investors at the commencement of the contr act), the 
investor agrees that the bank will deduct up to 50% of the additional profits as 
remuneration.”
The Bank's Share o f the Profit
The bank's share of the profit as Mudarib is equal to 10 per cent of the profits earned 
fiom investing the investors’ fimds; however, the bank does not get reward for its 
efforts it no profits are achieved. The banks’ contract states that “the bank at its sole 
discretion may forgo part of its shar*e of profits in favour" of the investor.”
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The Reserve Fund
The investor permits the bank to deduct up to 5 per cent from the fund's realised profits to 
meet any losses in respect of the fimds’ investment and to pay the investors' profits dming 
a period of decline in the flmd's profitability (income smoothing). The bank deducts the 
amount at the end of each month before the bank receives its shaie as Mudarib and the 
payment of investors’ profits. As in the case of the GMF, the amoimt of the reserve is not 
shown in the financial statements or notes and thus constitutes a hidden reserve.
6.2.1.2 Restricted Mudaraba Fund (RMF)
Under a Restricted Mudaraba Fimd (RMF) the investor (IAH) authorises the bank to use 
the investor’s funds according to the conditions specified by the investors, e.g., in a 
specified investment such as real estate or agriculture. Restricted Investment Accounts 
are targeted at high net worth investors who usually place their frmds for over a year. The 
investment in these fluids (investment products) will typically carry higher risk and higher 
profits when compared to the General Mudaraba Fund. Usually, the type of investment is 
stated in the agreement with the investor. The bank maintains separate accounts for each 
of these funds, including a separate balance sheet and profit and loss account. RMF funds 
are like open-ended funds where the investors change during the life of the fimd.
In order not to liquidate the fund’s investments before its matmity, at its discretion the 
bank may play the role of market maker and buy the units of those investors who would 
opt to withdraw their funds before the liquidation of the fund until new I AH join the 
Fund. The bank will in this case be entitled to receive its share of the profits, as an 
investor, on an aims-length basis besides its share as Mudarib,
The liquidity maintained in these funds is less than in the GMF because investors place 
their funds for a longer period. This enables the bank to invest a higher percentage of the 
fimds available in longer investments. Accordingly, the profits generated on these funds 
are expected to be higher than for GMF. As a result, investors in RMF aie expected to 
receive higher profits than those who invest in the GMF.
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The bank's contract states that the bank may use I AH funds for investments other than 
those specified in the contract. The reason given for incorporating such a provision is 
that in some cases the bank, for example, may receive funds from investors to be invested 
in purchasing an aircraft a few days before launching the deal. Hence, in order not to 
keep investors’ funds idle the bank may invest them in short-term assets before launching 
the fimd. The bank mentioned that it had obtained the SSB's consent to use the investors' 
funds for investments other than those specified in the contract. The bank determmes on 
a monthly basis the profits on each fund and credits the investors’ accoimts with their 
share of the profits after deducting 10 per cent for the reserve fund as well as its share as 
Mudarib.
The Main Terms and Conditions of the Restricted Investment Accounts Contract
Fund Management and Administration 
According to the banks’ contract:
1) “The bank acts as manager and administrator of the fimd. All relevant decisions 
regarding the fimd are taken at the discretion of the bank {Mudarib). The bank may 
delegate all or part of its duties to a tliird party as the bank deems suitable.”
2) “The investor authorises the bank to identify further investment opportunities, whether 
relevant to new or existing assets and services, to achieve a profit/gain over and above 
the projected profit, fiom the fund managed by the Mudarib. The investor hereby 
authorises the Mudarib, in its sole discretion and without any obligation, to take such 
steps as the Mudarib may consider are reasonably necessary to exploit such 
opportunities and, in consideration of the Mudarib taking such steps, the investor 
agrees that the Mudarib may credit to its own account, in payment by way of a special 
fee, an amount to the maximum of 50 per cent of the net amount of any profit/gain 
over and above the projected profit, so achieved after payment of fees, char ges and/or 
any other amounts that the Mudarib may have paid to any third parties for the 
piu*pose.”
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The Mudarib *s Share o f Profit
1 -The bank is entitled to receive up to 33 per cent of the total profits as remuneration 
for its role as Mudarib. If no profits have been generated during any given month, the 
bank will receive no remuneration. If there is a profit, the bank may give up part or its 
entire share to the investors at its full discretion.
2- The bank may charge to the fimd any direct expenses paid by the bank on behalf of 
the fimd, e.g., fees related to a feasibility study prepared for the fimd.
Investment Risks
The investor declar es that he is fully awar e of the potential risk in his investments and 
that the fimd may incur" losses. The Mudarib does not indemnify the investor for any loss 
suffered and the bank carmot guarantee the investor any retur ns or the return of the 
principal sum invested. The liabilities and obligations relating to the fund are to be bor-ne 
by the investors except in the case of the bank's negligence or breach of the contract.
Transaction Fees
The bank shall bear* general expenses not directly related to any specific fimd. Brokerage 
and other commission paid to third parties in the ordinary course of managing the fimd 
are charged directly to the fimd’s Profit and Loss accoimt.
''Redemption " Facility
The bank acts as a market maker by replacing investors who withdraw their fimds at 
matmity. The bank plays this role in the absence of an organised Islamic capital market. 
The bank determines its share of profits on an arms-length basis (this mean that the 
banlc’s rate of profit will be the same rate of profit paid to other investors in the fund.) 
The bank's policy is to sell its shar e in the fund to new investors willing to join the fund 
so as to avoid conflict of interest, after determining the net assets value (NAV), i.e., total 
assets inclusive of accrued profits less total liabilities. The bank uses the historical cost 
or mark to market where applicable to determine the value of the flmd’s assets. For 
example, the bank uses the historical cost basis for Islamic financing such as Murabaha, 
Musharaka and Mudaraba and it uses mark to market for quoted securities. The bank
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determines the net asset value (NAV) of the fund monthly, which is also checked 
periodically by the bank's auditors.
Reserve Fund
According to the contract, the bank is allowed to deduct up to a maximum of 10 per cent 
from the fund’s net profits for a reserve frind (hidden reserve) as Takafol (mutual 
provision) among investors in the fund. This reserve fund is determined after deducting 
any direct expenses relating to the fund and before the Mudarib share is taken. It is used 
primarily to meet losses in respect of the assets of the fund and to pay the investors' 
profits during a period of decline in the fund's profitability (income smoothing). 
However, the bank may exercise its discretion as to whether it makes such a deduction.
Special Syndication
This is a specialised operation where the bank acts as lead manager and is responsible for 
soiu'cing, structuring and arranging the deal. It also acts as Mudarib for managing the deal 
on behalf of the investors. For example, the bank enters into a deal whereby it purchases 
a commodity and appoints an agent to sell the product on behalf of the bank.
Usually, the bank invites financial institutions to participate in the deal to spread the risk. 
Normally, the bank uses its own funds only to replace investors wishing to sell their share 
before the liquidation of the deal. The bank recognises its fee as lead manager when the 
deal is concluded.
6.3 ACCOUNTING PRACTICES OF THE BANK
The accounting of the bank is divided into two main divisions:
1- Corporate Books (The Bank's Book).
2- Investment Accormt-Holders’ Books.
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The bank claims that its main reason for separ ating the corporate books from those of the 
investors’ accoimts is to identify the rights and obligations of the bank separately from 
those of the investors (IAH).
6.3.1 Corporate Books
In the corporate books the bank maintains a separ ate balance sheet and income statement. 
The balance sheet reflects the assets of the bank that have been financed by the capital 
and reserves of the bank, the current accoimts, and other liabilities, excluding the funds 
received from I AH as these are treated off the balance sheet as funds under management.
The income statement reflects the profits earned on the bank’s assets, the bank’s share of 
profits as Mudarib for managing the I AH’s funds, and fees for providing banking 
services, etc. The expenses side represents those expenses which are related to the bank’s 
own expenses including provisions against the assets of the bank, expenses not related to 
any specific fund, etc.
The bank states that it applies the same accounting policies to both its financial 
statements (corporate books) and the books of I AH (funds under management).
6.3.2 The Investment Account Holders Books (funds under management)
The bank states that it treats investment accounts (both restricted and imi'estricted) as 
funds imder management, since they are not liabilities of the bank. In case of loss neither 
due to the bank’s negligence nor to a breach of contract, the I AH will shaie in that loss in 
proportion to their contribution to the investments. The bank stated that its role as 
Mudarib is similar to tlie role of a fund manager who manages mutual funds.
The bank maintains separate accomits to determine the rights and obligations of the lAH 
in each fund. The bank believes “this accounting treatment is fairer to shareholders and 
Investment Account Holders compared to other accounting treatments applied by other 
Islamic banks.”
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The bank argued that it does not publish separate financial statements for its managed 
funds because this is not required under IAS 30. However, the bank mentioned to the 
researcher that it would provide such information to lAH at their request.
6.3.2.1 Profit Allocation
The profit allocation of Ahmed Bank has the following characteristics:
1) The shareholders of Alimed Bank are entitled to all profits earned on their
investments plus the profits earned by the bank as Mudarib and any other
fees/commissions collected by the bank for banking seiwices provided to its 
customers.
2) As the shareholders are the owners of the bank, all liabilities and coimnitnients of the 
bank are to be borne by the shareholders to the extent of their contribution to the
capital of the bank plus any unpaid calls on shares.
3) The relationship governing ciuTent accoimt holders and the bank is a debtor/creditor 
relationship, wliich means that holders of cuirent accounts make their fimds available 
to the bank at a zero return. In retuin the bank guarantees the payment of these funds. 
Ill case of loss the bank pays the cuiTent account holders fiom shaieholders’ funds. 
Revenues earned fiom investing the excess of cuiTent account funds that are not 
required to be held as liquid cash aie credited to shaieholders.
4) The bank’s accounting system was developed to enable it to determine the profit/loss 
of each fimd at any specific time and allows the bank to review its investment policies 
from time to time. The bank’s policy is to credit each I AH’s account at the end of 
each month with their share of profits after deducting the following:
■ the I AH’s share of the contribution to the reserve fimd (Takafol);
■ any direct expenses to be borne by the lAH; and
■ the bank’s share as Mudarib.
The banlc indicated that Islamic Shari 'a permits the bank to reduce its Mudarib rate 
without informing the I AH, but it camiot charge a higher rate than that stated in the 
contract without first obtaining the lAH’s consent. However, up to 1995 the financial 
statements do not disclose the actual Mudarib rates collected by the bank as this is not 
required under IAS 30.
6.3.2.2 The Accounting Treatments Adopted by Ahmed Bank
i) Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer: Alimed Bank offers Murabaha Financing Upon 
The Order Of The Buyer, whereby the bank buys the goods at the request of the client 
who, according to the SharVa ruling of the bank's SSB, is obliged to buy the goods from 
tire bank when the latter acquires them. The difference between the cost of pur chase and 
the selling price to the client represents the profit of the bank. Until 1993, the bank used 
the straight-line method of income recognition, whereby it divided the profits equally 
over the period of ihs Murabaha, In 1994, the bank started to use the reducing balance 
method for the major transactions of the Murabaha, though small transactions remained 
subject to the straight-line method. The bank states that such changes were not 
mentioned in the notes to the bank's financial statements because they had no material 
effect on the accoimts. The external auditors supported this view. However, in 1996, the 
audited accounts stated that the bank used both the reducing balance and the str aight-line 
method. The bank’s auditors stated that it was important to indicate this in the published 
accounts because it had a material effects on the accounts of the bank. In 1997, the bank 
stopped using the straight-line method. It should be noted that the reducing balance 
method might be either similar or identical to the ‘actuarial method’. This method 
assumes a constant ratio of income to capital outstanding and apportions each instalment 
between capital and income according to this ratio, thus notionally ‘repaying’ the capital. 
As the balance of capital outstanding is reduced, so is the proportion of each instalment 
recognised as income, and the effect of this method is therefore to recognise income 
sooner than with the straight-line method (for illustration see appendix 7).
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The bank claimed that using the reducing balance method would provide the following 
advantages:
1- It provides for a constant return on investment over time.
2- It complies with the matching concept.
3- It provides a fair method for profit allocation to all investors.
In addition, using the straight-line method will have the following disadvantages:
1- It leads to distortion in profit recognition.
2- It does not provide a fair method for profit distribution.
ii) Miisharaka Financing: Ahmed Bank applies the Fixed Musharaka, which mean there 
will be no change in the partner’s share during the life of the Musharaka. The 
Musharaka will be terminated when the partners decide to liquidate it or sell it to a third 
party.
The bank treats its share in the Musharaka as an investment in an associated company, by 
using the equity method to record its shar e in the Musharaka. In most cases the bank's 
participation in the Musharaka will not be less than 50 per cent of the amount of the 
Musharaka.
The bank claims that although its shar e in the Musharaka will be more than 50 per cent, 
and it exercises management control over the Musharaka, it treats its share as an 
investment in an associated entity and not as an investment in a subsidiary. This is 
because the Musharaka tliat the banlc finances is in the form of a specific transaction 
(trade project) and not a legal entity.
Hi) Mudaraba Financing: The bairk as Rah al Afo//provides the capital to the client 
{Mudarib) who invests it according to the terms of the contract. The bank's share in 
Mudaraba is accounted for using the cost method. Thus, any appreciation in the value of 
the bank's share will not be recognised, while in case of a permanent decline in the value
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of the bank's share a provision will be created against such decline and the bank’s 
balance-sheet will reflect the net amount after deducting the provision. The bank 
recognises its shar e in the profits of the Mudaraba only when it is distributed or declared 
as distributable by the Mudarib.
iv) Leasing Transactions: Most of the leasing transactions entered into by the bank ar e of 
the type that is known as Ijara wa Iqtina (or Ijara Muntahia Bittamleek), which means that 
the title in the leased asset will be transferred from the bank to the lessee at the end of the 
contract.
This type of leasing is somewhat similar to a finance lease, with the exception that with 
the latter (according to IAS 17) the lessor transfers the obligations of ownership 
(maintenance, insurance, etc.) to the lessee together with most of the rights of ownersliip - 
even before the transfer of ownership takes place. In Ijara wa Iqtina, the lessor remains 
responsible for maintenance, insur ance, etc., until the transfer of ownership takes place. 
Also, under Ijara wa Iqtina the lessor is responsible for any permanent impairment of the 
leased asset’s value before the title is transferred to the lessee if the impairment was not 
due to the negligence of the lessee.
The bank treats this type of leasing as a finance lease by reflecting the initial amount of 
the lease under accounts receivable and not under fixed assets. The income from the 
lease is recognised in accordance with the actuar ial method. Thus, lease instalments aie 
apportioned between capital and income as illustrated in the appendix under Murabaha, 
and the bank’s share in the leased asset decreases at an accelerating rate.
v) Prudential Reserves: The difference between reserves and provisions is that reseiwes 
aie pait of equity and are constituted by appropriations out of the net profits of the entity. 
If there is no profit, no reserve is created. (“Entity here may mean the bank or one of its 
managed frinds.) Provisions, on the other hand, are charged as an expense in arriving at 
the entity’s profit or loss. The bank maintains two types of reserves. These are:
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I) Fund Reserves
The bank creates a reserve for each fund it manages by deducting a certain percentage 
from the profits of that fund, which aie to be used primarily to cover future potential 
losses. The fimd’s financial statements reflect the assets after deducting the reserves, 
which means that, in effect, these reserves are treated from a balance-sheet point of view 
as provisions or contra-assets. In the case of a loss, it is charged against the ‘reserve’ and 
not against current profits; however, if the reserve is insufficient, the bank will provide 
finance to make good the deficit and this is considered by the bank as a donation to the 
fund and is charged in the bank’s profit and loss account.
The balance of reserves is referred to as Takafol (mutual provision) between investors in 
the fund. The bank's contract states the percentage that is deducted fr om the investors' 
profits. Although the reserve is primaiily set aside in case of possible losses, the bank 
may use the reserve to pay the investors' profits during a period of decline in the fund's 
profitability (income smoothing). The bank states that this is legitimate because these 
reserves belong to the investors and it has obtained the SSB’s approval. The balance of 
the reserves is not disclosed in the financial statements or in the notes thereon. Hence, 
they aie ‘hidden reserves’.
2f The Bank's Own Reserves and Provisions
The banks’ own reserves aie appropriated out of the bank's net profit. In addition, the 
bank creates provisions against a permanent decline in the value of its assets, and against 
non-performing facilities, as contra-assets against the assets of the bank. Such provisions 
are disclosed in the bank’s financial statements. The bank also discloses in its audited 
financial statements the amoiuit of reserves provided from shareholders' funds.
vi) The bank's investments in the fund: The bank stated that when it replaces investors 
in any of its managed funds, it treats its share as an investment in an associated entity, 
since it has management control over these funds. Hence, equity accounting is used.
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The Policy Of The Bank In Determining Its Share Of Profits As Mudarib And The 
Profits Of The lAH
The bank’s accounting policy is to recognise its shai*e of profit as in a closed-
ended fund when the transaction is liquidated. In the case of an open-ended fund, where 
investors are changing, the bank values the performance of each fund at the end of eveiy 
month to determine the profit of each fund by employing the historical cost plus or minus 
any accrued profits. This allows the bank to determine the investors' profit and its share 
as Mudarib, which is recognised on a monthly basis.
6.4 THE ROLE OF THE SHARI*A SUPERVISORY BOARD
The bank's Articles of Association state that "the SharVa Supeiwisoiy Boai'd shall have 
general responsibility to ensuie that the company's investments and activities (and those 
of its subsidiaries or controlled affiliates) are in accordance with Islamic principles.”
The members of the SSB consist of four SharVa scholars (including a chairman). 
According to the Articles of Association, the boai'd of directors is responsible for 
appointing the members of the SSB. The bank states that the SSB is independent of the 
management.
In order to ensuie that the bank has adopted its fatwas and instructions, the SSB appoints 
one of its members to review the operations and documents of the bank. The appointed 
member is required to present a report to the SSB on his review. The report is discussed 
among the committee members before it is submitted to the management of the bank for 
their response and before the SSB publishes that report as part of the amiual report of the 
banlc.
(16) The memorandum and articles o f association o f Ahmed Bank are more specific regarding the role o f  the SSB, compared witli 
those o f  Mohammed Bank.
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Occasionally, the SSB also holds meetings with the investment committee of the bank to 
discuss the committee’s investment policies and investment documents. This is with a 
view to checking whether or not the bank’s investments are in accordance with 
precepts and to ensure that the bank has adhered to its instructions.
Despite the importance of the SSB's participation in the setting up of the accounting 
policies of the bank to ensure that they ar e in accordance with the Shari 'a precepts, the 
accounting policies were actually agreed between the bank and its external auditors. In 
this respect it is important to mention that the SSB considers the bank as Mudarib and the 
Investment Account Holders as Rab al Mall (provider of funds).
6.5 VIEWS OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITORS
The external auditors of Almied Banlc stated that they have been appointed by the 
shareholders upon the recommendation of the board. The auditor’s report is, therefore, 
addressed to the shareholders only. The auditors argued tliat since they are appointed by 
the shar eholders, their main duty is to protect the interest of the shareholders.
The auditors stated that the audit procedures that they apply to Ahmed Bank are the same 
procedures as those applied to conventional banks. In both cases the auditor’s duty is to 
protect the interests of the shareholders. Hence, they carry out a full audit of the assets 
and liabilities of the bank, while, with regard to funds under management (which are 
treated as an off balance-sheet item), they perform a review rather than a full audit. This 
suggests that, although a review may bring significant matters affecting the accoimts to 
the auditor's attention, it does not ensure that the auditors are aware of all the significant 
matters that would be disclosed in a full audit. This is because the scope of conducting a 
review is substantially less than an audit. Therefore, tire auditors’ review report gives less 
assurance than that of an audit opinion.
It is worth noting that the only additional work that the auditors of Aluned Bank carTy out 
when they audit an Islamic bank is that in some cases they may require the management 
of the bank to obtain the SSB's approval for certain transactions.
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With regard to the accounting policies of the bank, the auditors stated that they were 
developed at the of the bank. They supported the bank's treatment of Investment
Account Holders as funds under management because they are not liabilities of the bank. 
In addition, the auditors of the bank supported the need for accoimting standar ds for 
Islamic banks. This was due to the special nature of certain operations car ried out by 
Islamic banks.
The auditors of the bank claimed that separ ating the Investment Account Holders into 
restricted and unrestricted investment accoimts as suggested in the AAOIFPs presentation 
and disclosures accounting standar d will not achieve a standardisation of the financial 
statements of Islamic banks. They ar gued that Islamic banks will change their contracts 
so as to be in line with the definition of a Restricted Investment Account in order to avoid 
reflecting the equity of Investment Account Holders as a balance-sheet item until the 
AAOIFI’s Discussion Memorandum and Exposure Draft Statement on Capital Adequacy 
appeared, the auditors might have thought that by treating I AH as an off balance-sheet 
item they would not subject I AH to capital adequacy requirements.
The next chapter will analyse the second case.
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CHAPTER? 
MOHAMMED BANK
The analysis of Mohammed Bank is divided into the following sections:
1- Introduction.
2- Types of contracts governing the bank’s relations with Investment Account 
Holders.
3- Accounting practices of the bank.
4- Role of the Shari’a Supervisory Board (SSB).
5- Role of the external auditors.
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Mohammed Bank was granted a banking license in the late 1970s with a paid-up 
capital of US$15.1m. The bank was established to carry out banking and other trading 
activities in accordance with the teachings of Islam (Mohammed Bank’s Ar ticles of 
Association). The past experience of the bank’s senior management was in 
conventional banks and insurance companies.
7.1.1 Assets of the Bank
Fie.t41 Evolution of Assets
Millions
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(17) This is a fictitious name for one o f  the Islamic banks.
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The growth in the bank's assets from 141IH (corresponding to 1991 according to the 
Gregorian Calendar*) to 1415H (corresponding to 1995) show an increase of almost 37 
per cent. The increase was mainly due to the calling of the remaining un-called 
capital, which amounted to US$15.1m. Also, a major increase was observed in the 
holdings of Investment Account Holders, which reached US$303m in 1415H 
compared to US$220m in 141IH. Current accounts reached US$30m in 1415H from 
US$20m inl411H.
During the same period, Murabaha financing increased substantially as it reached 
US$332m in 1415H compared to US$226m in 141 IH, an increase of 47 per cent.
Fig. (5 1 Evolution of Shareholders’ Funds
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7.1.2 Shareholders’ Funds
Figure (2) indicates an increase in the shareholders fiind in 1413H (corresponding to 
1993), the year* in which the bank called the remaining part of its capital, which was 
frilly subscribed by the shareholders. The increase in capital increased the ratio of 
shareholders’ funds to total assets from 1:17 in 141 IH to 1:11 in 1413H. This 
indicates that the bank strengthened its capital base.
Furthermore, it is important to mention that the bank’s overall return on assets 
increased by just over one-third, from.0.73 per cent in 141 IH to 1 per cent in 1415H. 
Meanwhile, the return on shareholders’ equity was 10.7 per cent in both 141 IH and
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1415H, as the bank’s share capital had increased by a similar proportion, from 
US$19.0m in 141 IH to US$30.6m in 1415H.
7.1.2.1 Rights of the Bank’s Shareholders
The rights of the shareholders’ of Mohammed Bank include the following:
1 - Appointment of members of the Board of Directors.
2- Appointment of the external auditors.
7.2 TYPES OF CONTRACTS GOVERNING THE BANK’S RELATIONS 
WITH lAH
It was observed from the discussion held with the management of the bank that the 
bank is authorised to invest the I AH’s funds in investments managed by the bank or 
through agents appointed by the bank. In addition, it was noted that all the bank’s 
contracts with I AH state that I AH are entitled to receive 75 per cent of the profits 
generated from their funds, after deduction of 10 per cent of such profits as provision 
against unexpected losses. The bank mentioned that, despite its right to deduct 10 per 
cent, thus far all provisions created have been chai'ged to the bank’s profit and loss 
account and shown in the balance sheet under ‘other liabilities’.
7.2.1 Savings Account (SA)
The bank stated that the contractual relationship governing the bank and the holders of 
savings accounts (sight deposits) is based on the contract. However, the
bank’s contract states that “50% of the funds available in the savings account (sv) will 
be invested in the bank’s portfolio and the holders’ of the saving accounts ai*e entitled 
to at least 75% of the profits generated on the 50% after deducting 10% of the profits 
for provisions against potential losses.”
This is illustrated by the following formula:
Balance available in SV x 50% x [75% -10%] = 32.5 % of balance
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The banlc’s policy is to pay the account-holders their share of profits at the end of the 
financial year, even if the lAH’s funds matui'ed before the end of the financial yeai*. 
The bank indicated to the researcher that it calculates the I AH’s share of profits from 
the date of placing the fund with the bank until the maturity date (this applies to all 
types of accounts).
The bank argued that this policy is adopted because an I AH who withdraws his funds 
before the end of the financial year* will not, therefore, share in any subsequent losses. 
However, paying an lAH his shar e of profits at the end of the financial year* will allow 
the bank to determine the profits or loss attributed to the lAH in respect of the 
duration of his investment.
7.2.2 Investment Accounts With Fixed Period (lAWFP)
Under this type of account, an lAH can choose to place his funds with the bank for 
one month, tlrree months, or one year*. The bank specifies the minimum amount to be 
deposited with the bankThe bank’s contract states that “75% of the funds available on 
IA WFP will be invested in the bank’s portfolio and the holders’ of this type of 
account are entitled to at least 75% of the profits generated on the 75%, after 
deducting 10% of the profits for* provisions against potential losses.” This is 
illustrated by the following formula:
Balance available in lAWFP x 75% x [75% -10%] = 48.75% of balance
The lAH receives his share of profits at the end of the financial year*. The bank 
mentioned that it renews the deposit only if the investor has approached the bank- 
expressing his consent to this.
7.2.3 Perpetual Investment Accounts (PIA)
Holders of tliis type of account ar e asked to deposit their funds with the bank for three 
year s. The bank’s contract states that “80% of the funds available on PIA will be 
invested in the bank’s portfolio, and the holders’ of this type of account are entitled to 
at least 75% of the profits generated on the 80%, after deducting 10% of the profits for 
provisions against potential losses.” This is illustrated by:
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Balance available on PIA x 80% x [75% -10%] = 52% of balance
It is worth noting that with this type of account, the bank will pay the profits to lAH at 
the end of the financial year*.
7.2.4 Specific Investment Certificate (SIC)
The account holder deposits a fixed amount with the bank. The total proportion 
invested in this type of account is higher than with the other types of deposits. The 
bank accepts deposits for short periods, such as three months.
As stated by the bank, in order to attract high net worth lAH the bank pays the lAH 
their share of profits at maturity, not at the end of the financial year. The bank mainly 
invests these funds in international commodities. The bank’s contract states that 
“90% of the funds available on SIC will be invested in the bank’s portfolio, and the 
holders’ of this type of account ar e entitled to at least 75% of the profits generated on 
the 90%, after deducting 10% of the profits for provisions against potential 
losses.” This is illustrated by:
Balance available on SIC x 90% x 75% - (10%) = 58% of balance
The Relationship Between the Bank and Current-Account Holders
The bank considers the funds maintained under current accounts as a free loan (Qard 
Hassan) provided to the bank by the cuirent account holders. The shareholders 
guarantee the amount of the principal. The bank invests tlie excess frmds and at the 
end of the year adds the income it earns to its overall profits.
7.3 ACCOUNTING PRACTICES OF THE BANK
When it was established in the late 1970s, banks in the coimtry in which Mohammed 
Bank operates were not required to follow a specific set of accounting standards. 
Therefore, at that time, banks (both Islamic and non-Islamic) followed accounting 
practices which they, together with their auditors, believed gave a fair presentation of 
the bank’s financial position and the results of its operations. In 1992 all banks.
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including Mohammed Bank, were required by the regulatoiy authority to adopt the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS).
7.3.1 The Accounting Treatments of Islamic Financing
i) Murabaha Financing: The bank states that it measmes its Murabaha financing 
receivables at cost to the client. It creates specific and general provisions against 
Islamic financing assets. The amounts of Murabaha financing are shown in the 
balance sheet as part of Islamic financing assets, and the notes do not show the 
amounts of each type of Islamic financing separately.
Before 141 OH (conesponding to 1990 according to the Gregorian Calendar) the bank 
applied the up-front method of income recognition, which meant all profits on 
Murabaha were recognised immediately after concluding the deal with the client. In 
141 OH the bank changed this accounting treatment following instruction from the 
regulatory authority to recognise profits on a pro rata basis for Murabaha contracts 
exceeding one financial year.
The following foimula is used to determine the bank’s profits from Murabaha 
financing:
(af-dp) X rm x dm = bp
(af) The total amount of facility
(dp) Down payment
(rm) The rate of Mur abaha per annum
(dm) Murabaha duration in years
(bp) Bank’s profits for the year
Note that Mohammed Bank does not calculate the profits on a monthly basis, unlike 
Ahmed Bank.
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The auditors of Mohanuned Bank clahn that this accounting treatment was taken from 
IAS 18, which states that “interest revenue which is the difference between the 
revenue from the sale of goods or rendering of the service and the nominal amount of 
the consideration, is recognised on a time proportion basis.”
ii) Musharaka Financing: Most of the bank’s Musharaka financing is of the 
declining Musharaka type. This means that the bank’s share in the Musharaka 
declines while the share of the other partner increases. For example, if the total 
amount of the Musharaka is US$100 and is invested in a building, and the bank’s 
initial share is $50, the bank will sign an agreement with the other partner stating that 
the bank will recover its initial shar e in the investment by adding 10 per cent to its 
initial share. Therefore, at the end of the Musharaka the bank will recover the cost of 
its initial share (US$50) plus US$5. This is in addition to the returns which the bank 
will receive in the form of rent. The latter will decline as the bank’s share in the real 
estate declines.
The payment will include part of the initial investment and part of the profits, and this 
will decrease the bank’s share in the building. The client would usually manage the 
building and the bank monitors the behaviour of the client and reserves the right to 
intervene if the client breaches the contract. This implication here is that the bank acts 
as a sleeping partner.
The bank measures its shar e in the Musharaka at cost, and at the end of the financial 
period any permanent decline in the value of the Musharaka would be reflected by the 
creation of a provision. This treatment is in line with IAS25 (para. 24), which states 
that “long term investments are usually car ried at cost unless in the case of permanent 
decline.”
Hi) Investment in Properties: The property is valued at cost, and in case of a 
permanent decline in the value of the property, a provision is created for such decline.
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This treatment is in line with IAS 25 (para. 23 A), which states that “investments 
classified as long-term assets should be caii'ied in the balance sheet at either:
1- cost;
2- re-valued amount; or
3- in the case of marketable equity securities, the lower of cost and market value 
determined on a ‘portfolio basis’.
7.3.2 The Contractual Relationship between Investment Account Holders and 
Mohammed Bank
Mohammed Bank reports equities of Investment Account Holders (IAH) as a liability 
on the balance-sheet, although the contractual relationship between the bank and lAH 
is based on the Mudaraba contract. The bank argues that this is a fair presentation 
because it is responsible for managing the investor’s funds in a prudent and 
professional manner, even though the bank does not guarantee the returns or the 
capital of these funds.
The management of Mohammed Bank claims that reporting I AH off balance-sheet as 
funds under management does not protect the interest of the lAH. Rather, it protects 
the management from any responsibility in cases of negligence by the bank. The 
bank’s treatment of I AH reflects its attitude that I AH represent a commercial 
obligation, i.e., it is in substance a fixed obligation on the bank similai* to a deposit in 
conventional bank. In other words, the management believes that lAH effectively 
represent a commercial liability on the bank in Üie sense that, if a loss were incuired 
relating to I AH funds, the bank would transfer the loss to the shaieholders. This 
would then be met from their profits, rather than deducted from the I AH funds, in 
order to avoid losing its lAHs’ confidence.
By contrast, AAOIFI’s Statement of Concepts (1993) requires Islamic banks to 
present equities of umestricted investment accounts as a separ ate item in the balance- 
sheet, which is part of neither shareholders’ funds nor liabilities.
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The bank stated that no losses relating to lAH have ever been borne by the 
shareholders from their profits, because all investment accounts have achieved profits. 
The reseai'cher is of the opinion that the bank, thus far, have not followed this practise 
of transferring losses. It is to be noted that the bank is not required to disclose any 
such information in their financial statements. On the other hand, the bank may also 
deduct part of the shareholders’ profits (share of Mudarib) to increase the I AH’s 
profits duiing a period of decline in the lAH’s profitability.
The bank mentioned that it commingles shaieholders’ funds with those of the lAH. 
The result is shaied between the two parties in proportion to their participation in the 
investments. The bank’s management indicated that all income, including that from 
banking services, is allocated between the shareholders and lAH.
The bank claimed that its reputation in the market is to a large extent influenced by 
the funds received from I AH and the adequacy of its capital. For example, if the bank 
wants to open a letter of credit with another bank, the conespondent bank will cany 
out an assessment report that will take into consideration the level of deposits. Hence, 
in order for the bank to act in a fair manner, both the shaieholders and the lAH should 
shar e in all of the bank’s profits.
It is worth noting that the management of the bank claims that the Board of Directors 
act as Mudarib since it is responsible for setting-up the overall policies of the bank, 
and the I AH are the Rab al Mall (provider of funds). This begs the question as to the 
status of the shareholders. A typical view would be that the bank is the Mudarib.
7.3.3 The Bank’s Provisioning Policy
The bank’s provisioning policy is to create specific provisions where losses .are 
expected to arise on Islamic financing contracts. The bank also creates a general 
provision on its financing portfolio. The bank’s accounting policy is to reflect the 
amounts of provisions in the income statement and to show provisions in the balance 
sheet as part of ‘other liabilities’.
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However, the bank would also create provisions against investments in properties and 
securities when there is a permanent decline in the value of such investments. The 
amount of such provisions is also char ged to the income statement.
Although the I AH authorise the bank to deduct 10 per cent of their profits to create 
provisions against losses (the bank’s contract), the bank has not used this right thus 
far. The bank’s provisions are charged to the profit and loss account and it credits 
specific provisions, which appear under the heading ‘other liabilities’ in the balance 
sheet.
7.3.4 The Bank’s Liquidity Policy
The bank adopts a conservative approach in managing its liquidity. The 1415H 
(corresponding to 1995) and 1416H (coiTcsponding to 1996) financial statements 
show that short-term assets (up to 3 months) exceed its short-term lAH of similar 
maturities by BD57m and BD31m, respectively. The bank’s financial statements 
show this 'surplus' is mainly invested in short-term commodities.
This policy tends to allow the bank to sell its commodity contracts in a short period if 
it faces any shortage in liquidity and at the same time earn some profits by investing in 
commodities transactions.
7.3.5 Profit Allocation
This method of profit allocation is designed to determine the lAH’s shar e of profits 
from the bank’s portfolio. The following method is applied to all types of I AH 
accounts:
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• (OBCA) Outstanding Balance of the I AH’s Account
• (TA) Total Assets
• (PIB) Percentage deemed to be Invested by the bank on behalf of
lAH, after deducting certain percentage for liquidity
• (TP) Total Profit
• (PPL) Provision for Potential losses
• (MR) Mudarib Profit Share Rate
• (ASP) Account Share in the Profit
Although the bank states that this is a general formula, nevertheless, in the case of a 
decline in the I AH’s share of profit, the bank may follow one or all of the following 
options in order to mitigate the fall:
OBCA PIB 100-MR%
ASP = TP -PPL
TA X X 100 X 100
1- transfer part of the shareholders profits to I AH in the form of a ‘donation’as it is 
permissible imder Islamic Jurisprudence for the Rab al Mall to give up part or all 
of his share of profit as Mudarib; plus
2- decide that the provisions are to be borne only by the shareholders; or
3- reduce its Mudarib rate to maintain the rate of the investors’ profits at the desired 
level.
This is intended to preserve the I AH’s confidence in the bank. As mentioned earlier, 
the transfer of profits from the shareholders to lAH is rrot disclosed in the bank's 
financial statements. It is worth noting that neither the shareholders nor the SSB have 
approved the practise of transferring profits from shareholders to lAH. (As already 
noted, the bank states that no such transfers have ever been made.)
(18) With regard to PPL, although this appears in the bank’s formula, in practice it appears not to be used.
106
The bank deducts from the amounts deemed to be invested in respect of each I AH’s 
type of account, a certain percentage for liquidity. This will not be included in 
calculating the allocation of profits when determining the lAH’s share of profits. 
However, the bank may invest pait of these ‘liquidity’ amounts in short-term 
investments after making provision for its short-term commitments, thereby 
generating additional profits for shareholders.
7.4 ROLE OF THE SHARI’A SUPERVISORY BOARD fSSBI
The SSB consists of six members. The meetings of the SSB take place at the 
management’s request and to respond to Shari 'a matters. The members of the SSB 
are not appointed by the shaieholders. No chairman has been appointed for the SSB,
Lately, the SSB extended its role to meeting with the staff of the bank. This is 
intended to educate the staff of the bank about issues relating to Shari 'a matters.
Fuithermore, the SSB reviews the annual financial statements of the bank before 
publication. This review is in order to ensuie that the bank’s profits have been 
generated only fr om investments permitted by the Shari ’a. The SSB also ensuies that 
the items appearing in the financial statements have been explained cleaily. Tliis 
procedure is supposed to 'ensure' that the operations of the bank are in accordance 
with Islamic Shari 'a.
Although the SSB was not involved in setting up the accounting policies of the bank, 
it issued a Fatw'a two or thi'ee years after the establisliment of the bank, to the effect 
that I AH and shareholders should be treated as partners (Shuraka) in the bank. This 
Fatwa was issued following a request to this effect made by the management of the 
bank to the SSB.
With regal'd to the bank’s method of profit recognition on M/mèfl/za financing, the 
SSB member whom the researcher interviewed objected to the bank’s initial treatment 
of recognising all the profits when the contract is concluded between the bank and tlie
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client (up-front income recognition). However, despite the SSB's objection, the bank 
continued using the up-front recognition of profits approach.
Therefore, it can be ai'gued tliat the Fatwas issued by the SSB are not treated as 
binding by the bank. Indeed, it is worth noting that the bank’s Articles of Association 
state that the SSB will play a 'consultative' role in such matters.
Nevertheless, every member of the SSB signs its annual report. The report states the 
following “The SSB has reviewed the balance sheet of Mohammed Bank and 
discussed its items with the bank’s management. Continuous contact was maintained 
between the officials of the bank and the SSB to examine the contracts and matters 
undertaken by the bank or dealt with, while undertaking its business activities. 
Religious opinions were expressed with respect to such questions and matters. The 
SSB committee, being thankful to Allah for its success, expresses its appreciation to 
the bank’s management for their keen interest in understanding and applying the 
provisions of tme Islamic Shari 'a.”
7.5 ROLE OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITORS
The auditors of Mohammed Bank stated that their auditing procedures for an Islamic 
bank are similai* to those for a conventional bank. In addition, the auditors believe 
that there is a necessity to develop Islamic accounting standards for Islamic banks, 
although a number of IAS standaids can be applied to Islamic banks. In this respect, 
the auditors mentioned that the issue of Islamic financing, including Murabaha 
financing and Musharaka financing, has not been addiessed by IAS.
With regal’d to the bank’s presentation of I AH’s as liabilities in the balance-sheet, the 
auditors of Mohammed Bank ai’gued that Islamic banks claim that I AH represent no 
legal liability for these banks. This is because the contractual relationship is based on 
the Mudaraba contract, whereby, in the case of loss relating to I AH’s funds these 
would be borne by lAH provided the loss was not due to the bank’s misconduct or 
negligence.
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It is worth noting that this treatment of I AH is similar to the treatment of another 
Islamic bank that was established before Mohammed Bank and is audited by the same 
accounting firm.
However (as the auditors indicated to the reseai'cher), Islamic banks usually prefer to 
transfer any losses to the shareholders rather than charging them to I AH. The auditors 
believe that if Islamic banks chai'ged the losses to lAH, they might lose their 
reputation in the market.
The auditors also stated that, in the absence of accounting standards for Islamic banks, 
differences would continue to exist between Islamic banks.
The auditors believe that they would accept the treatment of lAH as funds under 
management only if the bank strictly separated the accounts of shareholders fr om 
those of lAH, and the bank strictly adhered to the principles of Mudaraba (e.g., the 
bank does not transfer losses on lAH flmds to shaieholders’ shaie of profits.) In other 
words, the auditors seem to concui' with the bank in treating lAH accounts as in­
substance (or constructive) liabilities.
The auditors of Mohammed Bank indicated that they established the accounting 
policies of the bank in consultation with tlie management. Witli regai'd to the level of 
information disclosed by Islamic banks, the auditors believe that the present level of 
information disclosed by Mohammed Bank is in accordance with IAS. However, the 
auditors mentioned that, due to the nature of Islamic banks, more information needs to 
be disclosed in the bank’s financial statements, and this may be achieved when 
Islamic banks adopt the Islamic accounting standards issued by AAOIFI.
The auditors stated that the bank’s profits from aie now recognised on a
pro-rata basis over the period of the contract in order that each financial period is 
allocated its proportionate share of profits.
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The auditors argued that this accounting treatment of income recognition is more 
prudent than other accounting treatments used by some other Islamic banks. 
Recognising the profits pro-rata allows the lAH to receive an appropriate share of 
profits on their investments even if they decide to withdraw their funds before the 
liquidation of the investments. The auditors claimed that since Murabaha is a sale of 
goods, it falls within the scope of IAS 18, which states that" ... interest revenue which 
is the difference between the revenue fr om the sale of goods or rendering of the 
service and the nominal amount of the consideration is recognised on a time 
proportion basis.”
The auditors of Mohammed Bank pointed out that they are responsible to the 
shareholders because they were appointed by them. Therefore, if the auditors’ report 
is incorrect or it has ignored a major liability of the bank, the shaieholders would have 
the right to take the necessaiy actions against them.
The auditors of Mohammed Bank believe that banks which treat I AH as funds under 
management should be required to disclose more information than that which is 
required under IAS 30. Such information should include the amounts of provisions 
created against lAH’s investments, and the profits or losses earned on these flmds.
The next chapter will discuss the comparison, analysis and conclusions of the case 
studies.
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CHAPTER 8 
COMPARISONS, ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE 
CASE STUDIES
This chapter provides an analysis of the two case studies by casting light the casting 
similai'ities and differences and level of disclosuie between Ahmed Bank and 
Mohammed Bank. The reason for choosing these two banks for conducting the case 
study was that both banks operate in the same country and are therefore subject to the 
same supervisoiy regulations. In addition, each bank puisues different investment 
policies. For example, Ahmed Bank offers higher risk investments with higher 
returns, while Mohammed Bank offers low risk investments with, consequently, lower 
returns. The role of the SSB in the two banks is also different. Although both banks 
claim that they follow IAS, it appears from the transactions that were examined that 
each bank has a different accounting tieatment for the same transaction.
The chapter is divided into the following sections:
1- Comparisons of Case Studies.
2- Analysis of Alimed Bank’s Case.
3- Analysis of Mohammed Bank’s Case.
4“ Concluding Remarks.
8.1 COMPARISONS OF CASE STUDIES
Although the above indicates differences between the two banks in terms of their size 
and the complexities of their operations, whether these differences help to explain the 
differences in their accoimting policies is a matter which is discussed below. This 
section will highlight the main accounting differences, which were discussed in more 
details in the individual case studies.
8.1.1 The Accounting Treatment of Investment Account Holders
The contractual relationship governing the two banks and lAH is based on the 
Mudaraba contract. However, the accounting treatments of I AH differ between them.
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pending the implementation of AAOIFI standards. Ahmed Bank treats lAH as frmds 
under management (off balance sheet), while Mohammed Bank presents lAH under 
the liabilities side of the balance sheet.
The differences in accounting treatments between the two banks have resulted in non- 
compaiable financial statements. This will be discussed in more details in the case 
studies.
8.1.2 Disclosure of Information
i) Profit Allocation: Alimed Bank allocates the investors’ shar e of the profits on a 
monthly basis after it determines the profits achieved on each frmd. However, before 
making the payment, and before deducting its Mudarib shaie, the bank deducts from 
the profits a fixed percentage for ‘reserve fund’.
On the other hand, Mohammed Bank uses the following formula, which reflects the 
commingling of I AH funds with the shareholders’ funds in financing Total Assets:
OBCA PIB 1Q0-MR%
ASP = TP -PPL
TA X X  100 X  100
• (ASP) Account Shaie in the Profit
• (OBCA) Outstanding Balance of the lAH’s Account
• (TA) Total Assets
• (TP) Total Profit
• (PIB) Percentage Invested by the bank on behalf of lAH after deducting a certain 
percentage for liquidity( i.e. the ‘Investment Rate')
• (PPL) Provision for Potential losses
• (MR) Mudai'ib Rate
Although the contractual relationship between the two banks and their lAH is in both 
cases based on the Mudaraba contract, each bank uses a different metho4 for 
allocation of profits. Such a difference can be attributed to the differences in their
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investment policies, i.e., Alimed Bank separates the funds of the shareholders from 
those of lAH, while Mohammed Bank, conversely, commingles the funds of the 
shareholders with those of I AH.
ii) Transparency o f information: In the absence of a specific disclosuie standard 
issued on profit allocation by the lASC, or a clear direction fr om the regulatoiy 
authority, the two banks were not obliged to disclose information on their allocation 
of profits. For example, they were not obliged to disclose the actual Mudarib rate 
received by them, the profits generated on investing their I AH’s funds, any amounts 
transfeiTed from the shaieholders to the lAH or vice versa, or amounts transferred 
from one fund to another.
8.1.3 Islamic Financing
i) Murabaha Financing: Until 1993, Alimed Bank used to adopt the straight-line 
method of income recognition on an accrual basis. It then adopted the so-called 
‘actuai'ial’ or declining balance method, under which income is recognised pro rata to 
the balance of capital deemed to be outstanding. The bank recognises its shaie as 
Mudarib in the profits when the instalment is due.
Until 1989, Mohammed Bank used to adopt the up-front basis, whereby it recognised 
all the profits when the contract was concluded with the client. After 1989, the bank 
adopted an accrual basis using the straight-line method. The bank recognises its share 
of profits as Mudarib when the instalment is due.
ii) Musharaka Financing: Alimed Bank uses tlie Fixed Musharaka, and, therefore, 
its share in the Musharaka will not be less than 51 per cent of the capital. Alimed 
Bank treats its shaie in the as an investment in a joint venture (IAS 31). 
On the other hand, Mohammed Bank applies the declining Musharaka and it uses the 
cost method by applying IAS 25 to Musharaka as a long-term investment. This is 
accepted under GAAP (General Accepted Accounting Principles) because the bank 
has no influence over the Musharaka (being a sleeping partner).
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This accounting difference is due to the fact that each bank uses a different type of 
Musharaka and plays a different role. In the case of Alimed Bank, the bank always 
maintains a majority in the Musharaka, and under IAS this allows the bank to treat its 
share in the Musharaka as investment in a joint ventuie (using the equity method as 
permitted by IAS31), with recognition of undistributed profits. By contrast, 
Mohammed Bank treats its share as a long-term investment (IAS25), since it has no 
influence in the Musharaka as long as the other partner has not violated the 
agreement.
8.1.4 The Duties of the SSB
The SSB of Ahmed Bank has a larger role than the SSB of Mohammed Bank, 
possibly because the scope of its responsibilities is greater. In this context, the SSB of 
Ahmed Bank conducts a Shari ’a audit on the bank’s operations through the use of a 
Shari*a staff. While the role of the SSB of Mohammed Bank is no more than a 
consultative committee to the management
8.2. ANALYSIS OF AHMED BANK’S CASE
This section analysis the following accounting aspects of Ahmed Bank:
1- The Accounting Treatment of Investment Account Holders.
2- Disclosure of Information.
3- Islamic Financing.
4- The Duties of the SSB.
8.2.1 The Accounting Treatment of Investment Account Holders
In the main, Ahmed Bank offers to I AH various investment funds (portfolios). The 
funds of lAH are maintained in different portfolios according to the type of 
investments, the level of risk, and the level of discretion given to the bank. Usually 
the I AH’s funds will be invested separately from the bank’s own funds.
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The case study indicated that the bank treats investment accounts as accounts 
managed on a fiduciary basis, since in the case of a loss the bank will not be liable to 
compensate the investors (lAH) unless the loss were due to the bank's negligence or 
breach of contract.
The bank's auditors stated that the bank’s role as Mudarib is like that of a fund 
manager who manages the investors’ funds on their behalf. Therefore, the funds of 
I AH should be treated as funds under management, i.e., as types of fiduciary accounts. 
A fiduciary service is a service offered by a bank/financial institution acting in a 
position of trust to administer assets on behalf of another party . Fiduciary services 
include safe deposit rental boxes, trustee services, and funds management. Trustee 
and other fiduciary services include the holding or placing of assets on behalf of 
individuals, and, as these assets ar e not assets of the bank, they should therefore not be 
reflected in its balance sheet (IAS 30). This means that, because assets held on behalf 
of fiduciary accounts ar e not considered assets of the bank, the related funds should 
not be reflected in the liabilities section of the bank’s balance sheet.
As mentioned earlier, the management of Alimed Bank claims that its role is similar 
to that of a fimd manager in the Western model. Treating lAH as funds under 
management avoids subjecting the investment accounts to the capital adequacy 
requirements. Hence the bank is allowed to maintain lower capital. This may be a 
reason why this treatment is favoured by management.
Researcher’s Comments
It is true that lAH ar e not a liability of the bank and should therefore not be reflected 
as a liability in the balance sheet. However, there are significant differences between 
fiduciary accounts and Mudaraba contracts. These are stated below:
1-In exchange for the seiwice provided by the fund manager, the latter is entitled to 
a fixed management fee. In the case of an Islamic bank {Mudarib), the bank is 
entitled to a Mudarib share only if the I AH’s fmids are generating profits. The 
accounting treatment of I AH has implications from the auditors' points of view, 
as well. Treating I AH as an off balance-sheet item reduces the assets and
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liabilities to be audited by the auditors of Ahmed Bank, as funds under 
management represent no risk to the shar eholders. This is because, if there ar e 
losses on lAH ar ising in the normal cour se of business, they will be borne by the 
lAH. This apparently allows the auditors to carry out a limited review of funds 
under management rather than a full audit. Hence, the auditor's opinion does 
not cover frmds under management. This suggests that the interests of I AHs 
may be inadequately reflected in both the scope of the audit work and the 
auditor’s final report.
2- Under the conventional banking system, a ‘Chinese wall’ is established to 
prevent the bank from transfeiTing depositors’ funds, which are expected to be 
invested in a low risk, low return assets, to mutual funds. These mutual funds 
would be managed by the same bank and invested in higher risk assets, in 
order to generate higher profits to be “creamed off ‘ while paying a low rate of 
return to the depositors. It is worth noting that a Chinese wall is established to 
protect the depositors’ frmds and to match the investors’ funds with their risk 
preferences.
Dale (1996, chap. 2) argued that the separation of a bank’s secuiities business from 
the rest of the bank will not protect the depositor’s frmds, as the rules stipulated in the 
EU’s Capital Adequacy Directive of 1993 permit the bank to fund its securities 
business fr om its own liabilities. He also argued that in order to avoid, or at least 
alleviate, such a risk the funding rules should prevent or limit the use of deposits to 
support a bank’s trading book.
A Chinese wall is not established in an Islamic bank since the interest of the 
shareholders will be treated the same as those of lAH (if we assume that the bank 
commingles the shareholders funds with those of I AH, as in the case of umestricted 
lAH), and the results of the investments will be shared between the shareholders and 
I AH. However, this logic cannot be applied to the case of restricted I AH, and this 
raises the question of how far the contractual terms for restricted lAH provide 
protection similar' to that of a Chinese wall.
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3- In the case of conventional banks, mutual funds are separated from the bank’s 
retail operations; therefore, the bank will maintain two sets of accounts, one 
for the banks' assets and another for the mutual frmds.
This raises the further question as to whether Islamic banks which treat lAH as 
funds under management (witlr no commingling) should be subject to all regulatory 
controls including the liquidity ratio and single borrowing limit (similar to 
universal banks). A positive answer to be indicated, because the role of the 
supervisory authority is not only to reduce the risk attaching to the bank’s own 
capital, but also to reduce the risk borne by the lAH’s frmds as well
In addition, because the bank acts as a market maker for those investors (IAH) who 
withdraw their frmds before the liquidation of the fund, the bank must maintain 
adequate liquidity for this pirrpose. However, to encourage lAH not to withdraw 
their funds prior to liquidation, if one of the funds incurs losses the bank may 
prefer to transfer the losses to its own income statement rather than deducting them 
from the investors’ accounts.
Fur thermore, in the case of proven negligence in managing the investors' frmds, the 
bank's capital may also be affected. This would subject the capital of Ahmed Bank to 
various risks.
In Islamic banks, which commingle their own funds with the I AH’s funds, the assets 
of the bank include those that are financed by both the shareholder’s funds and I AH. 
Hence, the assets of the bank ar*e pooled with the assets financed by the lAH.
The above also recognises the importance of including the investors' accounts 
(Restricted lA and Umestricted lA) in the calculation of the capital adequacy.
(19) It is worth noting tliat the Basle Accord on capital adequacy is silent on the issue o f  funds under management. See Dale 
(1996) for more detailed analysis on this issue.
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It is worth noting that, due to the absence of accounting standar ds for Islamic banks, 
the bank had no choice but to adopt existing international accounting standar ds as 
required by the regulatory authority. It can be also inferred from the case study, 
however, that Ahmed Bank intended to reflect I AH as funds under management to 
avoid subjecting the bank to various supervisory controls, including capital adequacy 
and liquidity control.
The findings emerging fr om the case study ar e that the financial statements of Alimed 
Bank do not disclose adequate information to Investment Accoimt Holders (IAH). 
However, according to lASC (1997, pp. 42-43), “The users of the financial statements 
include investors, shareholders, employees, lenders, suppliers and other trade 
creditors, customers, governments and their agencies, and the general public.” I AH 
are not mentioned amongst the 'users' of financial statements and, therefore, this 
indicates that the International Accounting Standar ds Committee has not considered 
the type of information needed by the lAH.
Treating lAH as funds under management does not reflect the nature of the 
contractual relationship between the bank andlAH. This treatment reflects the fact 
that the IAS did not address the Mudaraba contracts in its accounting standards. The 
case also suggests the need to regulate the bank’s contracts with I AH to ensure that 
the bank discloses the necessary information which lAH need to know before signing 
the contracts. This would reduce the 'information asymmetry' between the parties 
involved and help to make these contracts more transparent.
The adoption of IAS seems to have had two contrasting impacts on financial 
statements. Firstly, it may indicate to the users of the financial statements that the 
bank is adhering to accepted international accounting practices, which will give the 
users of the financial statements more confidence in the bank’s accounting policies 
Secondly, it allows the bank to avoid disclosing important information in those 
financial statements.
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8.2.2 Disclosure of Information
According to IAS 30 (1997, p. 530) "if the bank is engaged in significant trust 
activities, disclosines of that fact and an indication of the extent of those activities is 
made in its financial statements.” This indicates that IAS 30 requires the bank to 
publish general information, which is appropriate for fiduciary services but not (for 
the reasons given above) adequate for Mudaraba contracts. The Investment Account 
Holders require additional information to that required under IAS 30, e.g., the profits 
generated from managing the investors’ funds, and the expenses charged against the 
investors’ profits. In addition, in case of loss, lAH would expect to obtain 
information that explains the reasons for the loss.
Although the bank discloses more information than the minimum required under IAS 
30, including information on the gross income generated from managing the 
investors’ funds, the total amounts of funds imder management, the types and amounts 
of Islamic financing which are financed by the investor’s fiinds, etc., the level of 
information disclosed in the bank’s financial statements is still not sufficient to assist 
the investors in the bank to make their investment decisions. This is because 
important information is not disclosed in the financial statements about the 
profitability of each fund, the amounts received by the bank for acting as Mudarib, 
and the amounts of ‘reserve funds’ maintained by each fimd. It is worth noting here 
that because the bank is not required by the law to publish a separate financial 
statement for each fund, the bank does not prepare them.
i) Transparency o f Information: Alimed Bank creates a separate ‘reserve fund’ for its 
General Mudaraba Fund and Restricted Mudar aba Fund. In case any of these funds 
achieves profits lower than initially expected, which would effect the lAH’s profits, 
the bank can then use the ‘reserve fimd’ by releasing an amount to enhance the I AH’s 
i.e. for ‘income smoothing’ purposes. The banlc believes that such action is legal 
because lAH are the real owners of this ‘reserve fund’. These arrangements were 
approved by the bank’s SSB. It is worth noting that the bank’s contract makes no 
reference to the income smoothing arrangements (neither to the right to deduct the 
percentage nor the release to enhance the profit.)
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Fulthermore, any direct expenses related to a specific fimd should be chai'ged to that 
fund. IAS 30 does not require any information to be published in the banks' financial 
statements regarding those expenses. This suggests that adopting the IAS would 
enable the Islamic bank to avoid disclosing important information in the financial 
statements.
ii) Allocation o f Profits: No financial statements are published by the bank for the 
managed funds, despite the importance of these statements in helping investors to 
evaluate the banks' performance in managing their funds. Although the bank’s 
contracts state the Mudarib rate, this is in effect a maximum rate, as the bank may 
charge lower rates during a period of decline in the profitability of the managed funds. 
The bank may increase the rate actually applied back to (or forwai'd) the ‘maximum’ 
when the profitability of the funds improves. In neither case does the bank need to 
disclose the actual Mudarib rate it collected in the financial statements
This suggests that publishing inadequate information in the financial statements of the 
bank has made it easy for the bank to use ‘income smoothing’ without this being 
apparent. This would lead investors to believe that the profits reported represent the 
actual profits generated on their investments.
The theme emerging from this section is that IAS 30 does not require Islamic banks to 
disclose adequate information in their financial statements regarding frmds under 
management, given that Mudaraba contracts are different from the funds under 
management as practised by conventional banks. It is worth noting that AAOIFI has 
developed an accounting standard that deals with disclosure requirements for profit 
allocation between owners’ equity and I AH (FAS No. 5 standard 1997).
(20) This analysis is based on the bank’s financial statements from the period o f  1991 to 1995.
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8.2.3 Islamic Financing
i) Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer: It can be ai'gued that the reducing balance 
method allows the bank to link the outstanding balance of the facility with the amount 
of profits. It is observed from the example in the case that, when the outstanding 
capital decreases the profit decreases, while, imder die straight-line method, the profits 
are unchanged despite the decrease in the outstanding capital balance.
Compar ed to the straight-line method, the reducing balance method is a form of 
profit recognition, which tends to make profit more sensitive to changes in the 
bank’s level of activity in frmds management. This is a problem that may be 
mitigated by use of the income smoothing teclmique already mentioned (hidden 
reserves).
It can be suggested fr om the above that more information should, therefore, needs to 
be disclosed regarding Murabaha financing, including the profits/loss generated on 
Murabaha financing. However, the bank discloses no such information since it is not 
required under IAS.
However, the new AAOIFI standar d on Murabaha allows this method of income 
recognition. (Plus recognition when instalments are received, when based on a 
decision by the SSB of the Islamic bank, or if the supervisory authorities require it.)
ii) Musharaka Financing: The bank has argued that it adopts IAS 28 (i.e. the equity 
method) to re-value its share in Musharaka, bearing in mind that this standard is 
established to deal with investment in associates. However, IAS 28 only addresses 
investment in associates when the enterprise holds not less than 20 per cent of the 
voting power of the associates, i.e., it is presumed that the enterprise maintains 
significant influence over the associates. The bank’s share in the Musharaka 
usually not less than 50 per cent of the capital, and if they has a controlling interest or 
joint control. Thus it might be more accurate to say that the bank has adopted the 
equity method permitted as an alternative to proportionate consolidation according to 
IAS31.
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However, Musharaka and its accounting treatments as set out in AAOIFI’s FAS No. 4 
do not correspond with any of the tluee types of joint ventures described in IAS 31. 
Unlike jointly-controlled operations and jointly-controlled assets, Musharaka controls 
its assets, generates its revenue, and incrrrs its expenses and liabilities. Each party to 
the contract is allocated his/her share of profit or loss. Each party also has the right to 
know the details of the assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses of the Musharaka.
In Musharaka, capital is measured at cost (the amount which was paid or at which the 
asset contributed was value at the time of contracting) and recorded imder the title 
Musharaka Financing, in the Islamic bank’s statement of financial position. The 
Islamic bank’s share of profit, resulting from partial or final settlement between the 
Islamic bank and the parlner, is recognised in the Islamic bank’s income statement to 
the extent that the profit is being distributed. Unlike the equity method in IAS28 and 
IAS31, the retaining of profit does not normally lead to adjustments in the Islamic 
bank’s capital in the Musharaka, which remains imchanged until the activity is 
liquidated. The capital of Musharaka may only be increased/decreased before the 
activity is liquidated, provided the parties to the contract agree to do so. This is 
important because, whilst profits may shared according to whatever ratios the Islamic 
bank and its partner agree upon, losses are shared in proportion to the capital 
contributed by each party. Losses are recognised in the Islamic bank’s accounts to the 
extent that such losses are being deducted from its share of the Musharaka capital.
It is to be noted that AAOIFI’s FAS No. 4 (AAOIFI, 1997) does not require any 
consolidation procedures for Musharaka transactions. An Islamic bank’s consolidated 
financial statements would therefore include the same amounts as its separate 
financial statements. Therefore, neither the proportionate consolidation preferred by 
IAS 31 for jointly-controlled equities nor the equity method permitted as an 
alternatives, is suitable for Musharaka transactions.
By contrast, FAS No. 4 (paru 12, p. 181) states that “in the case of that
continues for more than one financial period, the Islamic bank’s share of profit for any 
period, resultmg from partial or final settlement between the Islamic bank and the
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partner, shall be recognised in its accounts for that period to the extent that the profit 
is being distributed.” FAS No. 4.thus takes account of the contractual nature of 
Musharaka, whereas IAS31 does not.
Hi) Mudaraba Financing: The 1995 audited accounts reflect no assets based on 
Mudaraba financing. This may be because Mudaraba financing involves a higher 
risk than other modes of financing. This argument is justifiable since the bank 
(provider of funds) will have no say in the management of the project/investment, 
while the client {Mudarib) has control of the management of tire project/investments.
Therefore, in order for the bank to provide Mudaraba financing it would require a 
very detailed assessment of the client {Mudarib). This would involve additional 
expenses that would be added to the original cost of the Mudai'aba.
Although the 1995 audited accounts show no Mudaraba deals carried out by the bank, 
the management stated that the bank applies the cost method to -value its share in the 
Mudaraba when it exists.
The bank’s approach of applying the cost method to value its share in the Mudaraba, 
seems appropriate since the bank {Rab al Mall) will have no significant influence over 
the management of the investment/project. It is also consistent with the AAOIFI 
standard No. 3.
8.2.4 The Duties of the SSB
The SSB of Alimed Bank has a larger role than the SSB of Moharmned Bank, 
possibly because the scope of its responsibilities is greater. In this context, the SSB of 
Alimed Bank conducts a S'/z r^n’a audit on the bank’s operations thr’ough the use of a 
Shari’a staff. This staff submits its report to the SSB, which also holds frequent 
meetings with the bank’s management. The level of responsibility that has been given 
to the SSB of Alimed Bank was tended to enhance the bank’s credibility among the 
users of the financial statements about its compliance with the Shari ‘a precepts.
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Despite the importance, in principle, of the SSBs' participation in deciding the 
accounting policies of the bank, in the case of Ahmed Bank the SSB did not 
participate in setting its accounting policies. This suggests that the management may 
have viewed the role of the SSB as limited to verifying the bank's contracts, and 
ensuring that the profits are generated from sources acceptable to Islamic Shari’a.
It can be ar gued that the SSB never realised the importance of their participation in 
setting the accounting policies until the AAOIFI was established in 1991. If so, this 
case study indicates the importance of the AAOIFTs role in regulating the SSB in 
order to enable it to play a more effective role in the bank’s operations.
8.3 ANALYSIS OF MOHAMMED BANK’S CASE
This section analyses the following accounting aspects of Mohammed Bank:
1- The Accoimting of Treatment of Investment Account Holders.
2- The Information Disclosure.
3- Islamic Financing.
4- The Duties of the SSB.
8,3.1 The Accounting Treatment of Investment Account Holders
Mohammed Bank allows I AH to maintain accounts similar in someways to normal 
deposit accounts, and the bank will invest the shareholders funds together with those 
of I AH. Mohammed Bank operates more like a conventional bank in commingling the 
shareholders’ funds with those of other investors (IAH).
Presenting lAH as a liability in the balance sheet indicates to the users of financial 
statements that lAH represent a liability for the bank similar to any other liability. 
This treatment misrepresents the contractual relationship governing the bank and lAH. 
Presenting lAH under the liability section of the balance sheet has the (presumably 
international) result of showing the bank with a more impressive balance sheet. 
However, this could equally be well achieved by showing lAH on the liabilities and 
equity side, but not as a liability, (i.e. as a separate liability between shareholders 
equity and liabilities.)
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On the other hand, reflecting lAH as a normal deposit (liability) in the balance sheet 
allows the bank to claim it is complying with IAS 30 in disclosing the same level of 
information as required for conventional deposits under IAS 30. The bank is not 
required under IAS 30 to disclose important information relating to I AH, such as the 
actual Mudarib rate received by the bank. Such a practice thus helps the bank to 
claim to the users of the financial statements that it is disclosing adequate information.
This treatment of lAH conflicts with the AAOIFI standards which require Islamic 
banks to present Umestricted Investment Accounts on the balance sheet (but not as a 
liability), and with the AAOIFI treatment of Restricted Investment Accounts, which 
requires Islamic banks to present them as an off balance sheet item.
It can be infened fiom the above that the adoption of IAS 30 will suggest to the users 
of the financial statements that the level of information published in the financial 
statements is adequate. At the same time, it allows the bank to avoid disclosing 
important information in its financial statements including the bank’s actual shaie as
Mudarib and its accounting policies regai ding its allocation of profits. !
Fm'thermore, Mudaraba has no equivalent in Western financial instruments. The 
management of the bank, and their auditors, tended to interpret IAS to mean what they 
thought would be appropriate, given the bank’s accounting objectives. This 
interpretation seems to have served the bank’s objectives in improving its balance 
sheet footing. The inadequacy of IAS to cater for Mudaraba gave the bank a wide 
degree of discretion as regards disclosures.
The auditors of Mohammed Bank claimed that they are responsible to the 
shaieholders because it is they who appointed them. If the auditor’s report is 
incorrect, (i.e. it has ignored a major liability of the bank), the shareholders can take 
legal action against their auditors if they suffer losses as a result.
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It seems that Mohammed Bank’s external auditors’ global is to advise its clients to 
treat lAH as a liability item in the balance sheet. This would appear to be the case 
because this treatment of lAH is similar to the treatment adopted by another Islamic 
bank that is audited by the same accoimting firm. This means that the external 
auditors will cany out a full audit of all operations of the bank, regar dless of who 
bears the losses on the investments.
8.3.2 Disclosure of Information
i) Profit Allocation: The banlc’s profits allocation method suggests that I AH are 
entitled to the profits generated from investing their funds only after setting aside a 
certain percentage for liquidity (via the Investment Rate) and subject to the deduction 
of the Mudarib rate. Income from other activities, including fees and commissions 
generated from offering banking services, is also allocated between shareholders and 
lAH.
It is highly likely that the bank will invest a higher percentage than the Investment 
Rate that which is stated in the contract, in income-producing and less liquid assets.
However, the additional income will be for tire benefit of the shareholders and the |
whole of the “liquidity amounts” is treated as an interest fr ee loan (Qar*d Hasan).
As indicated in the case study of Mohammed Bank, the bank’s contracts state that it 
invests a specific percentage of the I AH funds’ placed with the bank, and the holders 
of the accounts are entitled to at least 75 per cent of the profits generated on their 
invested fimds, after deducting 10 per cent of the profits for what it calls provision 
against potential losses. The bank indicated to the researcher that the bank's Mudarib 
rates equal 25 per cent of the profits on all types of lAH.
It is important to note that, if the profit allocation resulted in profits for lAH lower 
than the profits paid by other banks operating in the same mar'ket, the bank might 
decide to reduce its Mudarib rate. As was indicated to the researcher by the 
management, although the bank has the right to deduct 10 per cent of lAH’s profits for 
provisions, the bank has so far not used that right.
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If the bank sets the percentage of I AH investment to be deemed as held in non-income 
producing assets too high (i.e. it sets the Investment Rate too low), it may find itself 
obliged to transfer some of the ‘shaieholders’ profits back to I AH in order to be 
competitive in the market. Such a transfer is considered a form of voluntary 
‘donation’ by the bank to the I AH. The financial statements disclose no information 
regaiding the practising of this by the bank, as this is not required under IAS 30.
It is worth noting that paying lAH (except the holders of Specific Investment 
Certificates) their profits at the end of the financial year enables the bank to re-invest 
the lAH’s profits duiing the yeai' for the benefit of the shar eholders. At the same time, 
it gives the bank a better pictur e of the level of profits paid by other banks so as to 
decide accordingly on the appropriate rate of profits for its lAH.
The profit allocation method indicates that the Mudarib rate of profits is deducted 
from the lAH’s profits and paid to the shareholders and not to the Boai'd of Directors. 
This implies that the Mudarib is the bank, and not, as the management stated, the 
Board of Directors.
The bank’s argument that the Board of Directors is the Mudarib is difficult to 
comprehend, since in case of misconduct or breaching of contracts, the bank as an 
entity will be responsible rather than the Board of Directors or the management 
generally. It seems unlikely that directors or members of management are personably 
liable for toilious acts (as opposed to criminal ones).
The transfer of profits from the shareholders to lAH may show that the shareholders 
are giving up part of their profits for the benefit of lAH. In fact, the truth is that the 
method of profit allocation is drafted to be in favour of the shar eholders (not only 
because of the Mudarib share but also due to the low Investment Rate.) Hence, in 
order to sustain the bank’s confidence in the eyes of I AH, the bank may transfer some 
of the ‘shar eholders’ profits back to lAH.
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Researcher’s Comment:
The reseai'cher believes that if the bank 'were required to disclose any transfer of 
profits (as discussed above) in the financial statements, this might negatively affect its 
credibility in the market. The lack of information transparency can be attributed to the 
lack of accoimting regulations, including the general inapplicability of IAS 30 to 
Islamic banks.
The bank is not required under IAS to disclose any information regarding its 
allocation of profits. This seems to have led to the transfer of profits between the 
shareholders and lAH without the I AH or the shareholders being aware of this practice 
on the part of the management.
ii) Provisioning Policy: Under IAS 30, banks are not required to separate the amounts 
deducted from the shareholders’ profits, from those which are deducted from the 
lAH’s profits. This is because, in the case of conventional banks, the provisions ar e 
directly deducted from the income statement, which will affect only the shareholders.
Moharmned Bank stated that it is permitted to deduct the amounts of provisions fr om 
the profits of the lAH only. It would therefore seems logical that the notes to the 
financial statements should disclose the actual amoimts deducted from the profits of 
the I AH, which Mohammed Bank does not do.
Researcher’s Comment:
In order to enhance the transparency of the financial statements, it is necessary for 
Islamic banks to separate the amounts of provisions deducted from the I AH’s profits 
from those provisions that have been borne by the shareholders.
8.3.3 Islamic Financing
i) Murabaha Financing: The theme emerging from tlris section is that the differences 
amongst Islamic scholar s regarding income recognition lead to different accounting 
results. Some Islamic scholars’ views were to stick to the initial concept of income
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recognition, which is to recognise the profits only after recovering the capital. Others 
allowed the recognition of income before the ftill recovery of the capital.
Fm'thermore, the IAS did not address certain accounting issues relating to Murabaha, 
such as the insolvency of the client, provision for doubtful debts, and the failm e of the 
client to fulfil his promise after making the down payment (in Arabic hamish gedyyah, 
which is considered an obligation on the Islamic bank and is to be treated as a liability 
imless the Shari 'a supervisory boar d of the Islamic bank decided otherwise.)
However, the new AAOIFI standar d on Murabaha allows this method of income 
recognition, (as well as recognition when instalments are received, if based on a 
decision by the SSB of the Islamic bank, or if the super'visory authorities require it.)
ii) Musharaka Financing: The Musharaka is similar' to a joint ventme since it 
involves par'tners. Hence, treating Musharaka as a long-term investment is acceptable 
mider IAS25, as the bank has no influence over the Musharaka provided it is a 
sleeping par tner, which is the case with Mohammed Bank. Therefore, this accounting 
treatment fairly reflects the actual contractual anangement between the bank and the 
client mider the Musharaka.
The bank states in its standard contract that it could deduct 10 per cent of the I AH’s 
profits as a provision against potential losses.
In the notes, the banlc discloses the total provisions it has created. The balance sheet 
will show the net Islamic financing after deducting the provisions. However, the bank 
is not required to disclose the actual amounts deducted from I AH’s profits in a 
specific financial year.
Hi) The Duties o f the SSB: The case indicated that the SSB has a very limited role in 
controlling the activities of the bank. Even the meetings of the SSB take place at the 
request of the management.
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On the other hand, it can be inferred from the role of the SSB of Mohammed Bank 
that it is not independent fr om the management, and that its role is to act as a 
consultative committee to the management. The decision of the bank’s management 
was to treat its relationship with the I AH as based on Mwt/araèa, while the S SB’s 
Fatwa stated that lAH should be treated as partners similar to shareholders (Shuraka). 
This illustrates the limited influence of the SSB on the management of the bank. 
Furthermore, the absence of a chair-man for the SSB, and the holding of its meetings 
upon the request of the management, raises doubts about the independence of the 
SSB.
8.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
1- The themes emerging from analysing the two case studies suggest that the use of 
IAS as a basis for the accounting of regulation of Islamic banks has been 
ineffectual. It has left the financial statements of the two banks non-compar able, 
and has resulted in an inadequate level of disclosur e. For example, consider the 
treatment of investment accounts (lAH). Ahmed Bank treats I AH as funds under 
management, off-balance sheet; Mohammed Bank shows lAH as a liability item in 
the balance sheet. IAS 30 gives no guidance as to which is the appropriate 
treatment.
2- It can be argued that the accounting differences have emerged because neither the 
national authority nor the lASC had any specific accoimting standard for 
Mudaraba contracts. Furthermore, the Mudaraba. has a imique feature (being 
neither equity nor a liability in the conventional senses), and this is ignored in the 
IAS standards. The banks were thus able to 'comply' with the IAS in the vacuous 
sense of not actually 'contr avening' them, whilst adopting accounting treatments 
for Mudaraba of their own choosing. It is worth noting that dur ing the early 1990s 
almost all parties, including the national authorities that regulate Islamic banks, 
Islamic banks themselves and the external auditors of Islamic banks, did not 
realise the need to standardise the accounting treatments for Mudaraba contracts. 
This only occurred when AAOIFI started issuing its standards. Later, these
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standar ds received significant support when one of the rating agencies criticised 
the treatment of lAH by an Islamic bank, despite the fact that such treatment was 
claimed by the bank and their auditors to be in line with lASC standards.
3- This situation seems to have allowed Islamic banks and their auditors to interpret 
IAS standards in a manner that suits their accounting objectives. Another example 
to illustr ate the inadequacy of the IAS for Islamic banks is the case of what they 
call provisions. Due to their nature, Islamic banks follow different investment 
policies, as in the case of Alimed Bank and Mohammed Bank. This implies that 
there should be certain minimum disclosures regar ding provisions in order to 
harmonise the information published in the financial statements by Islamic banks.
It should be noted that IAS 30 does not require Islamic banks to disclose important 
information, such as the percentages deducted in ariiving at the I AH’s profits in 
respect of provisions, and the amounts which have been transfened back from 
provisions to enliance the level of profits to be distributed to lAH. This is because 
IAS 30 was not designed to apply to Islamic banks, specifically as regards 
accoimting for lAH.
4- The above suggests that, even in a regulated accoimting environment, 
differences may continue to exist if the regulations ar e not geared towar d the 
special characteristics of the institutions that will adopt them, as in the case of 
Islamic banks. Hence, what matters is not the existence of regulation, but the 
type and appropriateness of regulation.
5- Another issue that emerges from the comparison of the case studies relates to the 
responsibility of the external auditors. Thus far in Islamic banks the prime 
responsibility of the external auditors would be to protect the interest of the 
shar eholders in ensuring that the management operates within the overall policies 
that they have approved by the shareholders. The auditors address their report to 
the shareholders because they have been appointed by them. This suggests that 
auditors are mainly liable to the shareholders. For example, the auditors of Ahmed
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Bank take the position that, since they are appointed by the shareholders, their 
audit and their opinion should be limited to the bank’s accounts, which would not 
include funds under management. However, although in Mohammed Bank the 
audit covers the bank’s financial statements including the assets financed by the 
I AH, and the audit opinion covers all the bank’s operations, it is not clear whether 
the auditors have responsibilities to lAH. In any event, the auditors do not 
recognise any such responsibilities.
Mohammed Bank and Ahmed Bank were established in the 1970s and 1980s, 
respectively. The rules at that time allowed an Islamic bank to operate either as a 
fund manager or like a conventional bank. This suggests that, due to the flexibility 
of the existing rules, each bank adopted the 'role' that met its objectives. This 
seems to have resulted in each bank providing different banking services, i.e., 
Ahmed Bank manages its investor’s funds like a fund manager, Mohammed Bank 
commingles the shaieholders’ funds with the investors ‘depositors’ funds like a 
conventional bank might do.
Such a setting may be acceptable in the case of conventional banks, where deposits 
represent a liability to the banks and shaieholders face a higher risk compaied to 
depositors. However, in the case of Islamic banks, the I AH, like the shaieholders, 
may lose their investments and, therefore, consideration should be given to the 
possibility of involving them, together with the shaieholders, in the appointment of 
the auditors. This would result in broadening the scope of the auditor’s 
responsibilities to cover the interests of the I AH. It also highlights the need to 
standardise the role of the external auditors in auditing Islamic banks. This is an 
issue of corporate governance, which deserves further research (see Archer, Kaiim 
and Al-Deehani, 1998).
132
6“ Due to the absence of a specific standard, each bank specifies the role of its SSB. 
Therefore, differences arise between Islamic banks regarding the role of their 
SSBs. This suggests that there is a need for a standard on the role of the SSB; with 
the aim of standaidizing the role of the SSB, preserving the confidence entrusted 
in them by the shaieholders and lAH, and to avoid any interference by the 
management of the bank.
The next chapter will discuss the overall conclusions of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS
Islamic banks were established in the 1970s to cany out their activities in accordance 
with Islamic Law. Their main difference from conventional banks is that Islamic 
banks are not permitted to deal in interest (by either accepting frmds or providing 
financing on an interest-beai'ing bases) since it is prohibited by Islamic law.
This thesis has attempted to examine and analyse certain accounting practices of 
Islamic banks in Balnain during the early to mid 1990s, with a view to determining 
the degree of compaiability of their financial statements, and the extent to which the 
accounting standards to which some of them were subject were effective fr'om the 
standpoint of the compaiability of their financial statements and of adequate 
disclosure. The accounting standards in question were the IASs issued by the lASC.
In particulai*, the thesis endeavoured to establish the hypothesis that tire adoption of 
IASs by Islamic banks had neither prevented their financial statements being non- 
compaiable nor led to an acceptable level of disclosuie.
To test this hypothesis, the reseaich conducted case studies on two Islamic banks in 
Balnain to imderstand in more deptli their accounting differences and their level of 
disclosures, and the cause of such differences. The findings of the case studies 
support the hypothesis, which in turn supports the need to develop accounting 
standards which specifically cater for the chaiacteristics of Islamic banks.
9.1 PRE-AAQIFI STATE OF ACCOUNTING REGULATION
Most of the countries that have been reviewed in this thesis either directly adopted the 
IAS as their national standards or developed national standards based primarily on 
IAS. For the reasons analysed in chapter 8, this failed to render the financial 
statements of Islamic banks comparable, thereby departing from the concept of 
comparability which is considered in the lASC Framework as one of the four 
qualitative char*acteristics that make the information provided in the financial 
statements usefril for users. The above suggests that the demand to adhere to the IAS
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by Islamic banks in order to achieve comparability is questionable to say the least 
(Karim, 1999).
IAS are designed for conventional organisations and conventional banks, e.g. IAS30. 
The following highlights some of the accounting practices which made IAS of little 
positive effect for Islamic banks:
1) The Mudaraba contract that governs the relationship between the I AH and the 
Islamic bank is neither a financial liability nor an equity instrument (AAOIFI, 
1993). Unlike holders of equity instruments, I AH can withdraw their funds at 
maturity; Islamic banks could refuse to pay lAH until the results of the investments 
financed by I AHs’ funds aie determined.
Unlike a debt instrument, investment accounts ai*e not a liability of the bank 
because in case of loss (not due to negligence or misconduct) I AH will bear the 
loss. Therefore, I AH have a claim on the bank’s earnings or assets, which ranks 
pari passu with that of the shaieholders (Archer et. al, 1998).
Furthermore, neither IAS nor the EC directives address the unrestiicted investment 
accounts or the restricted investment accounts in any of their standards, which gave 
the Islamic banks the discretion to treat them either under the liability section of 
the balance sheet or as fiinds under management. Hence, this option allowed 
Islamic banlcs to choose an accounting treatment that met their individual 
accounting objectives.
2) In the absence of a Murabaha standard, some Islamic banks recognise profits on 
Murabaha over the period of the instalments, by applying an interpretation of IAS 
18, which states that “interest revenue which is the difference between the revenue 
from the sale of goods or rendering of the service and the nominal amount of the 
consideration is recognised on a time proportion basis.” However, the Murabaha 
is a sale of goods on credit.
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Furthermore, none of the Islamic banks discloses in its accounts the type of 
Murabaha its practics (either obligatory Murabaha or non-obligatory Murabaha), 
although each type has different accounting implications.
3) Applying the equity method in the Musharaka financing by Islamic banks is not 
allowed by the Shari ’a, because of the implications of using the equity method for 
measuring the share which each partner should bear in case of loss. This highlights 
the need to develop a specific standard which takes into account the special juristic 
characteristics of the Musharaka. Islamic precepts stipulate that loss should 
always be divided between the partners in proportion to their respective shares in 
the capital, while profit (and hence retained earnings) may be shared on a different 
basis by agreement. Under the equity method, this could lead to the proportions of 
capital being changed in a way which is inconsistent with the rules for Musharaka.
4) Islamic banks are not requiredunder IAS30 to disclose important information in 
their financial statements such as the basis applied by the Islamic banks in the 
allocation of profits between lAH and shareholders, the amount charged as expense 
to umestricted investment accounts before allocating their share of profits, etc.
5) On the issue of Shari ’a compliance, the limited role of the SSB in some Islamic 
banks has allowed the management to take decisions without obtaining the SSB’s 
approval, e.g., transfer of profits from the shareholders to lAH. This highlights the 
need to regulate the role of the SSB. One possible solution is through a 
governance structme which gives more responsibilities to the SSB by mandating 
that their appointment and removal should be the responsibility of the shar eholders. 
In addition, the bank could be required to establish terms and conditions specifying 
the responsibilities of the SSB. Such terms and conditions could be presented to 
the shareholders for their approval. Fur thermore, it could be made a requirement 
that the report of the SSB on the bank’s compliance with Shari’a be presented to 
the shareholders after discussion with the management of the bank.
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9.2 POST AAOIFI STATE OF ACCOUNTING REGULATION
Islamic banks realised the importance of establishing some form of regulation to 
create accoimting haimonisation between them. Karim (1995) argued that not only 
Islamic banlcs but other interested pailies like the regulatory bodies and auditing firms 
supported establishing an external self-regulating body.
In 1991, AAOIFI, a private self regulatory, standai'd-setting body, was established in 
Bahrain to promulgate accounting standards for Islamic banks based on SharVa 
precepts, included as members (in addition to Islamic banks), representative of centr al 
banks, accounting firms and academics. The appointment of members of the 
Accoimting and Auditing Standar ds Boar d, the raising of funds, and promoting the 
role of AAOIFI are the main functions of the Board of Trustees (Karim 1995).
Following the establishment of AAOIFI, one of the main challenges it has faced in 
harmonising the accounting policies of Islamic banks is the treatment of investment 
accounts. AAOIFI has addressed this in Statement of Financial Accounting No.2: 
Concepts o f Financial Accounting for Islamic Banks & Financial Institutions, 
Financial Accounting Standard No, 5: Disclosure o f bases for profit allocation 
between owners equity and investment account holders, and Financial Accounting 
Standard No. 6: Equity o f investment accounts and their Equivalent (see points 1 and 
4 in sub-section 9.1 above).
Statement of Financial Accounting No. 2, classifies investment accounts into two 
types. Unrestricted investment accounts refer to fimds accepted by the Islamic banks 
from the public on the basis that such funds will be invested without recourse to the 
investors. The bank also has the right to commingle the fimds of the shareholders 
with unr estricted investment accounts. AAOIFI requires that equity of unrestricted 
investment account holders appear on the “liability” side of the balance sheet as a 
separate item (neither under the shareholders equity, nor under other liabilities.) 
Restricted investment accoimts are not considered an element of the Islamic bank’s 
financial position because the Islamic bank does not have unconditional right to use or 
dispose of these fimds. AAOIFI requires Islamic banks to publish a separate 
statement for restricted investment accounts along with the bank’s annual report.
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Financial Accounting Standai'd No. 5 requires Islamic banks to disclose the bases 
which they applied in the allocation of profits between lAH and shareholders. The 
standai'd also requires among other things, disclosui e of the basis applied by Islamic 
banks for charging expenses to lAH.
Financial Accounting Standard No. 6 sets out the accounting rules to be followed by 
Islamic banks for recognising and measuring the transactions relating to I AH.
In order to harmonise the accounting practices for Murabaha (see points 2 is sub­
section 9.1 above), AAOIFI issued Financial Accounting Standard No. 2: Murabaha 
and Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer, (AAOIFI, 1996). The standard requires that 
“Profits of a credit sale which will be paid for either by means of one payment due 
after the cuiTent financial period or by instalments over several future financial 
periods shall be recognised by using one of the following two methods:
i) Propoilionate allocation of profits over tire period of the credit whereby each 
financial period shall carry its portion of profits irrespective of whether or not cash 
is received. This is the preferred method.
ii) As and when the instalments ar e received. This method shall be used based on a 
decision by the SSB of the Islamic bank or, if it is required, by the Supervisory 
authority. In both of the above methods, revenues and costs of goods sold shall be 
recognised at the time of concluding the sale contract, subject to the deferral of 
profits” (AAOIFI, para. 8).
As a disclosure requirement, the standar d requires the Islamic bank to disclose in the 
notes accompanying the financial statements whether it considers the promise made in 
the Murabaha to purchase orderer as obligatory or not.
AAOIFI also issued a Musharaka Standard (see sub-section 3 in 9.1 above). This 
standard produced a new treatment on the measur ement of the Islamic bank’s share in 
Musharaka capital after contracting at the end of a financial period. It states that “The 
constant Musharaka capital shall be measured at tire end of the financial period at
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historical cost (the amount which was paid or at which the asset was valued at the 
time of contracting)” (AAOIFI, Musharaka Standard, 1996, para. 7).
In the case of diminishing Musharaka, the Musharaka standai'd states that “The 
Islamic bank’s share in the diminishing Musharaka shall be measured at the end of a 
financial period at historical cost after deducting the historical cost of any share 
transferred to the partner (such transfer being by means of a sale at fair value.) The 
difference between historical cost and fair value shall be recognised as profit or loss 
in tlie Islamic bank’s income statement” Musharaka Standard, AAOIFI, 1996, 
para. 8).
Fuithermore Financial Accoimting Standard No. 3 states that “profits or losses in 
respect of the Islamic bank’s Musharaka financing transactions that commence and 
end duiing a financial period shall be recognised in the Islamic bank’s accounts at the 
time of liquidation” (AAOIFI, 1996 para. II). However, “in the case of a constant 
Musharaka that continues for more than one financial period, the Islamic bank’s 
share of profits for the period, resulting fiom partial or final settlement between the 
Islamic bank and the partner, shall be recognised in its accounts for that period to the 
extent that the profits are being distributed; the Islamic bank’s share of losses for any 
period shall be recognised in its accounts for that period to the extent that such losses 
are being deducted from its share of the Mwj/zaraka capital” (AAOIFI, 1996 para.
12). With regard to diminishing Musharaka the treatment stated in para. 12 above 
should be applied after taking into consideration the decline in the Islamic bank’s 
share in the Musharaka capital and its profits or losses.
To regulate the role of the SSB (see sub-section 5 of 9.1 above), in 1997 and 1998 
AAOIFI issued two standards respectively: Auditing standard for Islamic Financial 
Institutions No. 4: Shari'a Supervisory Board: Appointment, Composition and Report 
and Auditing Standard for Islamic Financial Institutions No. 5: To
ensure its independence, ASIFI4 states that members of the SSB should be appointed 
by the shareholders in their annual general meeting upon the recommendation of the 
board of directors. Also a dismissal of an SSB member should be approved by the 
shareholders during the bank’s annual meeting.
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ASIFI 4 also states that at all times the SSB shall consist fiom at least three members 
and they have the right to seek the service of consultants if they wish to do so. The 
standard prohibits bank’s directors or who is considered as a significant shareholders 
of an Islamic bank from becoming a member of the SSB of the same bank.
ASIFI 5: Shari'a Review was established to provide guidance to assist bank’s SSB in 
performing their Shai'i *a review to ensure compliance with Islamic Shari 'a Rules and 
Principles as reflected in the Fatwas issued by them.
Recently AAOIFI also established a new Shari’a board consisting of 9 Islamic 
scholar s, which will be responsible for issuing Fatwas. This is a positive step to 
harmonise the Fatwas issued by Islamic banks, and which will tend to have 
implications on the accounting standards that will be promulgated by AAOIFI.
9.3 AAOIFI IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ISLAMIC BANKING INDUSTRY
At present, like the lASC, AAOIFI has no legal powers to enforce its standards. The 
decision to implement AAOIFI’s standards lies with the concerned bodies in the 
countries in which Islamic banks operate. This is a major challenge for AAOIFI. 
However, unlike the lASC, AAOIFI’s scope is confined to Islamic financial 
institutions. Tliis may make the task of AAOIFI easier because it would need to focus 
its efforts mainly on persuading the following to implement its standards; (a) Islamic 
banks’ regulators in the countries in which they operate; (b) market players that ai'e 
interested in the work of Islamic banks (e.g. rating agencies) and (c) stock exchange 
regulatory bodies.
However, the efforts needed to persuade Islamic banks’ regulators and market players 
should not be underestimated. One major problem that may make AAOIFI task 
difficult to achieve is that the adoption of AAOIFI’s standards may highlight some of 
the weaknesses of Islamic banks. This may deter some regulatory bodies fiom 
adopting AAOIFI standards. For example, Islamic banks that treated investment 
accounts as funds under management used to record them as an off-balance sheet item. 
Reporting the unrestricted part of these accounts on the balance sheet as required by 
AAOIFI’s standards would tend to have an impact on the calculation of the capital
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adequacy of these banks as well as on their liquidity requirements. Furthermore, 
AAOIFI’s standards require disclosui'e of much more information than would be 
disclosed when Islamic banks adhere to lASC. This may also unearth information that 
may be perceived by some regulatory bodies as detrimental to the stability of their 
banking system.
However, AAOIFI can learn the lessons that may be derived from a similar' challenge 
that seem to facing lASC. Keegan (1999, p. 82) observes that “Many of us strongly 
support the development and use IASs. But we must remember than an international 
regulatory culture ai’oimd IASs has yet to develop. Standard setters do not-and should 
not -  work in isolation fr om the markets for which they are writing the rules of 
comrnimication”.
Another challenge that may face AAOIFI in persuading regulatory authorities to 
adopt its standards is that some countries may be reluctant to adopt AAOIFI’s 
standar ds and abandon their national standards as this may be considered by these 
countries as giving up their own sovereignty to foreign powers.
Nevertheless AAOIFI should attempt to persuade the regulatory authorities that the 
adoption of its standards will not only enhance harmonistion and comparability 
(Karim, 1999), but also will enlrance transpar ency, wlirch will allow both national 
and international agencies to play a more effective role in safeguarding the 
soundness and stability of Islamic financial institutions.
Cox (1995, p. 8) supports this claim. She argues that “The final implementation of a 
uniform set of accounting practices for Islamic banks will also be a welcome 
development and the research efforts of organisations such as AAOIFI are to be 
applauded.”
AAOIFI would greatly benefit fr om the support it receive from market players such 
as international rating agencies, as they can play an instrumental role in putting 
pressure on the regulatory authorities to adopt AAOIFI’s standards. A case in point is 
the qualification given to Fay sal Islamic Bank of Bahrain by Capital Intelligence 
(one of the rating agencies that rate Islamic banks), which states in its report that
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“Due to the large degree of uncertainty concerning the effect the transfer of off- 
balance sheet uni'estricted investment accounts to the balance sheet (in compliance 
with the introduction of [AAOIFI’s] Islamic Financial Accounting standard (IFAS) 
No. 1), would have on the bank’s liquidity and capital adequacy ratios.”
The rating agency further claims that, in its opinion “ the supplementary information 
[presented by FIBB based on AAOIFI's standards] enables one to form a more 
accurate picture of the financial health of FIBB. For example, under the new 
accounting treatment (including unrestricted investment accounts on balance 
sheet).. .profitability ratios such as retirrn on average assets become more meaningful 
(2.06% opposed to 6.4 % using IAS). Thus in analysing the composition of FIBB’s 
asset structure, we have assmned imrestricted investment to be part of the Bank’s 
balance sheet, since they have a direct effect on the bank’s liquidity and profitability 
and give a more accurate reflection of the magnitude of business operations.”
However, the fact that the regulatory authorities in both Balirain and Sudan have 
asked Islamic banks to implement AAOIFI’s standards in preparing their 1998 
financial statements, and that major market players have started to recognise 
AAOIFI’s standards, indicates that the support for AAOIFI is in the ascending. 
These developments also provide support for the hypothesis advanced in this thesis 
regar ding the regulatory gap affecting accoimting of Islamic banks.
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APPENDIX 1 
POSITIONS OF PERSONS THAT WERE INTERVIEWED FROM 
AHMED BANK, MOHAMMED BANK AND KHALIFA BANK
Ahmed Bank 
■Chief Executive Officer 
■Executive Vice President, Commercial Banking 
■Senior Vice President, Capital Market
Mohammed Bank
■ The General Manager 
■Assistant General Manager 
■Director of Accoimts
Khalifa Bank
■The General Manager 
■Director of Accounts
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APPENDIX 2 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS WITH AHMED BANK AND 
MOHAMMED BANK
1)What is the contractual relationship between shareholders, investment account 
holders and the bank?
2) What are the differences between restricted investment accounts and umestricted 
investment accounts?
3)Wliat is the contractual relationship between saving accoiuit holders, cuiTent 
account holders and the bank?
4)Does the bank invest the excess liquidity of the cuiTent account and saving 
account? If the answer is yes, which account holders receives such returns?
5) What ar e the bases for choosing the existing accoimting policies?
6) What ai e the bases for the existing balance sheet presentation of the investment 
accoimt holders?
7)Was the SSB consulted on the accounting treatment of investment account 
holders? What aie the factors you have taken into consideration for this treatment 
e.g. prudence, fairness to investment account holders?
8) To what extent are the international accounting standaids applicable for Islamic 
financing like Murabalia, Musharakah, Mudaraba etc?
9) Was the external auditor of the bank consulted in choosing the accoimting policies 
adopted by the bank and why?
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10)Was the Shari'a Supervisoiy Board consulted in choosing the existing account 
policies and why?
11)Did the bank review other accounting policies before adopting the existing 
accounting policies?
12)Wliat factors you had taken into consideration in choosing the existing accounting 
policies?
13)Are the funds of investment account holders and shareholders invested in the 
same pool or different pool?
14)Does the bank's accounting policy segregate between the funds of shareholders 
and investment account holders and why? Please explain the reasons for choosing 
the existing accounting treatments?
15)Wlio is given priority in investment over the other: shaieholders fmids or 
investment account holder funds?
16) What aie the bank's accounting policies (asset valuation, profit recognition) of the 
following assets:
-  Muiabaha financing
-  Musharakah financing
-  Mudaiabah financing
-  Real estate for investment
-  Commodity investment
17) What are the factors determining the allocation of profit between shareholders and 
investment account holders, including the percentage of profit sharing between 
shareholders and investment account holders?
18)Wliat are the bank's policies regarding expenses and revenues that are borne by 
investment account holders and those that aie exclusively borne by shareholders?
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19)Wliat steps the bank undertakes to adjust the profit sharing between investment 
account holders and the bank?
20)Does the bank contribute part of the shaieholders profits to investment account 
holders in order to be competitive in the maiket?
21)Do you think Islamic banks should disclose more information than conventional 
bank since Islamic bank do not guaiantee investment accounts in case of loss?
22)Does the bank credit a higher profit rate (= return on capital) to shareholders than 
investment account holders and why?
23)Who are entitled to receive the amount of unused provisions and why?
24)Wliat is the bank's policy on recognition, measurement and disclosures of 
provisions?
25) What is the structuie of the SSB?
26)Wliat is the role and duties of the SSB?
27)What are the reasons for appointing the SSB?
28)What are the reasons for the accounting differences among the Islamic banks?
29)What are the relationship between the SSB and the external auditors?
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APPENDIX 3 
POSITIONS OF PERSONS THAT WERE INTERVIEWED FROM 
THE EXTERNAL AUDITORS
‘ Paitner -  Price Waterhouse Coopers (Balu'ain).
' Director -  Price Waterhouse Coopers (Bahi'ain).
' Managing Paitner -  Ernst & Young (Balirain).
' Executive Manager -  Ernst & Young (Bahrain).
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APPENDIX 4 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS WITH THE EXTERNAL AUDITORS
1)Ai'e the role and duties of the external auditor of an Islamic bank different from 
those of conventional banks? why?
2) Was your firm involved in setting up the accounting policies of the bank? If yes 
how and if no why?
3) Wliat is the relationship between the investment account holders, shareholders and 
the bank?
4)Do the accounting treatments reflect the banlc’s contracts? And what steps you take 
to insure such compliance?
5)Do you think that the international accounting standards are applicable to Islamic 
banks? if yes how and if no why?
6)Investment account holders are not addressed by international accounting 
standards. Wliat are the factors that you have taken into consideration to come up 
with the existing presentation of the investment account holders? Have you taken 
into consideration factors like prudent, fairness and reliability of financial reports? 
Also did you review other accounting standaids for this puipose?
7) What ar e the factors determining the allocation of profits between shar eholders and 
investment account holders?
8) What is your relationship with the SSB?
9) What are the banlc policies for provisions and expenses? Which account holders 
bear the amounts of provisions and expenses?
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10)Does the bank segregate the investments of shareholders from those investment 
accoimt holders and why?
1 l)What are the bank's accounting policies on profit recognition and measurement of 
the following items:
Mur abaha Financing , Musharkah Financing, Mudar aba Financing, Real Estate 
Investment and Leasing.
12)What is the banlc's policy on recognition, measurement and disclosures of 
provisions?
13)Do you review the bank's compliance with the SSB rulings?
14)Do you review the accounting policies of the subsidiaries/ branches of the bank in 
order to maintain accounting consistency?
15)Do you review the SSB rulings of the banks branches and subsidiaries to ensure 
consistent with shari'a rulings?
16)Ar e you satisfied with the level of information disclosed in the banks financial 
reports compared to the presentation and disclosur e standar d of the AAOIFI?
17)What are the reasons for the accounting differences among Islamic banks?
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APPENDIX 5
POSITIONS OF PERSONS THAT WERE INTERVIEWED FROM 
THE SHARI’A SUPERVISORY BOARDS
' Two members from the SSB of Alimed Banlc 
' One member from the SSB of Mohammed Bank
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APPENDIX 6 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS WITH THE SHARI'A SUPERVISORY 
BOARDS
1) Wliat are the rules and duties of SSB?
2)To what extent has the SSB been involved in setting up the accounting polices of 
the banks?
3)What are the steps that the SSB undertakes to ensure that the management 
complies with the shari'a rulings?
4) What is the relationship between the shareholders, investment account holders and 
the banlc?
5)To what extent do the accounting treatments reflect the banlc's contracts?
6) Wliat are the factors that the bank has taken into consideration in the allocation of 
profits between shareholders and investment account holders?
7) Which accounts bear the amomits of provisions and expenses?
8) Should the profit sharing rate of mudaraba be fixed and why?
9) Can the bank commingle the investments of the funds of the shareholders and 
investment accounts holders? and why?
10)Who is entitled to receive the amounts of unused provisions?
1 l)What is the relationship between the SSB and the external auditors?
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12)Wliat aie the bases on which the SSB prepares its report on the bank's compliance 
on sharia rulings?
13) Are your' views enforceable? If yes do the terms of reference of the SSB stated 
that?
14)Does the SSB verify the accounting policies of the bank to erisiue that the bank 
has implemented its shar i'a rulings?
15)Do you think that the promulgation of accounting standar ds for Islamic banks will 
strip-away some of the duties of the SSB?
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APPENDIX 7
The following illustration highlights the differences between the straight-line and the 
reducing balance methods:
Allocation of Miirabaha Income 
Comparison of Methods 
Example
A Murabaha for US$10,000m was allowed for 4 years at 5 per cent flat profit (i.e., 
US$2,000m). Murabaha will be repaid in foiu annual equal instalments, payable at the 
end of each year.
Consider the computation according to:
■ Method 1) Allocation of profit on reducing balance (i.e. actuarial method); and
■ Method 2) Allocation of profit on time basis.
Results
■ Method 1) Return per annum is 7.71385 per cent throughout the period of 
Murabaha (This is the ratio of income to capital).
■ Method 2) Return per annum fluctuates between 5-20 per cent.
Method 1) Allocation of Profit on Reducing Balance
Year Iiistal Instalment Profit Capital Outstanding Capital Return
No. US$ uss US$ US$ Annum
%
0 10,000
1 1 3,000 771.38 2,228.62 7,771.38 7.71385%
2 2 3,000 599.47 2,400.53 5,370.85 7.71385%
3 3 3,000 414.29 2,585.71 2,785.14 7.71385%
4 4 3,000 214.86 2,785 0 7.71385%
Total 12,000 2,000 10,000
Return Per annum 7.71385%
Flat Profit 5.0000%
Per
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Method 2) Allocation of Profit on Time Basis
Year Iiistal Instalment Profit Capital Outstanding Capital Return
No. US$ US$ US$ US$ Annum
%
0 10,000
1 1 3,000 500 2,500 7,500 5.000%
2 2 3,000 500 2,500 5,000 6.6667%
3 3 3,000 500 2,500 2,500 10.0000%
4 4 3,000 500 2,500 0 20.0000%
Total 12,000 2,000 10,000
Return Per amium Variable
Flat Profit 5.0000%
Per
Note that in oui* example, with the declining balance method, total profit of US$1370.85 
is recognised by the end of the year two, as compared with a total profit of US$1000 by 
the end of year two using the straight-line method.
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